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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ELECTORAL MANIPULATIONS, ECONOMIC POLICIES AND VOTING 
BEHAVIOR IN INDIA 
 
By 
 
HARINI LETHA KANNAN 
 
December 2009 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes voting behavior and presence of political cycles in 
India. While such exercises have been carried out extensively in the context of developed 
countries and established democracies, there have been few studies on similar behavior in 
developing countries and new economies. The focus on India in this study may provide 
valuable insight into this literature in an area that has been largely ignored.  
Our findings suggest that political manipulation of taxes, grants and expenditures 
are prevalent at both the national and sub-national levels; though they are tempered by 
the nature of partisanship. However, while these manipulations may be economically 
inefficient, they are politically very strategic as incumbents seem to focus on 
xiv 
 
manipulating those items for which they can claim sole responsibility. Indian voters seem 
to be fiscal conservatives, as they penalize increases in most items of expenditures and 
generally reward reductions in taxes. Evidence of yardstick effects in taxes is also 
presented. We find that a higher degree of „clarity of responsibility‟1 also fosters stronger 
economic voting effects. Voters seem to be cognizant of the division of functional 
responsibility between the two levels of government (the center and the state) and they 
evaluate their performance independently. Also, we find results consistent with the notion 
that the central government is responsible for the overall health of the economy as voters 
seem to penalize the central incumbent for increases in inflation and reward them for 
steady growth while being indifferent to such outcome variables while voting for the state 
level incumbent. 
The policy implications of such findings are also briefly discussed. It is a matter 
of grave concern if incumbents tailored policies to provide them with the biggest political 
payoff. This may lead to differences in economic development across states and the 
incidence of expenditure and tax changes may fall unfairly on the most vulnerable people 
of the society. There are also important insights on assignment of responsibility and the 
„how‟ of political interference which would aid us in building more comprehensive 
political economy models that are closer to reflecting reality than purely economic 
models commonly used today. 
                                                          
1 Clarity of responsibility exists when the voters are aware of the level of government and/or political agent 
to whom various policies can be attributed. When voters know who to hold responsible, they vote on the 
basis of economic policies and hence we find stronger economic voting effects when there is greater clarity. 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
Summary and Introduction 
Summary 
Elected political agents are expected to fulfill the various demands of their 
constituents; however, their actions may be more in line with fostering their own welfare 
at the expense of the citizens‟. The public choice framework is used to model this 
behavior of the government and political agents. Politicians are modeled as vote 
maximizing agents who attempt to influence voters by using various tactics. While 
influencing voters by large campaign expenditures, handing out jobs to supports are 
examined,
2
 the use of economic policies to examine voter behavior is the focus of most 
extant literature.  
Interestingly, while the theoretical models emphasize the use of economic policies 
as tactical instruments to influence voter behavior, empirically this is not examined 
directly. Models of opportunistic behavior by the government,
3
 examine the presence of 
election cycles in tax collections, government expenditures and deficits i.e., whether the 
government tries to reduce (increase) taxes (expenditures) in the election year. Models of 
strategic behavior
4
 on the other hand attempt to discern the pattern of political 
redistribution i.e., who are the ultimate beneficiaries of these actions, the longtime 
supporters or swing voters. Though these do provide insight into the workings of the 
government, they do not attempt to examine whether these policies did in fact influence 
voter behavior. To do this one would need to examine whether opportunistic or strategic 
actions by politicians in the election period influenced voters to vote for them in the 
                                                          
2
 Jacobson  (1990) and Thomas (1989) 
3 Models of political business cycles, Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff(1990) 
4
 Models of tactical redistribution among voters, Cox and McCubbins (1986), Dixit and Londregan (1998)  
2 
 
 
forthcoming elections. This can be accomplished by examining the effect of election or 
pre-election year expenditure (taxes), economic outcomes such as income growth, 
unemployment and inflation on voter turnout, vote share and the probability of winning 
of the incumbent.  
In keeping with the Indian theme instituted in this exercise; an attempt to establish 
a relationship between pre-election government behavior and various outcomes of 
elections in India is undertaken. India, a fertile ground for these kinds of excursions has 
been a serious matter of inquiry for many years. While electoral cycles, strategic 
redistributions and patronage through favorable regulations have been found to exist 
here; researchers concur that there is a need to examine whether voters condition their 
vote on economic policies and outcomes.
5
  
Though voting behavior of the Indian electoral has been studied extensively; they 
have generally been based on surveys or case studies of individual voters.
6
 Most studies 
that use aggregate election data do not employ rigorous econometric methodology but 
rather use measures of correlation to eke out a relationship between voter turnout, vote 
share of parties and various socio-economic variables. Kondo (2003) uses regression 
analysis to examine relationship between these variables and concludes that literacy, 
urbanization, agricultural development and political competition positively influences 
voter turnout, however, the importance of socio-economic variables reduce over time. 
Studies that use individual survey data conclude that while gender, caste, religion, 
education and income are important in explaining political awareness and exposure to 
                                                          
5
 Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) and Dasgupta (2007), in his contribution to The Oxford Companion to 
Economic in India emphasize this lacuna.  
6
 Kondo (2007) provides a brief review of types of studies undertaken. 
3 
 
 
propaganda;  they matter less in case of party preference. Recent surveys show that rising 
prices and unemployment are major issues that affect the electorate. Meyer (1989) 
concludes that Indian voters vote retrospectively, and are sensitive to short term shifts in 
agricultural output and the economy. This holds true even when we account for formation 
of new parties (Meyer and Malcolm 1993). 
7
  
We intend to use previous research on electoral cycles and political economy of 
intergovernmental transfers as a stepping stone to examine the effects of pre-election 
behavior of political agents on voter behavior. While there is widespread 
acknowledgement of the presence of electoral cycles in taxes and expenditures prior to 
national and state elections; these studies tend to use less comprehensive and older data.
8
 
Also, though research indicating the presence of political manipulation of grants also 
exists,
9
 there has been no systematic study on the presence of cycles with respect to the 
most important element of fiscal policy in the hands of the central government–the 
intergovernmental transfer system.  
This dissertation therefore attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
political cycles in the different elements of fiscal policies available to the various 
governments and an exploration of economic voting effects in India.  
                                                          
7
 Authors hypothesize that, irrespective of economic performance; the entry of a new party may reduce 
votes of a ruling party. 
8
 Chaudary and Dasgupta (2005, 2006) , Khemani (2004) 
9
 Rao and Singh (2000), Dasgupta et al. (2007), Khemani (2004) 
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Introduction 
The incorporation of political variables in the study of a few purely economic 
relationships brings abstract models closer to reality. In the vast field of political 
economy, the study of how elections and politics interact with the economy is accorded 
tremendous importance. The main strands of this literature focus on the phenomenon of 
tactical redistribution (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Dixit and Londregan 1998), political 
business cycles (Nordhaus 1975, Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Rogoff 1990, Alesina 1987), 
and the economic voting behavior of the electorate in response to actions carried out by 
politicians (Ferejohn 1986). While theories of  tactical distribution examine which type of 
voter, core supporters or swing voters, benefit from the incumbent‟s largesse,10 political 
business cycles examine the presence of election cycles in economic outcomes such as 
inflation and unemployment,
11
 tax collections, government transfers, expenditures  and 
deficits. Economic voting on the other hand analyzes the voter response to economic 
policies of the incumbent, and outcomes of economic policies of incumbents such as 
inflation, unemployment and income growth.   
Empirical studies that attempt to find relationships between economic and policy 
outcomes and electoral fortunes of the incumbent are based on the reward-punishment or 
responsibility hypothesis. In its simplest version, voters condition their responses on 
economic policies and outcomes such as income, inflation, inequality and are assumed to 
reward incumbents who perform well and punish those who perform unsatisfactorily. 
                                                          
10
 Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), Olle and Navarro (2006), Dutta et al. (2007), Rodden and Wilkinson 
(2004) 
11
 Alesina and Roubini (1990) 
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Recent research has enriched this model by incorporating measures for clarity of 
responsibility, economic geography and yard stick effects.  
In India, a fertile ground for such excursions, these phenomena have been a 
serious matter of inquiry for many years. Political economy studies in India have focused 
on models of opportunistic and strategic behavior by the government. The former 
examine the presence of election cycles in tax collections, government expenditures and 
deficits i.e., whether the government tries to reduce (increase) taxes (expenditures) in the 
election year;
12
 while models of strategic behavior attempt to discern the pattern of 
political redistribution i.e., who are the ultimate beneficiaries of these actions, the 
longtime supporters or swing voters.
13
 Interestingly, while the theoretical models 
emphasize the use of economic policies as tactical instruments to influence voter 
behavior; there is a lack of studies on voting behavior in India which would validate these 
propositions. While electoral cycles, strategic redistributions and patronage through 
favorable regulations have been found to exist here; researchers concur that there is a 
need to examine whether voters condition their vote on economic policies.
14
  
In this section, an attempt to establish a relationship between pre-election 
government behavior and various outcomes of elections in India is undertaken. There are 
many reasons why India is an excellent country to base our exercise. Extant research in 
economic voting behavior has focused on explaining this phenomenon in western 
countries with established democracies and a developed economy. Though other 
                                                          
12
 Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2005, 2006) , Keech and Pak (1989) 
13 
Chibber (1995), Khemani (2003), Rao and Singh (1998,2000), Dutta et al. (2007), Biswas and Marjit 
(2002), Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) 
14 
Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) and Dasgupta (2007), in his contribution to The Oxford Companion to 
Economics in India emphasize this lacuna.  
6 
 
 
countries have in been included in cross-country voting studies, the inherent instability of 
vote functions across nations behooves a greater need of country specific studies; so such 
an exercise involving India, a dynamic young democracy and developing economy would 
be a valuable addition to the literature. Economic voting behavior has found to be weak 
in countries with a low clarity of vertical responsibility,
15
 i.e., when voters are unable to 
assign responsibility of the economic policies or performance to the different levels of 
government; economic factors play a less important role in decisions of voting. However, 
in India there is a clear delineation of the functional responsibility of each level of 
government in the constitution and so examining economic voting effects of elections to 
different levels of government is easier to justify.
16
 The argument for decentralization 
centers on the fact that bringing the government closer to its citizens improves its 
functioning by enhancing the relationship between citizen needs and government 
services. Proponents of greater decentralization have argued that it promotes economic 
development and growth. Countries have been encouraged to decentralize in an effort to 
promote a closer matching of needs and development. But inherent in this argument is 
that incumbents of these levels of governments would be held accountable for their 
actions, free and fair elections therefore are a necessary condition for decentralization to 
reap its potential benefits. Therefore a result indicating the presence of economic voting 
in India can be interpreted as voters holding governments accountable. Finally, having 
established previously the nature of political economy in India, examination of economic 
                                                          
15
 Powell and Whitten (1993), Anderson (2000, 2006) 
16
 We must note that such clarity of delineation is true in case of responsibilities entrusted with the center 
and the state though there is much less clarity regarding powers of local governments. Since we examine 
only the center and the state; this would not be of much concern. 
7 
 
 
voting behavior is the next logical step which would enhance the current state of 
literature in this area in India.  
This study also extends the literature on political cycles in India by examining 
inter-governmental transfers, incorporating a larger number of states and including more 
recent elections.
17
 To accomplish the task of examining economic voting behavior in 
India, this exercise proposes to analyze the following questions.  
Studies involving U.S. states have analyzed the effect of macro economic 
outcomes such an income growth, unemployment and inflation on Presidential, 
Gubernatorial and state assembly elections. Such an exercise would be an interesting 
undertaking within the Indian context. Hence the first research question is: 
Proposition 1: Are Central and State incumbents rewarded electorally for increases in 
income growth and central incumbents penalized for increases in inflation prior to 
elections?
18
  
Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) have unearthed electoral cycles in social and 
developmental spending, commodity taxes and current account expenditure, while 
Khemani (2006) has found cycles in excise tax collections and public investment 
spending in various Indian states. Ghosh (2006) finds that the property crime rate 
significantly drops prior to an election, so if this was due to changes in expenditure on 
                                                          
17
 Existing research in this area restricts its analysis to 14 major Indian states and elections until 1992. We 
include all Indian states with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir and analyze all election held until 2008. 
18
 Though newer voting and political cycle theories argue that it is only unexpected income growth that 
would affect voter behavior; empirical studies have found evidence for the simpler explanation that pre-
election income growth has positively influenced the electoral fortunes of the incumbent.   
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police we can expect voters to positively react to increases in expenditure on public 
safety. 
Proposition 2a: How do voters react in elections for state legislative assemblies to 
increases (decreases) in government spending (taxes) by state level incumbents?
19
  
Proposition 2b: Are political cycles persistent in state fiscal policies prior to state 
legislative elections? 
Khemani (2003), Dutta et al. (2007), Rao and Singh (2000), Rodden and 
Wilkinson (2004) examine the political economy of intergovernmental transfers. They 
argue that a central incumbent interested in maximizing votes across the Indian states 
would attempt to manipulate central grants to favor either their core supporters or swing 
voters. Findings from these indicate that manipulable grants are provided to co-partisans 
at the sub-national level and to states co-partisan with central coalition partners. Given 
this, we can analyze the effect of such grants on vote shares of incumbents in elections to 
the Lower House of the parliament. A caveat however is in order; since most of these 
grants are not directly „visible‟ to the individual voter, it may be hard to establish such a 
relationship.  
Proposition 3a: In elections to the Lower House of the parliament, are central 
incumbents rewarded by voters for increases in central grants to states? Given the 
previous research, economic voting effects may be greater in co-partisan states.  
                                                          
19
 While evidence from the U.S., (Levitt and Snyder 1997, Peltzman 1992) and Canada (Evans 2006) 
suggest that increases federal spending improves the vote shares of House and national legislative assembly 
incumbents; there is also evidence from US to suggest that voters penalize increases in expenditure and 
may not penalize tax increases if neighboring states have also had increases (Beasley and Case 1995).  
9 
 
 
Proposition 3b: Are political cycles persistent in grants and loans provided by the center 
prior to national elections? How does alignment of the states matter? 
Interestingly, the Indian set up also allows us to analyze a perhaps unintended 
political consequence of federalism. While empirical works on voting behavior of other 
countries focus on the effects of national and state government policies on elections to 
congruent levels of government; the fiscal dependence of Indian states on the national 
governments affords us an opportunity to examine whether the incumbent at the center 
manipulates policies to aid his supporters to win state elections. 
Proposition 4a: How do voters react in state assembly elections to grants and transfers 
provided by the center? 
Proposition 4b: Are political cycles persistent in grants and loans provided by the center 
prior to state assembly elections? 
Since grants and loans from the center in India are used to finance a majority of 
the state‟s expenditures; state fiscal policy can be affected by both central and state 
incumbents. Therefore we also attempt to establish a relationship between vote shares of 
central and state incumbents and state fiscal policy instruments in national elections. 
Proposition 5a: Do voters reward or penalize state (central) incumbents for changes in 
government expenditure and taxation at the time of national elections? 
While these propositions are reasonably simple, complexities can be easily 
incorporated. In case of the first proposition, one can include variables to measure a 
state‟s growth relative to national growth so it would mean that voters only respond to 
10 
 
 
growth in state incomes that diverges from trends in national growth. Similarly, economic 
policy variables for other states can be included in the tests for the second proposition to 
account for yardstick competition. Research indicates that the reward and punishment 
effects in the U.S. are tinged by partisan flavor; Republican incumbents are more 
severely punished for tax increases than their Democratic counterparts while the 
magnitude of punishment is larger for Democratic incumbents who cut spending that 
when Republicans do the same. However, these effects may not be found in the Indian 
scenario given the fact that Indian political parties are generally populist in nature and 
seem to have no such distinct differences in ideology.
20
 Interestingly, it has been argued 
that when there is low clarity of horizontal responsibility, i.e., in the case of divided or 
coalition governments, economic voting effects are muted. India has enjoyed a wide 
variety of government types, from single party government to coalitions, so variables to 
indicate divided governments can be incorporated to test the importance of clarity of 
horizontal responsibility in India.  
This exercise fills the gap in the political economy literature of India with an 
examination of voter behavior and a more extensive analysis of political cycles. Since 
economic voting studies have not been extensively examined in new democracies and 
developing economies, this exercise would enrich this literature by examining India, 
which is neither.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized in the following manner; chapter II 
provides a review of literature on the different aspects of tactical redistribution, economic 
                                                          
20
 Chibber (1995) argues this point and concludes that in India, political parties fight over obtaining access 
to state resources to dispense patronage and are not affected by different ideologies. 
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voting, political cycles and political economy in India; chapter III details the political and 
institutional set up in India while a simple theoretical model of economic voting is 
described in chapter IV. Chapter V provides information on data and methodology used 
while chapter VI contains the empirical results and analysis. Chapter VII enumerates 
policy implications and concludes.    
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CHAPTER II 
Review of Literature 
This section contains a detailed and critical review of the literature from which we 
base on analysis. Theoretical background of political cycles, tactical distribution and 
economic voting theories are reviewed with accompanying analysis of empirical papers 
which test these theories.  
Theories of Tactical Redistribution 
The two commonly used frameworks for analyzing this behavior have been the 
Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Dixit and Londregan (1998) models. While both these 
theories postulate that the incumbent attempts to redistribute state resources to maximize 
votes; the manner in which this is carried out differs across these two theories.  
Cox and McCubbins (1986) view the electoral politics as a redistributive game in 
which candidates‟ strategies are proposed redistributions of welfare among the various 
groups in their constituencies. By modeling this as a redistributive game, the authors 
attempt to analyze the stability of electoral coalitions by examining which groups expect 
to gain from the candidates‟ decisions. This implies that candidates, by manipulating the 
incidence of taxation and allocating government expenditure, can achieve any 
redistribution of welfare.   
These authors model candidates as rational and self interested with the objective 
of winning the election; and voters vote on the basis of utility received due to promised 
redistribution. While candidates can promise redistribution to the various voter groups 
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they cannot deprive any group of an exceedingly large amount; and the total amount of 
redistribution is constrained. The candidates promise benefits to groups from whom they 
obtain the largest electoral returns, i.e., votes. The candidate‟s optimal welfare 
redistribution will involve „high return‟ groups obtaining large benefits while „low return‟ 
groups bear costs or obtain nothing. Also, a high responsive group need not necessarily 
get more than a low response group, but if a low response group benefits then so will the 
high response group. To clarify the question of electoral stability, the groups are 
classified as support groups, opposition groups and the swing voters depending on their 
proclivity of voting for the candidate. The candidate‟s strategies are termed as stabilizing 
if more benefits are directed to the support groups which aids in maintaining the existing 
coalition. To answer the question whether this pattern of redistribution will arise out of a 
prior conclusion about candidate behavior, we need to state the results in absolute levels 
(as the proposition was that if a low response group benefits, so will a high responsive 
group). Therefore if groups can be strongly ordered in terms of their responses, then a 
pattern of redistribution would emerge wherein groups with the highest rates of 
responsiveness would obtain larger benefits than others.  
The authors argue that opposition groups can be considered to be less responsive 
and support groups are more responsive. While the responsiveness of swing groups is 
ambiguous, any investment in them can be considered more risky than investment in 
support groups. Therefore a risk averse candidate would invest nothing or very little in 
opposition groups, more in swing groups and the most in support groups; implying 
preservation of the existing coalition. These propositions are supported by evidence from 
research on urban service delivery.  
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Dixit and Londregan (1998) consider the interaction between redistributive politics at 
central and local levels in a federal system and characterize the factors influencing 
success in redistributive politics. Redistribution has an ideological (egalitarian) 
dimension as well as a tactical (electoral politics) dimension. Redistribution is used to 
earn the support of groups of voters who are rather indifferent between party ideologies. 
The authors construct a model in which two parties L and R, compete for the votes of 
several groups. Each voter cares only about two things, his private consumption and an 
ideological issue (X). The ideological issue can be represented along one dimension; the 
politicians do not posses the knowledge about the voters‟ preferences but do know their 
distribution )( X
g
  along X. The parties L, R have locations 
RL
XX ,  in the ideological 
spectrum. There is a critical level 
g
X termed „cutpoint‟ for each group such that all its 
members with X < 
g
X  will vote for party L and those with X > 
g
X  will vote for party R.  
The expected number of people who vote for party; )( XNL
gg
  and ))(1( XNR
gg

Parties attempt to influence the cutpoints
 
by redistribution policies and thereby the 
votes they receive.  
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) investigate whether there are any tactical motives 
behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level (municipal) governments in 
Sweden. They find that temporary grants to support ecological sustainable development 
provided by the central government a few months prior to elections are susceptible to 
strategic distribution by the central incumbent. Though they find evidence in favor of the 
Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are 
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many swing voters; they do not find that incumbent governments transfer money to its 
own supporters. Authors conclude that they cannot surmise from this study whether 
tactical distribution leads to a less efficient distribution of grants than if the incumbent 
did not exhibit any vote purchasing behavior. 
Olle and Navarro (2006) employ a rich dataset from Spain with information on 
nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 to test the hypothesis that 
municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor government will receive more grants than 
those that are not aligned. Grantor governments include Central, Regional and Upper-
local governments. The authors use a simple model of electoral choice and test two 
hypotheses; aligned municipalities obtain higher grants than unaligned municipalities and 
an aligned grantor provides higher grants to a municipality than an unaligned one. 
Though municipalities have access to own source revenues and the grant system is 
formulated to prevent its use for pork-barrel politics; the funding of capital spending 
relies heavily on grants that are decided upon by the grantor exclusively, rendering them 
rather discretionary. The authors find that upper level governments do provide larger 
grants to municipalities that are aligned (almost 40 percent more than grants provided to 
aligned municipalities) and this is true even if a party is a coalition leader at both levels. 
Veiga and Pinho (2007) use an unexplored dataset on Portugal to examine how 
political variables influence the grant system with emphasis on how the patterns have 
changed over time as the democracy has matured. The data set consists of information on 
grants from the central government to municipalities in Portugal over the years 1979 to 
2002. The authors test the hypothesis that a risk averse politician would favor his 
supporters (Cox and McCubbins 1986) against a hypothesis that politicians would expend 
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their resources where they can be assured of maximum gain, i.e., on swing voters (Dixit 
and Londregan 1998). They also test the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) model of rational 
opportunistic political budgetary cycles. They authors use a dynamic Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) methodology and find that transfers to municipalities do increase 
prior to a national and municipal election however there is no difference in the magnitude 
of grants provided to aligned and unaligned states. They also find evidence supporting the 
Dixit and Londregan hypothesis that the central incumbent will provide larger grants to 
„swing‟ municipalities. Interestingly, the authors find that strategic manipulation of grants 
was more pronounced in the early years of democracy with higher grants provided to 
aligned and swing municipalities. For the subset of non-formula grants, the authors 
conclude that the grants are influenced by the timing of the election but are not employed 
strategically. Therefore while opportunistic behavior of incumbents increased over time 
(larger grants before election in later years of democracy), strategic behavior decreased 
(no evidence for aligned or swing hypothesis).  
Though we have examined only a minuscule number of studies relating to tactical 
distributions; they are representative of the current state of literature. While evidence in 
favor of both models exists, they are largely influenced by subject country and time 
period under study. Though we do not attempt to test the exact propositions from these 
models; we use the insights gleaned from them to provide a nuance to the basic electoral 
cycle models. A caveat is required, though authors have used the notion of „alignment‟ 
and „swing‟ interchangeably, these are different phenomena. While alignment refers to a 
co-partisan at power at two levels of government, a swing region is defined in terms of 
„usual‟ support from its residents for a party. Therefore a region could be both aligned 
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and swing. Since we are unable to measure the nature of „swing‟ effectively, we use the 
notion of aligned versus unaligned in our analysis and acknowledge that the conclusions 
we make about the effect of alignment may be picking up effects due to „swing‟ also. 
While previous works relating to the transfer system in India have concluded in favor of 
either model, we hope to extend our analysis to analyze other instruments of fiscal policy 
such as expenditures. 
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Political Cycle Theories 
Studies relating elections and voting behavior to economic policies can be widely 
classified into two strands of literature. Political cycles examine the presence of cycles in 
policy instruments such as taxes, transfers and expenditures prior to an election, while 
studies on voting behavior examine the effect of policies on the voting behavior of the 
electorate. While there is an abundance of research in India for the former, a lack of 
research of the latter renders this exercise an interesting one. The following sections 
contain a review of literature for these classes of studies. 
Nordhaus (1975) was one of the early pioneers of the class of political business 
cycles brought about by manipulations in monetary policy. These however were 
dismissed as naïve with the advent of the rational expectations revolution. Early political 
business cycle theories suggested that politician would indulge in inflationary practices 
prior to an election so that they can enjoy a Phillips curve trade off which is favorable in 
the short run. With the rational expectations revolution however, these models lost 
credibility as no trade off can exist even in the short run, if economic agents are fully 
rational in understanding the incentives faced by an incumbent government. 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) incorporate rational expectations 
theory and outlined models of political cycles in monetary and fiscal policies. Incumbents 
in these models use policies that appear opportunistic as signaling devices to transmit 
valuable information to voters in the presence of information asymmetries. 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) argue that, electoral cycles in macroeconomic variables 
arise due to the presence of asymmetric information. The information asymmetry exists 
as the incumbents are aware of their level of competency while the voters can only 
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observe it with a lag. Competency is defined as requiring lower amounts of tax revenue to 
provide a basket of public goods.  Though initially unobserved by the voters, the authors 
show that the equilibrium exists where in the incumbent‟s competency is fully reveled by 
the taxes set. They conclude that while short-run cycles in monetary and fiscal policies 
can exist; the level of economic activity may not be necessarily affected.  
Rogoff (1990) argues that the untenable assumptions of the adaptive expectations 
based political cycles diminish their usefulness and searching for political cycles in taxes, 
transfers and government expenditure may prove more fruitful. With rational voters and 
information asymmetry, he concludes that an incumbent may substitute visible public 
consumption expenditure for investment expenditure thus signaling his competency.  
Drazen (2000) argues that it is difficult to reconcile the presence of political 
cycles due to manipulations in monetary policy especially in countries with independent 
central banks. However, since empirical results do indicate increases in money supply 
prior to election, he opines that it may be the result of an accommodating monetary 
policy followed by the central banks in response to spending increases by the incumbent 
signaling his competency.  
The models reviewed above focus on the manipulation of monetary and fiscal 
policy by incumbent officials irrespective of ideology. Alesina (1987) argues that the 
ideology of the incumbent political party affects the nature of cycles and constructs a 
partisan electoral cycle consistent with rational expectations.  With two parties at the 
opposite ends of the political spectrum having different optimal values for inflation and 
unemployment one may not expect any cycles. However, with uncertainty surrounding 
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the eventual winner; there may be positive or negative inflation surprises in the first half 
of the term, depending on which party, left-wing or right-wing wins the election. 
Empirical evidence for the above is mixed, with evidence of the presence of 
cycles depending on the nature of economy, country and type of political system. Van 
Dalen and Swank (1996) examine whether ideology or opportunistic motives explain 
government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The author argues that electoral 
cycles may not manifest themselves in aggregate expenditures and there is a need to 
examine the composition of expenditures. They examine the presence of electoral cycles 
in defense, infrastructure, education, health care, social security and public 
administration. Electoral cycles are detected in all items except expenditures on health 
care. Ideology does affect the types of expenditures though with a lag. While higher 
transfer payments are provided by left-wing governments; higher expenditures on defense 
and infrastructure are found under right-wing governments. The authors conclude that 
expenditure growth can be explained by both opportunism and ideology. 
Alesina and Roubini (1992) examine the behavior of GDP growth, inflation and 
unemployment prior to elections using data from 18 OECD countries. While they reject 
Nordhaus‟s (1975) naïve model, they do find evidence of higher inflation after elections. 
The authors reason that this is due to expansionary spending prior to the election which 
validates Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988). They also find evidence of 
partisan cycles but none for permanent differences in employment and output. 
Keech and Pak (1989) use data from the Veteran transfer programs in the U.S. to 
examine whether political cycle exists in government programs. Interestingly while a 
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cycle seems to have existed for the period 1961-78 prior to the transfers being indexed; 
the cycle disappears in the period 1979-1986 with indexation.  
Reid (1998) argues that in parliamentary democracy the incumbent government 
can not only manipulate economic policies before elections but can schedule elections 
when the economy is prospering. The occurrence of these phenomenon is examined using 
Canadian provincial government election from 1962-92. Results indicate no evidence of 
incumbents manipulating the timing of elections. The fiscal variables included to 
examine the electoral cycle hypothesis are transfers to people, transfers to business, 
expenditure on goods and services and change in non-borrowed revenue. Results indicate 
that electoral cycles exist, with expenditures on all items except purchases of goods 
increasing, and revenues falling significantly prior to elections. 
Schuknecht (1996) argues that empirical evidence on the presence or absence of 
political cycles is examined for developed countries while evidence of these from 
developing countries is scanty. This is especially surprising since the lack of good checks 
and balances in developing countries may in fact lend the system to such manipulations. 
This paper focuses on political cycles in developing countries. Results indicate that 
though countries do not experience higher output growths, fiscal deficits (expansionary 
spending) are lower (higher) prior to elections, however cycles are stronger in less open 
countries.  
The general conclusion that incumbents do influence instruments of economic 
policy prior to elections remains, even with the increasing sophistication of political cycle 
models. This exercise attempts to extend the literature on political cycles to developing 
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countries and newer democracies, by examining its presence in India. While empirically, 
most of these studies measure broad aggregates in policy, we argue that it is important to 
examine individual items of taxation, expenditure or transfers. Electoral manipulations 
are costly and economically inefficient, so rational incumbents are more likely to 
influence a particular item in their taxes, expenditures or transfers rather than attempt a 
general increase or decrease.  Though studies on political cycles in India exist, they are 
not comprehensive and tend to use aggregate measures. Our examination of 
disaggregated measures of taxes and expenditure, incorporation of insights from the 
tactical distribution literature and analysis of the grant system which constitutes the 
central government‟s most important instrument of fiscal policy would therefore provide 
valuable additions to the current literature.
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Studies on Economic Voting Behavior  
This section contains a brief review of research on the determinants of voting 
behavior. While influencing voters by large campaign expenditures and handing out jobs 
to supporters is prevalent, the use of economic policies such as the ones described below 
is the focus of most extant literature. These studies can widely be classified as those 
examining voter behavior/reactions to economic policies, especially fiscal policies such 
as taxation and expenditure, and those which examine voter reactions to economic 
outcomes such as inflation, unemployment and economic growth.  
Some stylized facts from economic voting studies are, while economic voting 
with respect to economic outcomes such as income growth and inflation is found to exist 
within a country at national level elections, early cross country examinations and sub-
national studies have not found such behavior. However, once variables measuring clarity 
of responsibility and accountability are included, evidence of economic voting behavior 
is found in those studies too. Economic voting effects tend to be stronger for macro level 
variables such as national income growth, unemployment and inflation rather than 
individual income growth or experience with unemployment, i.e., sociotropic voting 
effects are more prevalent than egotropic or pocketbook voting. Voting is also 
retrospective with voters basing their decisions on past performance of the incumbent 
rather than basing their votes on future promises. 
Ferejohn (1986) constructs a model in which voters have an incentive to base 
their votes on incumbent behavior and incumbents choose their strategies based on this 
knowledge. This is essentially a model of retrospective voting with voters basing their 
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decision on incumbent‟s actual performance rather than hypothetical campaign promises. 
Voters are assumed to maximize their welfare given that elected officials would pursue 
their self interest while in office. The author concludes that voters not only need to vote 
retrospectively, to control politicians but also vote sociotropically.  
Several other papers examine the effect of economic outcomes on voting 
behavior. Chappell (1990) argues that since most studies on the effect of economic 
conditions on U.S. presidential and House elections use only post-war data; it is difficult 
to draw inferences due to the small data set. He also argues that the use of opinion poll 
data to overcome this lacuna is not effective and proposes to use both in a seemingly 
unrelated regression model to explain the relationship between economic performances 
and voting. Estimates indicate that though there are some differences in voting and poll 
responses; inflation adversely affects vote share and approval while GNP growth affects 
them positively.  
Erikson (1989) analyzes the effect of economic growth on presidential vote and 
finds that even after controlling for qualitative variables such as the electorate‟s „likes‟ 
and „dislikes‟ of incumbents, economic growth has a robust positive effect on the 
incumbent‟s vote share. Interestingly, the Erikson (1990) paper corrects for perceived 
measurement errors in previous work and concludes that economic conditions do not 
influence Congressional voting.  
Brender and Drazen (2008) test the hypothesis that good economic conditions and 
an expansionary fiscal policy would obtain favorable results for incumbents in elections 
using data from 74 counties over the period 1960-2003. To overcome shortcoming of 
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previous research special attention is paid to factors such as new democracies, level of 
economic development, strength of democracy and different electoral systems. Results 
indicate that contrary to expectations, the probability of reelection of the incumbent 
increases with tighter fiscal policy over the incumbent‟s term in both developed and 
developing countries. However though voters in developing countries penalize election 
year deficits, voters in developing countries do not seem to base their vote on it. Higher 
economic growth on the other hand is rewarded by voters only in less developed 
countries. 
Chappel and Veiga (2000) use data from 13 European countries to analyze the 
effects on macroeconomic variables on election outcomes. Different estimation methods 
are carried out. In case of a simple vote function estimation in which an incumbent‟s (a 
single party‟s vote or a coalition‟s total votes) vote share depends on inflation, 
unemployment and income growth; the author find that higher inflation adversely affects 
the incumbent. This result is corroborated with results from estimations which allow the 
voters to compare economic outcomes to those of other countries. Unemployment, 
income or consumption growth does not seem to have any relationship with votes in the 
preceding estimations. Since coalition governments are common in many parliamentary 
democracies, the authors argue that it is difficult to attribute responsibility of economic 
outcomes to just one party; and such responsibility is differently attributed for major and 
minor parties in a coalition. To incorporate this aspect; the authors estimate the vote 
function for each coalition party independently and obtain similar evidence as before.  
Svoboda (1995) attempts to explain the lack of evidence that state level economic 
conditions do not affect the governor‟s reelection prospects by examining individual level 
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exit pool data from 1982 and 1986 gubernatorial elections. The author concludes that 
while presidential performance does affect co-partisan incumbents in gubernatorial races; 
voters do assign responsibility of the state‟s economy to the governor and therefore 
affecting his or her reelection prospects. 
Anderson and Ishii (1997) establish the need for inquiry into economic voting 
effects in Japan since research thus far has been concentrated on Western democracies. 
The effect of macroeconomic performance, economic openness (since the incumbent‟s 
traditional supporters have been adversely affected due to the government‟s trade policy), 
electoral mobilization and political factors on voting is examined. Results indicate that 
the incumbent‟s vote share is not affected by economic factors such as high 
unemployment, inflation or low economic growth; but increasing openness of the 
economy has a significant negative effect. 
Wilkin et al. (1997) argue that since there is a wide variety of political context in 
countries, it may be difficult for voters to use all the information in voting. Hence the 
authors contend that voters only evaluate the majority party in the government while 
voting. Using data from 38 countries the authors find that economic growth in the period 
prior to the election positively affects the major incumbent party; it has no effect on the 
vote shares of other members of the governing coalition. The authors conclude that in a 
multiparty system, economic voting centers around reward and punishment of the major 
party in power. 
More recent research has incorporated measures for accountability and 
responsibility as better clarity of responsibility, i.e., the knowledge regarding the identity 
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of agents responsible for different economic policies and outcomes would strengthen 
economic voting effects. 
Stein (1990) argues that the assignment of functional responsibility to different 
levels of government is vital for voters to base their voting decisions. The responsibility 
of the national and regional economy seems to rest with the federal government and so 
voters reward and punish them more so than their regional counterparts. The authors use 
U.S. exit poll data to test the hypotheses that economic conditions do not play an 
important role in gubernatorial voting, economic conditional play a role in gubernatorial 
elections only in races wherein the incumbent is a co-partisan of the president and finally 
that economic conditions play an important role in gubernatorial elections where any one 
of the participant is a co-partisan of the president. The results indicate that voters assign 
the responsibility of their personal welfare and the economy to the federal government 
and therefore do not base their votes in the gubernatorial races on the economy. However 
voting in senatorial races were a clear referenda on the federal government‟s economic 
policies.  
Economic voting is most prevalent in cases where the functional responsibility of 
the government is clearly delineated. While in divided governments it may be difficult to 
apportion responsibility (horizontal clarity); such delineation is especially important in 
the case of a multi-layer structure of government with functional responsibilities assigned 
to different levels (vertical clarity). Hence Anderson (2006) argues that when the 
constituents find it difficult to attribute responsibility, evidence of economic voting 
would be weak. He tests the hypothesis that economic voting is weak in countries with 
divided and multi-layer governments using individual level data. Results indicate that 
28 
 
 
national incumbents are rewarded for good economic performance while lack of 
horizontal clarity does weaken economic voting. Increasing vertical clarity improves 
economic voting; and is robust to different specifications of vertical clarity. The author 
concludes that economic voting is strongest in presence of high vertical and horizontal 
clarity. 
Though country specific studies have found abundant evidence that electoral 
outcomes have been influenced by inflation, unemployment and income growth; 
evidence from cross-country studies examining the same phenomenon have not been 
encouraging. Powell and Whitten (1993) argue that this may be due to differences in the 
ideology of incumbents, electoral support, the clarity of responsibility in the country and 
that voters may be judging the economic performance more on a relative basis than an 
absolute one; so including measures for these may lead to a different conclusion in cross-
country studies. To test his hypothesis the author uses national election data from 19 
industrialized countries. Results indicate that in countries lacking clarity of responsibility, 
relative economic growth, inflation and unemployment have no effect on incumbent 
votes. However in countries where the clarity of responsibility is high, relative economic 
growth is beneficial to all governments, voters penalize left-wing governments for 
relative increases in unemployment while penalizing right-wing governments for relative 
increases in inflation. The authors therefore conclude that inclusion of the above 
variables has led to conclusions similar to those of country specific studies.  
Whitten and Palmer (1999) extend Powell and Whitten (1993) analysis by 
including larger number of observations, a theoretically sound method of distinguishing 
between different levels of clarity of responsibility and accounting for the electoral effect 
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of economic growth differentiated by composition of government (when a large coalition 
of parties with different ideology form a government, they may follow consensual 
policies to influence economic growth more than other macro variables such as inflation 
or unemployment. Hence, voters tend to use economic growth as an important 
determinant of their vote when confronted with coalition governments). Results indicate 
that clarity of responsibility enhances economic voting, retribution of voters for economic 
outcomes is tempered by ideology of incumbent and voters tend to give more importance 
to economic growth when it is a multiparty government than when it is a single party 
government. 
Nadeau et al. (2002) build on previous research by Powell and Whitten (1993) on 
the importance of clarity of responsibility in economic voting and argue that the clarity 
measures not only vary across space but also over time in specific countries. Using 
individual level data from eight European countries, they construct long, medium and 
short term measures of clarity to extend analysis in this area. The new variables include 
the percent of seats won by ruling party in legislature, ideological cohesion within the 
ruling coalition, term of government and number of parties in the legislative assembly. 
When countries are not classified into low and high clarity countries; the effect of 
economic condition on incumbent vote is significant but small; however with the 
clustering of data on the basis of clarity, results indicate that economic voting is 
significant in countries with high clarity of responsibility. Similar results are obtained 
when the clarity index is included as a variable in the analysis to exploit its variability 
over time with a country. 
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Anderson (2000) argues that economic voting effects are enhanced when the there 
are measures of accountability. Using survey data from 13 European countries, the author 
includes measures of political context, which when interacted with economic variables 
are found to strengthen economic voting. The measure of political context include clarity 
of responsibility, party target size (voters find it difficult to assign blame or credit when 
there is a fractionalized coalition government, so a large party size would enhance 
accountability, also this measure tends to vary over time within a country due to elections 
unlike the more constant institutional measure of clarity of responsibility) and clarity of 
available alternatives (in countries with large number of political parties the voters may 
have trouble finding a good alternative for the current incumbent). Results indicate that 
greater clarity of responsibility and larger target party size enhanced economic effects. 
Also when there are fewer alternatives available for the voter to express his discontent; 
economic effects are stronger. 
Ebeid and Rodden (2006) argue that a relationship between economic outcomes 
and an incumbent‟s reelection prospects only if public policy affects the economy and 
where responsibility can be easily attributed. Therefore, the author concludes that when 
there are other factors such as weather, natural resources and the like which affect 
economic performance, the voters do not hold the incumbent solely responsible for the 
economy and his or her reelection chances is only tenuously related to the state of the 
economy. This implies that economic voting would be more pronounced in more 
diversified economies versus agricultural or extractive ones. This hypothesis is tested 
using gubernatorial election data from the U.S. In estimations which do not account for 
the economic geography of the state; incumbent vote is unaffected by the state economy 
31 
 
 
or relative state economy (a variable that measure the state‟s economy relative to the 
national economy). However, once economic geography is accounted for, relative state 
economy plays an important role in incumbent vote share. The author concludes that as a 
state economy diversifies from agriculture and resource based one, its responsibility is 
increasingly attributed to the governor and therefore affects the incumbent vote.  
While the previously reviewed papers generally use aggregated economic 
outcome or policies measures, many others focus on how an individual‟s experience has 
influenced his or her vote. While voting based on macro aggregates has been termed 
Sociotropic voting, behavior based on own experiences are termed pocketbook or 
egotropic. The following papers examine the strength of both phenomena. 
Jordhal (2006) attempts to establish the relationship between macro and 
microeconomic outcomes and an individual‟s vote.  It is argued that a self interested 
individual may vote on the bases of microeconomic outcome, i.e., outcomes that affect 
him personally while a more „public‟ interested individual‟s vote may be conditioned by 
macroeconomic factors. However since a growing economy may be beneficial to all; 
voting on the basis on macroeconomic conditions does not rule out voting on the basis of 
self interest. Using voter survey data from Sweden the author defines macroeconomic 
variables as changes in unemployment and inflation while microeconomic variables 
subjective evaluation on an individual state of welfare. In cross section estimations the 
author finds that both micro and macro economic factors influence voters though 
macroeconomic variables are a more important than microeconomic ones. Personal 
experience with unemployment has the strongest effect; voters who have faced 
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unemployment tend to favor left-wing governments. Panel data estimation confirms these 
results with a stronger effect of macroeconomic variables on voting behavior. 
So far we have enumerated the effect of economic outcomes such as income 
growth, unemployment and inflation on voting. Though it would be ideal to examine the 
effects of other outcomes such as education attainment, infrastructural improvement and 
health related ones, data for these are difficult to obtain. Hence public expenditures on 
various items are used as proxies and voting decisions are assumed to be based on them. 
Similarly, while the voters may be affected by the outcomes of lower taxation such as 
more efficient utilization of resources; this is hard to measure so; the revenues generated 
from them are used as proxies. The following papers attempt to establish a link between 
economic policies and voting behavior. 
Cuzan and Heggen (1984) build a model in which increases and accelerations in 
ratio of federal expenditure to GDP adversely affects the electoral prospects of the 
incumbent president. They argue that expenditure and support are inversely related and 
rising expenditures increase the opportunity costs of budget outlays and hence erodes 
support. Using data from 26 presidential elections in the U.S. from 1880-1980 they find 
evidence to support their hypothesis. 
Levitt and Snyder (1997) analyze the effect of federal spending by representatives 
in their districts on House elections. The reasons for the lack of evidence of a 
relationship, the authors argue is because the effort extended by politically vulnerable 
representatives is not measured. An omitted variable bias therefore exists which lead to 
downward biases while measuring the impact of expenditures. Using data on district level 
spending for the period 1983-90 and state level spending for the period 1962-90, the 
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authors attempt to establish a relationship between federal spending and electoral 
outcomes at lower levels. They argue that per capita spending in rest of the districts is a 
good instrument as state economic conditions may affect funds going to a state, spending 
in a district is correlated with this, however as long as state  level economic shocks are 
unrelated to electoral results in a district, state spending is a valid instrument. Results 
from estimations using state level expenditure data indicate an increase in vote share of 
the incumbent by 0.9 percent for every $100 increase in per capita discretionary spending 
while results from instrumental variables regression using district level data indicate a 2 
percent increase for a $100 per capita increase.  
Evans (2006) uses the methodology popularized by Levitt and Snyder (1997) to 
estimate the effects of discretionary spending by the federal government on parliamentary 
elections in Canada. District level and provincial data are used. Results from instrumental 
variables estimation using district level data indicate increases in the majority share of 
votes by 2. 5 percent for every $100 increase in per capita spending while results from 
provincial data indicate a .68 percent increase.  However when instruments were 
reformulated the magnitude of the district spending level dropped to 1.5 percent. 
Peltzman (1992) examines voter‟s response in presidential, Senate and 
gubernatorial elections due to growth in federal and state funding in the U.S. from 1950 
to 1988. The focus is on the changes in vote shares of the incumbent due to changes in 
the federal budgets. The main explanatory variable is the change in the federal spending 
and since macroeconomic changes may also affect their vote share, real income and 
inflation are included through a „Happiness Index‟. Results indicate that the vote share of 
incumbent decreases as spending increases, however voters are most responsive to 
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changes about 2 years prior to a Presidential election. Interestingly, voters do not treat 
changes in expenditure in defenses, subsidies or transfers differently. Expenditure growth 
at the state level also reduces the vote share of the incumbent governor and in contrast to 
the indifference between expenditures at the federal level; voters penalize governors for 
increases in welfare spending.   
Kone and Winters (1993) use data from 407 gubernatorial elections to test the 
hypothesis whether changes in personal income and general sales tax policies have 
affected incumbent governors or incumbent party nominees in U.S. states. The authors 
argue that changes in income tax is expected to have more of an effect as compared to 
changes in sales tax; as this affects higher income, more educated and informed voters. 
They also hypothesize an asymmetry in voting; voters may reward lowering of taxes at a 
lesser magnitude than their punishment of higher taxes and since newer tax policies are 
more visible than changes in older ones; these would influence vote choices more. 
Contrary to expectations, results indicate that new increases in sales tax have a larger 
adverse effect than new increases in income tax. Similar results are obtained when new 
tax policy and new increases in taxes are combined to form an independent variable. 
Voters also penalize tax increases more than they reward tax decreases.  
Sobel (1998) estimates the political costs of increasing taxes and reducing 
expenditures for members of U.S. state legislatures. The author argues that in case of 
recessionary crises, states may have to decide between two unpopular choices of 
increasing taxes or cutting expenditure. Knowledge about the political costs involved in 
either of these measures can help predict which of these would be finally chosen.  Results 
indicate that discretionary tax (expenditure) increases (decreases) are politically costly. 
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Increases in taxes equal to one percent of state budget decreases the probability of 
reelection of the state legislator by .86 to 1.79 while similar decreases in expenditures 
decreases probability of reelection by 0.71 to 0.75. Statistical tests indicate that the costs 
of taxes and expenditure are equivalent. Political costs of tax increase were higher for a 
Republican controlled legislature than reduction in expenditures while their magnitudes 
were similar for a Democratically controlled legislature. Costs of Republican tax 
increases are larger than that of Democratic tax increases. Interestingly the author also 
finds than by being ideologically conservative, the Republicans lower their cost of tax 
increases while being ideologically liberal the Democrats lower the costs of reductions in 
expenditures.   
Research on the political costs of taxes and expenditures tends to use aggregated 
measures. Landon and Ryan (1997) however argue that the voters may misperceive these 
and so it is important to estimate the costs of different taxes and expenditures 
independently. The political costs of various tax and expenditures and voter preference 
regarding different fiscal variables are examined using Canadian provincial data. Political 
costs are measured as reductions to an incumbent‟s probability of reelection and 
incumbent share of votes.  Results indicate that increased expenditure on goods and 
services would increase incumbent vote percentage while increases in sales taxes, 
transfers to persons and debt reduce their share. Interestingly when all taxes and 
expenditure items are aggregated they seem to have no impact on vote shares. Higher 
sales tax, direct taxes on individuals and gasoline taxes reduce the probability of 
reelection of an incumbent while government expenditure increases it. As in case of 
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estimation using vote shares, aggregated measures of taxes and expenditure do not seem 
to affect probability of reelection.  
Besley and Case (1995) develop a political-economy model of tax-setting in a 
multi jurisdictional world with incumbent behavior and voter‟s choices determined 
simultaneously. Though the political costs of raising taxes are considered to be large; the 
authors posit that voter behavior is ambiguous. If the voters do not believe that a tax 
increase is required, even a small increase can be political suicide, but if they see tax 
increases all around, voters may infer that such an increase is necessary. To incorporate 
this, the authors develop a model wherein the voters vote for incumbents based on their 
performance while in office in comparison to other jurisdictions. The model is one of 
asymmetric information with the politicians having more information on the cost of 
provision of goods than the voters. There are two types of politicians; „good‟ ones who 
do not seek rents and the „bad‟ ones, who finance their whims with higher taxes. As the 
voters evaluate an incumbent‟s performance comparing it to their counterparts in other 
jurisdictions; reelection will depend not only upon the incumbent‟s own policy but also 
on those of its neighboring jurisdictions. A theoretical prediction is that if a state has 
higher tax increases relative to its neighbors, the voters interpret this as evidence that 
their official is „bad‟ and do not reelect him. Also, since tax-setting is influenced by 
electoral competition, there is the incentive for incumbents to trim their taxes to 
comparable levels of other jurisdictions (yardstick competition).  
The authors use data on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. from 1960-1988 , tax 
data from the TAXSIM program and the Statistical Abstract of the United States to test 
their predictions that governor‟s defeat is positively related with tax increases and 
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negatively related to tax increases in neighboring states while tax changes in neighboring 
states would be correlated. The authors find that the probability of an incumbent‟s defeat 
is increased by an increase in state taxes; this effect is offset if neighboring states also 
increase taxes simultaneously.  
Olle (2003) critiques the yardstick competition framework as it does not 
incorporate the process of local electoral accountability. Incumbents may not be 
particularly worried about the political costs of tax increases due to term limits or high 
probability of reelection, therefore taxes may be higher in jurisdictions where the 
incumbent has high expected margins of victory and will tend to mimic less. Proportional 
electoral rules, characteristic of European countries may lead to divided governments and 
since there is lower clarity of responsibility, there is an incentive for these governments 
to tax more and mimic less. Voters also seem to condition their vote on party ideology, 
for example tax increases from left leaning parties are punished less severely than tax 
increases from right wing parties; so leftist parties may have higher taxes and mimic less 
of the tax-cutting policies of neighbors. The author tests the hypothesis for three local 
government taxes, property, business and motor vehicles using tax and election data from 
Spain. Authors find evidence of mimicking behavior in case of property and vehicle 
taxes.  Results indicate that tax rates seem to be higher and less intense mimicking is 
observed in municipalities where the elected official has wider winning margins, where 
the government is left leaning and during non-election years. However tax rates are not 
found to be higher in case of coalition governments and they also do not mimic less. 
Brender (2003) examines the circumstances under which voters reward fiscal 
responsibility using data on mayoral elections from Israel held in 1989, 1993, 1998. The 
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author argues that since localities faced soft budget constraints and there was a lack of 
data on their fiscal positions during the late 1980s and early 1990s, voters may not be 
basing their votes on the fiscal performance of mayors in these elections. However, by 
1998 mechanisms promoting hard budget constraints and speedy dissemination of 
information were in place which imply that fiscal performance could have  been an 
important determinant of votes in that election. Results indicate that fiscal variables such 
as larger deficits, accumulation of debt and higher debt did not affect mayoral reelection 
in the 1989 and 1993 elections while their presence significantly reduced the probability 
of reelection in the 1998 elections. There was no evidence in favor of an election cycle 
hypothesis. Interestingly when student graduation rates during a mayor‟s term are 
included as proxies for service quality, it is found to positively influence the probability 
of reelection in the 1993 and 1998 elections. This implies that voters not indifferent to 
local issues in the earlier elections, rather the lack of information on fiscal variables 
prevented the voters from basing their vote on them. Unpopular incumbent mayors in the 
earlier election were not penalized for running up large debt while they were punished in 
the later elections signaling the effect of change in the rules of the game. Voters also 
favor mayors who avoid wage excesses, collect taxes efficiently and undertake more 
development projects.  
Drazen and Eslava (2007) construct a political business cycle model in which the 
incumbents attempt to influence voters by changing the composition of government 
expenditure. Citing previously conducted research they argue that it may not be rational 
to increase aggregate spending or deficits in an election year, however by changing the 
composition of expenditure to one that is closer to the voters‟ preferences, the incumbent 
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can benefit. This is due to the fact that the voter cannot distinguish between politicians 
doing so to gain votes and politicians whose spending patterns closely mirror what they 
prefer. In such a scenario political cycles emerge even if voters are fiscal conservatives 
and fully informed of policy. Using data from Colombian provinces they find that the 
composition of expenditure does change with increases in investment spending and 
decreases in current account expenditure. Their findings on voter responses also suggest 
that while voters do penalize deficits; they value investment expenditures. Incumbent‟s 
vote share increases (decreases) with increases (decreases) in investment spending 
(deficits). 
In an atmosphere where tax policy plays and important role in campaigning while 
political scientists dismiss its role in electoral outcomes; Johnson et al. (2005) attempt to 
establish a relationship between electoral outcomes and income taxes in Britain. The 
authors argue that tax to GDP ratios and standard tax rates do not effectively capture the 
incidence of income tax on individuals; so in addition to standard and marginal tax rates 
they use microsimulation measures to construct an „effective‟ tax rate based on standard 
rates, exemptions and deductions. While no significant relationship emerges in case of 
the standard and marginal tax rate; increases in effective tax rates have adversely 
influenced the incumbent‟s electoral outcome. This result is further strengthened in case 
of married tax payers. 
Martinusen (2004) argues that testing for relationship between economic 
performance and electoral outcomes has not been extended to the local levels mainly due 
to inability of attributing responsibility of economic outcomes to the local government 
which presupposes the ability to identify the existence of such a government. This is due 
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to that fact that local governments tend to govern with bi-partisan consensus so 
attributing responsibility is indeed difficult. However since local governments within a 
country face the same national laws and regulations and are relatively homogenous, it 
would be easier to find the effect of economic outcomes keeping fixed history and 
political context. The increasing politization and partisan nature of local governments in 
Norway, the author opines clarifies accountability and hence uses data from Norway 
local government elections to establish a link between electoral outcomes and economic 
and political variables. Economic variables include local level unemployment, local fees, 
charges, taxes, coverage and productivity of services while political factors include 
ideology, nature of government, national support of the incumbent party and the like. The 
author concludes that though political factor seem more important in influencing the 
electoral outcomes at the local level than economic outcomes; increases in 
unemployment and local charges do affect the incumbent party‟s vote shares adversely. 
Interestingly when the data is re-estimated to account for both changes and levels of the 
variables; the author finds that the incumbent is adversely affected by the level service 
coverage and not changes in service charges, though changes in unemployment still play 
a vital role. 
Brender and Drazen (2008) use data from 74 countries to test whether good 
economic performance and expansionary fiscal policies are rewarded by voters. 
Specifically they test whether deficits, loose fiscal policy and economic growth in the 
period prior to the election raise the probability of reelection and whether the nature of 
economic development, age of democracy and differences in electoral systems affect 
voter retribution differently. Results indicate that deficits prior to the elections are 
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penalized severely by voters while they reward improving budget balances over an 
incumbent‟s term in office. Economic growth over an incumbent‟s term is also rewarded. 
Interestingly when countries are differentiated according to the level of economic 
development, the authors find that while voters in all countries penalize budget deficits 
over an incumbent‟s term; expansionary fiscal policy adversely affect reelection 
prospects only in developed countries and higher economic growth is rewarded only in 
less developed countries 
We attempt to provide a flavor for the above arguments and conclusions in this 
section, since the focus of this dissertation is on economic voting and we draw our 
questions from a variety of these papers, this section is far more extensive than others. 
Though the literature on economic voting has evolved from naive studies examining the 
relationship between incumbent vote and growth to ones that incorporate yardstick 
effects, measures of clarity of responsibility and ideology of incumbent; the conclusions 
regarding economic voting has not been extended to developing countries. With the 
exception of Landon and Ryan (1997) most of these papers also examine voter behavior 
with respect to aggregate measures of economic policy. However, in reality, voters may 
be influenced by a few elements in the incumbent‟s economic policy and base their 
decisions on them. Such nuances related to voter behavior may be lost when aggregates 
are examined and may lead to erroneous conclusions that economic voting does not exist. 
This exercise attempts to overcome the shortcomings of previous research by examining 
the presence of economic voting in India while incorporating disaggregated measures of 
economic policies, yardstick effects and insights from the literature on clarity of 
responsibility. 
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Political Economy in India 
The rich diversity of political agents, levels of governments and the institutional 
set up in India makes it an interesting area for research in intergovernmental relations. 
Research testing the various theories of redistribution, political business cycles, 
government responsiveness and regulation in the Indian context are reviewed in this 
section.  
It has been acknowledged that the intergovernmental grant system through which 
the central government provides transfers to state governments through various channels; 
has been influenced politically in India. Many papers hence examine the transfers 
through the prism of tactical redistribution theories. A large selection of these is reviewed 
below. 
Rao and Singh (2000) use panel data on transfers from the central to state 
governments in India to test whether the economic importance of a state measured by its 
state domestic product and political strength measured by a state‟s importance in the 
ruling coalition and political alignment with the central government influences the level 
and composition of per capita transfers to states.  
The authors find some evidence that political bargaining does exist when transfers 
are distributed with the population of a state (which is interpreted as political capital) 
being the most important determinant. Surprisingly they find that aligned states get lower 
centrally sponsored and central plan schemes transfers  
Khemani (2003) argues that while extant research on the political economy of 
intergovernmental transfers finds evidence of political bargaining in the distribution of 
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grants; a common policy implication to prevent their strategic manipulation is to have an 
independent body entrusted with the responsibility of their distribution. However since 
there is no study on the effectiveness of such an authority; the author attempts to fill the 
gap in this literature by analyzing how politics affects the transfer system in India where 
two institutions the Finance and the Planning Commissions, carry out the distribution. 
The hypothesis is tested using data on transfers to 15 states in India over a period of 24 
years, (1972-1995). In addition to the economic variables such as state income and 
population that may influence the amount of transfers, three political variables are 
included. „Affiliation‟ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a state government 
is affiliated to the central incumbent and 0 otherwise. The other variables include the 
proportion of seats from the state controlled by the national ruling party and the 
interaction between the above. The author concludes that transfers more amenable to 
control by political agents are indeed manipulated by them. The author finds that 
statutory transfers are generally progressive in distribution across states with more of 
their variation explained due to income and population. With the inclusion of political 
variables, plan grants are directed towards affiliated states; affiliated states with a lower 
share of national ruling party members of Parliament obtaining more grants. The author 
suggests this provides an idea about the objective of the ruling party–maximization of the 
number of seats won in the election. Surprisingly statutory grants are provided in smaller 
amounts to affiliated states. These contrasting results for the different types of grants is 
interpreted as an transfers from an independent body is not open to political manipulation 
and its presence counteracts the effects of political opportunism.   
44 
 
 
Dutta et al. (2007) construct a model of distributive politics where the central 
government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to distribute grants to states on the 
basis of political considerations. These considerations are whether a state is aligned with 
the center or is a swing state. This model is tested using data on 14 Indian states from 
1974 to 1997. The authors hypothesize that when the central government‟s objective is to 
maximize expected vote share across states, it would try to buy votes from states which 
have been it support base, i.e., they are aligned and from states which have a large 
percent of its voters who are easily manipulated, i.e., swing states. The benchmark model 
focuses on the first case where the central incumbent party is interested in promoting its 
interests at the state level. Results indicate that states which are aligned and characterized 
as swing in the Vidhan Sabha (state assemblies) and irrespective of nature of swing in 
Lok Sabha (lower house of the Parliament) elections on an average receive higher per 
capita grants. The authors perform various robustness checks and conclude that the 
central incumbent does indeed provide higher transfers to states which are swing and 
aligned.  
Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) argue that while research on the political economy 
of intergovernmental transfers attempts to find evidence in favor of either the legislative 
bargaining model or the theories of a strategic unitary executive; the suitability of these 
theories depend on the existing institutions in a country. For example, a legislative 
bargaining approach would be a better fit for presidential systems while a strategic 
unitary executive theory fits British style Westminster systems. The authors point out that 
India‟s democratic history can be divided into two phases; a Congress party dominated 
phase that functioned like a unitary executive and the later period of coalition 
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governments which allows for the testing of these two theories. To determine the nature 
of political manipulation of grants, the authors use data on grants and loans to all Indian 
states from 1957 to 2003. Since the political system in India has changed dramatically the 
authors split the period of survey into two parts, the years of Congress domination and 
years when coalition governments ruled. Core support states is proxied by the share of 
the state‟s Lok Sabha delegation controlled by Congress while swing states are proxied 
by a measure that takes the absolute difference between the share of each state‟s 
legislative delegation controlled by congress and 50 percent. To test alignment effects, a 
dummy variable is used. Results indicate that Congress dominated states have been 
favored, however the Congress central incumbent has favored both core supports, swing 
states and states which were governed by Congress chief ministers. In the coalition period 
from 1995, junior coalition partners are favored along with states that have parties in the 
Lok Sabha providing „outside‟ support.21 Aligned chief ministers get more grants while 
surprisingly states with at least one party common between state and national coalition 
obtain lesser grants. The authors contend that this may be due to the disfavoring of junior 
coalition partners.  
The preponderance of research on the tactical manipulation of government 
behavior notwithstanding, it is important to examine the effect of politics on other 
instruments of government policy. Biswas and Marjit (2002) argue that since among 
central disbursements, the two most important ones are letters of intent and industrial 
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 Outside support of the government by a party in Indian political parlance implies that the party supports 
the single largest party in government formation but will not be a part of its cabinet.  
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licenses;
22
 there is a need to examine the determinants of this type of disbursement.  
Since lobbying is not explicitly carried out in India; they create indices for bargaining 
power of the states. Lobbying power for a state can be calculated as the summation of 
proportional representation of various categories of ministers in the cabinet contributed 
by the state in question, normalized in terms of the state population. Other measures 
include voter turnout in earlier elections (states with higher turn outs are favored as they 
provide with a higher rate of „return‟), an index to measure opposition unity (states with 
higher opposition unity are favored as the incumbent who want to win reelection would 
lobby for more disbursements), percent of MPs from a state who are a party of the ruling 
coalition (lobbying power) and a dummy for the alignment of state governments. The 
authors find a state‟s income is an important determinant in disbursement of licenses; this 
is interpreted as evidence of private sector lobbying (a state‟s income is a good proxy for 
private capital interests). State lobbying in council of ministers in pre-reform and non-
coalition years, voter turnout, alignment, election years and opposition unity also emerge 
as important determinants. Since the reforms implemented in the early 1990s virtually 
scrapped licensing policies for most industries; the reform dummy shows negative 
significance.  
Though, not very comprehensive, the following papers on political cycles in 
chronicle its presence in India. Chaudhuri and Dasgupta, (2005) attempt to quantify the 
effect of a national election and the type of central government on economic policies 
implemented using annual data from India. The hypothesis are based on Rogoff and 
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 Industries employing over 100 workers and with fixed assets worth over a million Rupees needed to 
obtain a license to establish new industries or extensions to the current one as mandated by the Industries 
Act of 1951. This policy was largely abandoned with the implementation of economic reforms in the early 
1990s with a few exceptions. 
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Sibert (1988) who postulate that before elections an incumbent with a view to remain in 
power will lower tax revenues and raise public expenditures to signal competency to the 
electorate, while Rogoff (1990) allows the government to undertake two types of 
expenditures, public consumption and investment, and since public investment 
expenditure is assumed to be imperfectly observed by voters there would a shift in favor 
of public consumption expenditure before elections. They also explore the hypothesis that 
a coalition government would be predisposed to higher debts as partners‟ demands need 
to be fulfilled without the imposition of higher taxes.  
The authors do not focus primarily on the deficit but look into tax collections 
(income, corporate and excise and custom duties), central government developmental 
expenditure and developmental expenditure on agriculture, per capita subsides for 
fertilizer purchase, publically distributed food grains , the central government budget , 
expenditure on infrastructure (schools, railways, roads) and measures of monetary policy 
such as per capita money supply, discount rate and deposit rate at commercial banks. The 
political variables include a dummy for election year and coalition (measuring the 
amount of time a coalition government was in power at the center) and majority 
(measuring the proportion of seats won by the ruling party). Since the beneficiaries of a 
cut in excise taxes would be the poor and the middle class we may expect to see a 
political cycle in them; a similar argument holds for income taxes. The authors find an 
electoral cycle in case of excise and income tax and coalition governments have no 
differential effects on tax policies. Surprisingly the authors find evidence of electoral 
cycles in case of expenditure on agriculture, distribution of food grains and fertilizer 
subsidy while there is no evidence that coalition governments spend more than majority 
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governments. An electoral cycle also exists in case of central government deficits 
however they are not affected by the type of government. The authors hypothesize that 
coalition governments would want to provide benefits to their small number of supporters 
and these may be effectively doled out through infrastructure projects than expenditure 
on education and healthcare which would benefit many, so spending on infrastructure 
would be positively related to presence of coalition governments. They find evidence in 
favor of this. While they find no cycles in money supply and discount rates, a clear cycle 
emerges for deposit rates, the authors conclude that since the central government until 
recently mandated these rates, they raised them to buy votes from savers.  
Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) use data from 14 Indian states to investigate 
whether state governments‟ fiscal policies are affected by the prospect of approaching 
elections. They also analyze the effects of a non-cohesive coalition on policies. The main 
explanatory variables are the degree of fragmentation of a government in a given year 
and an election dummy denoting the presence of an election. Interestingly the authors 
acknowledge the issue of incumbents strategically manipulating the date of the election 
and therefore differentiate between scheduled and early elections. Results indicate that 
states collect lower commodity tax revenues in election years and fragmented 
governments collect lower non-tax revenues that cohesive ones. The authors find that 
state governments spend lesser (current account expenditure) on average during an 
election year, contrary to Rogoff and Sibert‟s (1988) propositions. However state 
governments do undertake up to 6 percent higher capital developmental expenditure 
(social and economic services) in election years. This is mainly due to spending on 
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agriculture and industry and is interpreted as strategically manipulating expenditures to 
affect a small number of pivotal voters.  
Khemani (2004) analyzes the impact of elections on economic policies in Indian 
states. A methodological innovation to instrument for the potentially endogenous 
elections is employed. The author finds that state governments manipulate fiscal 
instruments that target benefits to narrow interest groups, for example, excise tax 
collections (public investment spending) tend to be lower (higher) in election years.   
Though political business cycle models have been around for many years; most of 
these models do not account for the potential endogenity of election timing which is an 
important feature in a parliamentary democracy. To overcome this shortcoming; 
Chowdhury (1993) develops a political-economic interaction model for India. India is an 
interesting study since four out of the ten general election held since 1952 till 1991 have 
been called for before the term has ended. A simultaneity bias exists as while the 
incumbent can call for an election when the economy is performing well, he or she can 
also manipulate the economy prior to an election. A mixed qualitative and continuous 
variable simultaneous equation model approach is used to resolve this issue. The author 
finds no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that incumbents manipulate the economy. 
However, there is strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the incumbent calls for 
elections when the economy is doing well.  
Using data from major Indian states Ghosh (2006) attempt to unearth the effect on 
impending elections on the crime rate. While existing research has found political cycles 
in fiscal and monetary policy; crime rate is chosen as it is the outcome of the 
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government‟s social policy. The author argues that an incumbent politician may exert 
effort to reduce crime rate prior to an election. Since the phenomenon of calling for mid-
term elections (elections before the term of current government is completed) in India; 
the author argues that it may be difficult of the incumbent to manipulate policies. 
However, policies can be easily manipulated prior to scheduled elections; so one may 
expect to find political cycles in case of scheduled elections. Results indicate a strong 
evidence of political cycles in property crimes rates with property crimes reducing 
significantly prior to a scheduled election; with the same increasing prior to a mid-term 
election. 
While economic voting has generally been ignored in the Indian case, some 
research exists with respect to effect of socio-economic factors on voting decisions. 
Though voting behavior of the Indian electorate has been studied, the studies have 
generally been based on surveys or case studies of individual voters.
23
 Most studies that 
use aggregate election data do not employ rigorous econometric methodology but rather 
use measures of correlation to eke out a relationship between voter turnout, vote share of 
parties and various socio-economic variables. Kondo (2003) uses regression analysis to 
examine the relationship between these variables and concludes that literacy, 
urbanization, agricultural development and political competition positively influences 
voter turnout, however, the importance of socio-economic variables diminishes over 
time. Studies that use individual survey data conclude that while gender, caste, religion, 
education and income are important in explaining political awareness and exposure to 
propaganda, they matter less in the case of party preference. Recent surveys show that 
rising prices and unemployment are major issues that affect the electorate. Meyer (1989) 
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 Kondo (2007) provides a brief review of types of studies undertaken. 
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concludes that Indian voters vote retrospectively, and are sensitive to short term shifts in 
agricultural output and the economy. This holds true even when they account for new 
party formation (Meyer and Malcolm 1993).
24
  
Though some research on political cycles exists, these are not comprehensive and 
ignore the central government‟s main tool of policy, the grant system. This, coupled with 
the complete lack of research on economic voting effects has encouraged us to embark on 
this exercise. 
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 Authors hypothesize that, irrespective of economic performance; the entry of a new party may reduce 
votes of a ruling party. 
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Summary 
The preceding sections, while provided us with an overview of the current state of 
literature in political economy; it also pointed to its glaring shortcomings. The lack of 
studies based on developing countries and the use of aggregated measures to examine the 
presence of political cycles and voting behavior; has provided us with justifiable reasons 
to undertaken an analysis that would enable us to addresses this lacuna. In addition to 
this, insights from theories of tactical distribution and clarity of responsibility help us to 
make more nuanced conclusions regarding economic voting and electoral manipulation. 
The two broad research questions examined in this exercise are pre-election 
manipulations of central and state governments and economic voting behavior of the 
Indian electorate. While the presence of the former has been documents by other studies, 
this exercise attempts to enrich the literature by concentrating on different disaggregated 
measures of policy, analyzing pre-electoral manipulation in the intergovernmental grant 
system and incorporate insights from clarity of responsibility models to present a more 
sophisticated analysis.  
Voting in India has generally been examined through the prism of caste, religion 
and regional associations, however it is acknowledged that electoral fortunes of an 
incumbent is influenced economic growth , inflation and economic policies. This exercise 
attempts to quantify that notion while also answering the broader question of whether 
conclusions regarding economic voting can be extended to developing countries. 
Specifically we would examine the effect of taxation, expenditure and other 
economic policies on incumbent vote shares. Given the Indian set up we can examine the 
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effect of central government economic policies on voter behavior in national elections, 
effect of state government policies on state elections and as mentioned before; the effect 
of central government policies on state level elections. In addition to voter behavior 
analysis, we also wish to extent the existing literature on political cycles in India. 
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CHAPTER III 
Political and Institutional Set Up in India 
India is the second most populous country in the world with over 1.1 billion 
people
25
 constituting about 17 percent of the world‟s population. India‟s population is 
almost four times as that of the U.S., the third most populous country in the world. Indian 
states encompass large diversity in area, population and their economy.  Many states in 
India have populations that are larger than most European countries, with the most 
populous state, Uttar Pradesh having a population of over 181 million, even larger than 
that of Pakistan, the sixth most populous country. 
26
 
Growth rates of states are not converging in India, with significant differences 
also present in infrastructure and human development. The per capita income of the 
richest state Punjab is more than four times that of the poorest state, Bihar.
27
 
In this section we present facts about the political institutions, electoral history and the set 
up of Center-State relationship in India.  
The Indian Government 
India is a federation of 28 States and 7 Union Territories. India has a three tier 
system of government the Central, State and different local governments. The Parliament 
is the supreme legislative body of India. The Indian Parliament comprises the two 
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 Rao and Singh (2005) 
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Houses-Lok Sabha (House of the People, also known as the Lower House) and Rajya 
Sabha (Council of States, also known as the Upper House).  
The Lok Sabha is comprised of elected representatives chosen by direct election 
through adult suffrage. The maximum strength of the House envisaged by the 
Constitution is 552, which is made up by election of up to 530 members to represent the 
States, up to 20 members to represent the Union Territories and not more than two 
members of the Anglo-Indian
28
 community to be nominated by the President, if that 
community is not adequately represented in the House.
29
 The total elective membership is 
distributed among the States in such a way that the ratio between the number of seats 
allotted to each State and the population of the State is the same for all States. The 
country is divided into 543 territorial constituencies from each of which a Member of 
Parliament is elected. The plurality or „first past the post‟ system of voting is used, 
wherein the candidate obtaining the largest number of votes is declared the winner. 
According to the Constitution, elections are to be held once in every five years, unless the 
parliament dissolves earlier. Therefore the Lok Sabha is not a permanent body, but 
dissolved every five years when a general election is held.  
The Rajya Sabha consists of 250 members:  238 members representing the States 
and Union Territories, and 12 members nominated by the President. Rajya Sabha is a 
permanent body and is not subject to dissolution. However, one third of the members 
                                                          
28
 Article 366(2) of the Indian Constitution defines an Anglo-Indian as „a person whose father or any of 
whose other male progenitors in the male line is or was of European descent but who is domiciled within 
the territory of India and is or was born within such territory of parents habitually resident therein and not 
established there for temporary purposes only‟.  
29
 This right was secured from Jawaharlal Nehru by Frank Anthony, the first and long time president of the 
All India Anglo-Indian Association. The community is represented by two members. This is done because 
the community has no native state of its own. 
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retires every second year, and is replaced by newly elected members. Each member is 
elected for a term of six years. Members are elected by the Electoral College consisting 
of elected members of state Legislative Assemblies by means of proportional 
representation.  
Given that members of the Lok Sabha are directly elected; it is not surprising to 
find an imbalance in the powers of the two Houses. The Lok Sabha enjoys significantly 
greater power than the Rajya Sabha. Lok Sabha is the House to which the Council of 
Ministers is responsible under the Constitution. Money Bills can only be introduced in 
Lok Sabha. Also it is the Lok Sabha, which grants the money for running the 
administration of the country. 
Nominally, the head of the country is the President in whom all executive powers 
are vested, but the real administrator of the country is the Prime Minister. After the 
national elections are held the President calls the most suitable candidate to form a 
government at the center. This candidate usually is the head of the largest party in the 
parliament. To form the government, a party and its allies require to have won at least 51 
percent of total seats in the parliament. In case the government resigns because of any 
reason, the President can request another candidate to form the government. The 
President can also declare, according to government advice, on new elections and if 
necessary, an emergency state.  
Legislative Assemblies are the highest legislative bodies in states. Each state has 
an assembly to which representatives are elected through the plurality system of voting. 
The usual term of an assembly is five years after which a state election is called. The state 
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is divided into constituencies from which Members of Legislative Assembly are elected. 
Some states have a bicameral system, so another body, the Constituent Assembly also 
exists.  
The head of a state government is called Chief Minister, who is member of the 
state Legislative Assembly. Constitutionally, the figurehead of the state is the Governor, 
who is appointed by the President according to the advice of the central government. 
After the state elections the governor calls for the suitable candidate to form the 
government. In general the governor has more legislative rights at state level than the 
President has at national level. The governor can call on early elections in the state, or 
dismiss the government if there is reason to believe that the government has failed or is 
unstable.  
The 73
rd
 and 74
th
 Amendments to the Indian constitution (in 1992) deemed it 
mandatory for the states to establish local governments. The 73
rd
 Amendment deals with 
the establishment of rural local governments (which are also known as Panchayati Raj 
Institutions [PRIs]) and the 74
th
 Amendment made the provisions relating to urban local 
government (Nagarpalikas). All States now have a uniform three tier Panchayati Raj 
structure. At the base is the Gram Panchayats. A Gram Panchayat covers a village or 
group of villages. The intermediary level is the Mandal Panchayat (also referred to as 
Block or Taluka Panchayat). The intermediary level body need not be constituted in 
smaller States. At the apex is the Zilla Panchayats covering the entire rural area of the 
district. The amendment also made a provision for the mandatory creation of the Gram 
Sabha. The Gram Sabha would comprise of all the adult members registered as voters in 
the Panchayat area. Its role and functions are decided by State legislation. Urban areas in 
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states have Municipal corporations for big cities, town municipal committees and Nagar 
Panchayats for areas in transition.  
Fiscal Federalism in India 
The Indian federal set up and their relationship between have been prescribed in 
the Constitution. The Constitutions initially provided for two levels of government, the 
center and the state while amendments (73
rd
 and 74
th
) in 1992 allowed for the 
establishment of local governments.  The Union, State and Concurrent Lists of the 
constitution lay out the expenditure responsibilities and taxation powers of the various 
levels of government. While items mentioned under the Union and State lists are under 
the purview of the central and state government respectively; both the state and the centre 
can legislate on items in the Concurrent List. However in case of a conflict between the 
state and the central government regarding items on this list; the views of the central 
government prevail.  
Tax and Expenditure Assignments 
The central governments functions include those required to maintain 
macroeconomic stability, international trade and relations (issuing of currency through 
the central bank, banking, insurance, dealing in foreign exchange and foreign loans), 
issues that affect more than a single state (operation of railways, post, atomic energy , air 
transport interstate commerce and the like) and defense. The states are responsible for 
local governments, within state commerce, inland transport and communication, public 
health and sanitation, law and order, agriculture and irrigation. Though economic and 
social services such as education, social security and insurance, employment and 
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unemployment are items on the Concurrent List, in virtue of their proximity to the 
people, states have large role to play in these areas.   
In 2000-01, states‟ spending constituted about 58 percent of total government 
spending, while they collected about 34 percent of the revenue. The states‟ share of 
spending on social and community services (education, medical and health and welfare) 
was about 90 percent of total spending on this item while it was about 60 percent for 
economic services (agriculture, industries, transport, power and irrigation).
30
 
The assignment of taxation powers in based on the principle of „separation of the 
bases‟; the various lists outline the tax bases open to the different levels of government. 
The important sources of tax revenue for the center mentioned in the Union List include 
taxes on all income except agricultural income, corporation taxes, custom and export 
duties, excise duties and tax on services. Central tax collections stood at 10.22 percent of 
the GDP in 2004-05. Corporation tax and income tax comprised of 30 and 17.5 percent 
while union excise duties and custom duties comprised of 27 and 17.4 percent of total tax 
collected in 2006-07.
31
   
Sources of tax revenue for the state governments mentioned in the State List 
include tax on sale and consumption of goods, tax on land and buildings, motor vehicle 
tax, taxes on agricultural income and duties on goods manufactured or produced in the 
state. State‟s own tax revenue as a share of GDP was almost 6 percent in 2004-05. While 
direct taxes constitute only 2.8 percent of total tax revenue, sales and state excise taxes 
                                                          
30
 Rao and Singh (2005) 
31
 Taxation in India 1925 to 2007 (2007), Edited by M.M. Sury. 
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constituted about 55.5 and 12.8 percent of total tax revenues in 2004-05.
32
 The most 
important non-tax revenues for the state government are grants in aid from the Central 
Government and other grants from the central government. Other sources of revenue for 
the state government include incomes from undertakings owned fully or partially by the 
state government, fees for services provided and borrowings which have to be authorized 
by the Central government.  
The Concurrent List does not contain any tax item so that the center and state are 
prevented from taxing the same base. The center has precedence over state in the matter 
of making laws regarding subjects in this list. The center also enjoys residual powers, if a 
tax base in not mention in the Union and State Lists, the center has the right to tax such a 
base.
33
  
Before the 73
rd
 and 74
th
 amendment, only two levels of governments, center and 
state were provided for by the constitution. Local governments, if present were 
constituted by the states. With the amendments, the states have a constitutional obligation 
to create a variety of local bodies corresponding to population size, both for rural and 
urban areas. The local bodies however are still creatures of state which determine their 
jurisdiction and assign subjects and resources to them out of the State List. In reality there 
is very little decentralization to the local governments. 
Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Transfers 
Since tax bases were so divided that the central government would enjoy larger 
and more elastic tax bases, leading to a vertical fiscal imbalance between the center and 
the state and inter jurisdictional spillovers were present; various inter governmental 
                                                          
32
 Ibid. 
33
 The 88th amendment, which allowed the center to tax services, was implemented due to this feature. 
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transfers were instituted. There are four channels of explicit transfers in India. The 
constitution provides for the devolution of taxes collected centrally and grants in aid (also 
known as statutory grants). The Finance Commission a constitutional body appointed 
every five years by the President of India; makes recommendations on distribution of 
taxes between the center and states, its appropriation among the different states and 
principles governing distribution of grants in aid of revenues to states.  
Grants and loans for implementing development plans are distributed by the 
central government to the state governments in accordance with recommendations 
provided by the Planning Commission. Prior to 1969 these grants and loans were 
distributed according to the discretion of the central government. Since then, plan 
assistance is distributed according to the Gadgil formula approved by the National 
Development Council. Elements included in the formula are state population, per capita 
state GDP, fiscal management and special problems experienced by the state. Another 
channel of transfers is through grants provided by the various ministries to their 
counterparts in the states for specified projects either wholly funded by the Center, 
(Central sector projects) or requiring the states to share a proportion of the cost (centrally 
sponsored schemes).  
The Finance Commission‟s operation and recommendations have come under 
serious criticism since it is confined to work on only non-plan items in the States‟ 
budgets and the Planning Commission works on the plan items. This unwieldy 
distribution prohibits the Commission from analyzing the fiscal condition of the states 
holistically. It also provides incentives for misrepresentation to both Commissions by 
States in a bid to increase their transfers. The Finance Commission uses the „gap-filling‟ 
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approach to distribute grants provided for under the Article 275 (1) of the constitution. 
Taking into account a states‟ non-plan expenditure, its share in devolved taxes and own 
source revenues, grants are provided to close deficits. This provided no incentives to 
states for prudent fiscal behavior. This methodology was converted into one which 
accounted for the fiscal capacities of states by the Ninth Commission but was abandoned 
by the Tenth. Later Commissions have however begun to partially allow for the fiscal 
capacity. Criticisms levied against plan assistance are that it has no relationship with the 
investment requirements of states and repayment capacity is not taken into account while 
providing loans. The harshest criticisms are reserved for assistance provided via Central 
sector and centrally sponsored schemes accounting for about 20 percent of the transfers; 
as these are subject to discretion by the central government. While the economic rationale 
behind these grants is intra-state spillovers; they are an example of the Central 
government interfering in the allocational activities of state governments. The scope of 
these grants has been expanded since 1970 when other plan assistance was done through 
the Gadgil formula. There are over 225 Central programs in action today.  
Per capita transfers (in real terms) from center to states have increased over 3 
times from Rs.198 in 1975-76 to Rs. 633 in 2001-02. As percent of GDP transfers have 
increased from 3.7 percent to 4.5 percent in the same period. Transfers constituted about 
38 percent of states‟ revenues and 28 percent of state‟s expenditures in 2001-02. 34 
Finance Commission transfers in the form of tax devolution and grants was 64.6 percent 
of total grants to states during the fourth plan (1969-74) and decreased to 61 percent 
during the seventh plan (1985-90). In 2001-02, this has risen to 64.2 percent. Planning 
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 Transfers under the purview of both Commissions are included. 
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Commission transfers in the form of state plan grants and Central schemes has increased 
from 24.4 percent during the fourth plan (1969-74) to 35 percent during the seventh plan 
(1985-90). In 2001-02, this has fallen to 31.5 percent. There has been a steady increase in 
the discretionary element of transfers as witnessed by the increase in proportion of grants 
provided through the central schemes from 11.5 percent during the fourth plan (1969-74) 
to 18 percent during the seventh plan (1985-90). In 2001-02, this has fallen to 14 percent. 
Rao and Singh (1998) conclude that many channels of implicit transfers exist in 
India. These undermine the ends to which the explicit transfers are utilized. The common 
forms of such transfers are inter-state tax exportation, subsidized lending from financial 
institutions and the center. 
Elections and Political Parties in India 
India is a multiparty democracy with small regional parties gaining importance 
and popularity over the last few years. National parties are those which are recognized by 
the Election Commission (an independent body that is responsible for conducting 
elections) in more than four states. A political party is considered to be a state party if it 
has engaged in political activities for the past five years and has as elected members, at 
least 4 percent of the state‟s Lok Sabha seats or 3.33 percent of state assembly seats; or 
obtained 6 percent of the valid votes polled in a general or state level election. There are 
over 700 registered (with the Election Commission) but unrecognized parties actively 
participate in the Indian political landscape. Though the number of State and 
unrecognized parties change over the years; the number of national parties has remained 
almost the same. The Indian National Congress (INC hereafter) has remained a national 
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party since the first election in 1951. Other parties such as the Communist Party of India 
(CPI) and Communist Party (Marxist, CPM) are also national parties active since 1951 
and 1967 respectively. Though Indian politics has been dominated by the INC, other 
parties have provided some opposition; with parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) proving to be the biggest and most consistent one.  
Independent India has conducted fourteen general elections for the formation of 
the central government since 1951. Interestingly the vote share of the National parties has 
remained high, changing from 76 percent (in 1951) of the total valid votes to 
approximately 63 percent (in 2004). However since 1996 there is a marked decrease in 
share of national parties, this is reflected in the composition of the central government 
with a single large party such as the INC or BJP forming the government with the support 
of state parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), All India Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) from Tamil Nadu, Telugu Desam Party (TDP) from 
Andhra Pradesh, Rastriya Janata Dal (RJD) from Bihar, Shiv Sena from Maharashtra , 
Janata Dal from Bihar and Karnataka and the Bahujan Samaj Party (a national party with 
significant presence in Uttar Pradesh).  
Among the National Parties, the INC‟S share of votes increased from 45 percent 
in 1951 to 49 percent in 1984 and fell to 26.53 percent in 2004. The INC has been in 
power at the center for 48 of the 60 years that India has been independent. The 
Communist parties have garnered on an average about 8 percent of total votes while the 
BJP which entered the political arena in the late 1970s obtained 7.7 percent of votes in 
1984 with its share increasing to 25.6 percent in 1998. 
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The current government headed by Dr. Singh (INC) is a coalition of 12 parties 
and is provided external support by 6 others. The previous government headed by Mr. 
Vajpayee (BJP) was a coalition of 13 parties.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Theoretical Model 
This model draws heavily from Landon and Ryan (1997) though we have made 
modification to suit our needs. 
Since we are examining voter behavior with respect to various economic policies 
and outcomes; we begin by incorporating into the model, an individual‟s utility function. 
The utility of voter in i period t is given by: 
𝑈𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑡
𝑖 ,𝑔𝑡
𝑖)  
Where t is the period associated with the current election, i.e., the term of office of 
government to be elected; 𝑐𝑡
𝑖  is a vector of private consumption goods, and 𝑔𝑡
𝑖  is a vector 
of publicly provided goods including transfers. These transfers also include direct cash 
transfers such as pensions, which are included in gross income, 𝑦𝑡
𝑖 . 
The individual maximizes this utility function with respect to a budget constraint 
given by: 
𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑡
𝑖 1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑖   
Where 𝑝𝑡  is a vector of prices, which is a function of the overall inflation in the economy 
(π), 𝑦𝑡
𝑖  is gross income including transfers, a function of the overall economic growth (θ), 
and 𝜏𝑡
𝑖  is a vector of taxes paid by the individual. 
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The indirect utility function of an individual is given as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉(𝑦𝑡
𝑖(θ) , 𝜏𝑡
𝑖 ,𝑝𝑡(π))  
Note that by incorporating a vector of taxes and expenditure instead of aggregate 
taxes and expenditures; we are allowing for each to have a differential impact on the 
individual and hence a differential impact on their voting behavior. It is also important to 
note that utility depends on voter‟s perception regarding taxes and expenditure 
undertaken. Therefore the marginal utility (disutility) a voter obtains from an increase in 
a specific form of spending may be negative if a voter perceives such expenditures to be 
wasteful. 
35
 
Voters reward or punish political parties based on the expected utility they would 
enjoy if the said party be in power. This would be explored in detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
We construct two value functions which illustrate the value to the voter of having 
the incumbent continue in power and the value if the opposition forms the government. 
These value functions are functions of the indirect utility functions derived above. 
The value to the voter of having an incumbent continue to govern is given by: 
𝑍𝐼𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑡
𝑖  + 𝜀𝐼𝑡
𝑖   
Where ∆𝑉𝐼𝑡
𝑖  is the expected change in utility of the voter i during period t if the incumbent 
is reelected; and 𝜀𝐼𝑡
𝑖  is a random error affecting the probability than an individual would 
vote for the incumbent. ∆𝑉𝐼𝑡
𝑖  in turn depends on economic growth, inflation and changes 
                                                          
35 In our empirical estimations this is done by examining a small set of policy variables in each regression. 
This also helps us to preserve degrees of freedom. 
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in taxes and expenditures experienced by the individual in period t. A similar value 
function exists in case of the opposition, given by: 
𝑍𝑂𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝑂𝑡
𝑖  + 𝜀𝑂𝑡
𝑖   
An individual would vote for the incumbent if the change in the value of having 
the incumbent in power is greater than having the opposition in power.  
∆𝑍𝑡
𝑖 =  𝑍𝐼𝑡
𝑖 −  𝑍𝑂𝑡
𝑖  > 0  
∆𝑍𝑡
𝑖 =  𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑡
𝑖  −  𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝑂𝑡
𝑖  + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 > 0  
Where 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 = (𝜀𝐼𝑡
𝑖 −  𝜀𝑂𝑡
𝑖 ) 
Therefore the probability than an individual would vote for an incumbent is given by: 
Pr ∆𝑍𝑡
𝑖 > 0 =  Pr⁡(𝜀𝑡
𝑖 > −(𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑡
𝑖  −  𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝑂𝑡
𝑖  )  
Since micro data on electoral behavior, incomes, taxes and expenditures are 
generally unavailable; aggregated electoral and policy data such as percentage of votes 
obtained, aggregate income, taxes and expenditures are commonly used to examine voter 
behavior. Shapiro and Deacon (1975) argue that the observed percentage of votes 
obtained is equivalent to the probability that any voter would vote in a certain way, apart 
from a random error. Therefore a party interested in maximizing the probability that an 
individual would vote for it can be interpreted as them maximizing the percent votes 
obtained. To obtain this conclusion the authors assume that is distributed in a known 
fashion with its mean a function of average voter characteristics and arguments in the 
indirect utility function and a known variance. They then derive probability distribution 
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functions and argue than the proportion of voters voting for or against is equal to the true 
probabilities plus a random error. While the authors assume logistic density function and 
use logit for their estimations; we assume normal density.  
Also, the policy and outcome variables in the model are those of the following 
period and hence are unobserved. As the expected utility is derived in part from 
expectations including what they received in the past.  The past period values used in the 
empirical estimations can be though of as proxies for their expectations.
36
  
In federal states, where there are multiple levels of governments; the credit or the 
blame for a particular policy or outcome may be shared by different levels of 
government. Therefore when we examine voter at these levels, we need to look at 
multiple probability functions. In case of the Indian scenario analyzed here; we examine 
two probability functions; one each for the central and state incumbents. 
The probability of voting for the state incumbent is given by: 
PrS ∆𝑍𝑡
𝑖 > 0 =  𝛿Pr⁡(𝜀𝑡
𝑖 > −(𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑡
𝑖  −  𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝑂𝑡
𝑖  )  
Where 𝛿 is the proportion of the credit or blame accruing to the state incumbent. 𝛿 
depends on the voter‟s perception of any tax, transfer or expenditures. 
The probability of voting for the central incumbent is given by: 
PrC ∆𝑍𝑡
𝑖 > 0 = (1 − 𝛿)Pr⁡(𝜀𝑡
𝑖 > −(𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑡
𝑖  −  𝑍𝐼 ∆𝑉𝑂𝑡
𝑖  )  
Where (1- 𝛿) is the proportion of the credit or blame accruing to the central incumbent.  
                                                          
36 Generally this implies that the voters have long time horizons and would use all the information since the 
last election. But in our empirical estimations we typically use a shorter time horizon for many cases.  
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By the principle of „clarity of responsibility‟37 we would expect to find stronger voter 
responses when 𝛿 equals 1 (0) as then the voter is aware that the incumbent he is voting 
for is solely responsible (not responsible) for a policy or economic outcome. We may 
expect muted responses for those policies and outcomes which are shared responsibilities. 
Here this implies stronger responses in case of state taxes (in case of state level elections 
with state incumbents) and economic outcomes such as inflation and economic growth 
(in case of national elections with national incumbents, as they are generally considered 
to be responsibilities of the central governments). We can expect muted responses in case 
of state expenditure policies given that most of these are financed through 
intergovernmental grants and hence can be perceived as shared responsibilities. 
38
 
The driving force behind this model is the voter‟s perception regarding the tax he 
or she is required to pay or public good available. While earlier models hypothesized that 
reduction (increase) in taxes (public expenditures) always lead to improvements in 
voters‟ utility; in this model we do not subscribe to these rather naïve assumptions. 
Rather, we allow for differences in voter perception, for example an increase in public 
spending on say construction of parks may not be perceived as increase in utility, if the 
voter feels that such spending as wasteful or is not a user of the facility. One could also 
ideologically oppose large governments. Similarly, a voter may not necessarily 
experience disutility due to an increase in taxes, if he or she perceives it as a benefit tax 
and is satisfied with the services provided. While such a set up of the model renders it 
closer to reality; its drawback is the inability to conclusively make predictions using the 
                                                          
37 When voters are aware of the responsibilities of the different levels of government; they would find it 
easier to assign credit or blame and hence increased clarity would lead to stronger voter responses. 
38 Hence we may not expect to find any voter responses to intergovernmental grants provided as these are 
not “visible” and they finance expenditures which are associated with lower clarity of responsibility. 
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same. This implies that examination of the presence of economic voting in essence is an 
empirical question, the answer to which is dependent on voters‟ perceptions and its 
aggregation. Our propositions hence do not speculate the direction of voter response but 
rather attempt to unearth presence of economic voting, if any given the federal set up in 
India. Specifically we examine the presence of economic voting in state and national 
level elections with respect to tax, transfer and expenditures carried out by them. 
In addition to analyzing voter behavior, we also examine the presence of political 
cycles in the various instruments of fiscal policy available to the governments. We use 
insights from existing political cycle and tactical redistribution theories to extrapolate our 
findings.  
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CHAPTER V 
Data and Methodology 
Data  
The data required for this effort are varied and many sources were tapped to 
collect them. The public finance data for later years (1990 onwards) were obtained from 
the Reserve bank of India (RBI hereafter) Publications, State Finances: A Study of 
budgets and Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy. For the earlier years (1980 
onwards) online data does not exist; and so this was obtained from compilations made at 
the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Delhi. Data on inflation was obtained 
from the RBI publication, Handbook of Monetary Statistics of India. Data on State 
domestic product (SDP), Gross domestic product (GDP) and population were taken from 
the Central Statistical Organization‟s (CSO) publication, National account statistics. 
Reports from the Census of India were used to source data on literacy, urbanization and 
Schedule class population. The Election Commission of India releases reports detailing 
participants and results after every national and sub-national election. These reports were 
the source for the electoral data used in this exercise. Data on state and central 
incumbents were complied from various sources; they proved to be valid checks for one 
another since this data was not available from the usual data depositories in India. 
Sources include Indiastat, world statesman and Wikipedia websites, newspaper reports 
and periodicals published in India. 
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Methodology 
Since the data in their most comprehensive form is a panel spanning 24 states and 
28 years; panel data methodology seems the most appropriate one to use for our data 
analysis. Both random and fixed effect methodologies are implemented along with a 
pooled OLS estimation for comparison; though in the presence of time invariant 
unobserved variables, this methodology is not ideal. 
In every econometric model the dependent variable (y) is influenced by a set of 
independent variables(X, c).  
),,...,,(
21
cxxxfy
n
  
These variables can be either observed (X) or unobserved (c). What matters is the 
relationship between X and c. If X and c are uncorrelated, c can be included in the error 
term. When c is correlated with X, treating c as a constituent of the error term will bias 
the results. 
Panel data techniques provide us with a solution of the omitted variable problem. 
With panel data we have observations for the same set of variables over a period of time. 
If the omitted variable c is time constant, the regression of interest is: 
     
itiitit
ucy  X  
 
i
c  is called a „random effect‟ if we treat 
i
c  as a random variable. When it is 
treated as a parameter to be estimated, it is known as „fixed effects‟. In most econometric 
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studies random effects imply no correlation between X and c, while fixed effects allow 
for some correlation. 
A random effects estimator includes the unobserved effects in the error term to 
create a composite error term.  
     
itiit
ucv   
As the random effects estimator uses a GLS framework some form of strict 
endogenity between X and 
it
v  is required for consistency. 
The general estimating equation for electoral cycle analysis is given by:  
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
Where t is the time period in which the election takes place and election dummy 
denotes either national or sub-national level election depending on the research question 
being analyzed. The fiscal policy variable denotes the various transfers, taxes, 
expenditures and non-tax revenues of states each of which is independently analyzed for 
both national and sub-national level elections for the different proposition outlined 
earlier. The vector Z consists of other explanatory variables such as literacy, 
urbanization, population, schedule class population, real SDP and share of agriculture in 
state‟s domestic product. 𝛼𝑖  denotes state specific fixed effects while 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the random 
error term. 
The general estimating equation for voter behavior analysis is given by:  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝛾𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
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Where t is the time period in which the election takes place and incumbent vote 
share denotes vote share of sub-national or national level incumbents depending on the 
research question being analyzed. The vector F denotes the various sets of fiscal policy 
variables (previously outlined) of the preceding period. The different sets of policy 
variables are independently analyzed for both national and sub-national level elections 
for the different proposition outlined earlier. The vector Z consists of other explanatory 
variables such as literacy, urbanization, population, schedule class population and real 
SDP and vote share obtained by incumbent in previous election.𝛼𝑖  denotes state specific 
fixed effects while 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the random error term.  
When we estimate the regression for voter behavior analysis with respect to 
economic growth and inflation; the vector F denotes economic outcome variables such as 
inflation, national economic growth and average national economic growth when we 
analyze responses in national elections while it denotes state economic growth, relative 
state economic growth, relative growth interacted with economic geography variable and 
average state economic growth over the term of an incumbent. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Empirical analysis and Results 
In India, the state governments are assigned primary responsibility for a majority 
of public expenditures and have significant taxing authority.  Here we examine two 
aspects; firstly we examine the presence of electoral cycles prior to elections in the 
various fiscal policy instruments which are the responsibility of states. Secondly we 
analyze voter behavior in sub-national elections as a function of fiscal policy variables.  
The national government in India undertakes fewer expenditure responsibilities; 
however they form a major source of non-tax revenue to sub-national governments in the 
form of grants. Since the national government is able to manipulate these grants; voter 
behavior with respect to grants in national elections is also analyzed.  While many 
existing studies only explore the relationship between economic policy instruments and 
voter behavior in congruent levels of government; an attempt is made here to analyze the 
presence of electoral cycles and economic voting across different levels of governments.  
This is done by examining voter behavior in national elections in response to fiscal policy 
carried out by the states, and in sub-national elections in response to grants provided by 
the state are also analyzed. Data from 1980-2008 and 24 Indian states is used to analyze 
both aspects.
39
 
Government expenditures in Indian states are undertaken on revenue and capital 
accounts. Revenues of states includes grants from the central government, taxes levied on 
                                                          
39 The Union territories are excluded due to lack of public finance data while Jammu and Kashmir is 
excluded due to its special status. 
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sales, income, property and other economic activities and revenues from providing 
services. 
Different sets of expenditures and taxes are analyzed. These include revenue 
expenditures associated with social services, revenue expenditures associated with 
economic services, revenue expenditure associated with infrastructural expenditures, 
capital expenditure on social and economic services, and capital expenditure on 
infrastructure, taxes and non-tax revenues. This segmentation is used across analysis of 
voter behavior in general elections also.  
It must be noted that we estimate multiple number of regressions. For voter 
behavior analysis, sets of regressions with fiscal policy instruments in the categories 
described above dependent variables are estimated.
40
 While in case of political cycle 
estimations; multiple regressions with different fiscal policy instrument as the 
independent variable is estimated. The specification for each regression is provided prior 
to discussing the results obtained.  
The main dependent variable in voter behavior regressions is the percent of votes 
obtained by the incumbent government at the time of election. In case of national 
elections this implies the total percent votes obtained by the main coalition members that 
form the national government while in case of sub-national elections this implies the 
percent votes obtained by the main party in power i.e., the party of the chief minister.
41
 
                                                          
40
 Since the data set is small we cannot include all fiscal policy instruments in the same regression.   
41
 Due to lack of comprehensive information on coalitions (if present) at the sub-national level, this 
formulation is used. This approach can be justified by recognizing that the most visible member of the state 
administration is the Chief Minister, and the responsibility of economic activities and outcomes would be 
attributed to him or her. This formulation has also been used in other papers that deal with countries with 
coalition governments.  
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Since voting data exhibit persistence due to entrenched support and ideological leanings 
of the electorate which tend not to change rapidly over time, it is important to include the 
votes received by the incumbent in the previous elections as a control variable. Fiscal 
policy variables such as taxes, transfers, non tax revenues and loans form the main 
explanatory variables. If the election takes place in the second half of the fiscal year, the 
expenditure and revenue variables used are of the current fiscal year. If the election takes 
place in the first half of the fiscal year, then the independent variables belong to the 
previous fiscal year.
42
 It captures the most recent policy variables which are experienced 
by the voters. Annual data is used. No other data (quarterly, monthly) are easily available. 
Other explanatory variables include real state domestic product (Real SDP), population, 
percent of Schedule class population (SC), literacy, and urbanization.  
The dependent variable in the case of the electoral cycle regressions is the fiscal 
policy variable while the independent variable of interest is a dummy indicating the 
presence of an election in a given fiscal year. Many authors argue the need to distinguish 
between scheduled and unscheduled elections in these kinds of studies. Policy 
manipulations are possible when there is an scheduled election and generally will not 
exist in an unscheduled one
43
  as the unscheduled elections typically occur suddenly in 
the middle of an incumbent‟s term due to lack of political support in which case the 
incumbents may not have had the opportunity to manipulate expenditure or taxes. A 
scheduled election is defined as one which takes place when the current legislative body 
                                                          
42
 This specification has been used in other papers. 
43
 In India such elections are termed as midterm elections. 
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is at least four years old.
44
Other explanatory variables include real state domestic product, 
population, percent of Schedule class population (SC), literacy and urbanization and 
share of agriculture in the state economy. 
Three types of regressions, pooled OLS, panel data methods Random and Fixed 
effects are analyzed. Nominal level values, real level values and per capita values of 
expenditure and tax variables are used. 
                                                          
44
 Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2004) follow this definition. Four years is chosen as the cutoff as the term of 
any national or sub-national legislative body in India is 5 years. 
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Cycles in Government expenditure, taxes and non-tax revenue in case of Sub-
national (Assembly) elections 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
The fiscal policy variables in this case are state level tax and non-tax revenues 
collected and expenditures undertaken. And the election dummy denotes sub-national 
elections. 
Results indicate that pre election manipulation of fiscal policy instruments by sub-
national incumbents does exist in India. Interestingly while there is strong evidence for 
the presence of cycles in taxes and other non-tax revenues collected; the same cannot be 
concluded in case of expenditures. This may be the case since these taxes are in the sole 
preview of the sub-national government, while many expenditure decisions are 
undertaken in consultation with the center. Overall the results indicate that states have 
lower own source revenues prior to an election. Own-tax revenues, including property 
tax, commercial services and sales tax, excise taxes are all lower prior to an election. In 
case of non-tax revenues, pre election receipts from provision of economic services are 
lower. Evidence of electoral cycles in expenditure items is not as strong, with no cycles 
emerging in case of social services or infrastructure revenue expenditures; however 
revenue expenditure on irrigation and capital expenditures on water supply and sanitation 
are lower prior to elections. Interestingly, results indicate that expenditures on police are 
higher.
45
 As hypothesized, these cycles are present only in case of scheduled elections; a 
dummy indicating non scheduled election is generally not significant. A drawback in 
                                                          
45
 These results are comparable to those obtained by Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) and Khemani (2004). 
These studies use older and less comprehensive Indian data; typically they use data up to 1992 for 14 major 
Indian states. 
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existing research in political cycle analysis is that presences of such cycles are generally 
examined using highly aggregated policy instruments. A tactical incumbent may not want 
to manipulate all instruments due to the increasing inefficiencies he or she may face; but 
rather prefer to manipulate those which they feel would impact the voters the most, in 
other words bring more bang for their buck.  
It is interesting that we find almost no cycles with respect to expenditures even 
when examine these at highly disaggregated levels. It could be that with falling tax and 
non-tax revenues prior to elections, the incumbent is hard-pressed to increase 
expenditures but given the ballooning deficits of the Indian states this may not be the 
answer. As mentioned before, the states are recipients of intergovernmental grants which 
in turn finance expenditures, so in some sense, the states do not have sole responsibility 
over expenditures. In such a scenario the states may not only be able to influence taxes 
more easily but it would also be politically expedient to manipulate items of policy where 
there is greater clarity of responsibility (taxes) and internalize all the perceived gains. 
Finally, there is the notion that people value in-cash transfers more highly than ones in-
kind. Hence reductions in taxes and fees which in turn imply increases in disposable 
income may be more effective manipulations than increases in expenditures. However it 
is rather puzzling that in a country like India where almost one third of the population 
still works in the agricultural sector and a large number of people still lack access to 
water, the incumbent chose to reduce on water supply and irrigation expenditures pre-
election. These are typically very visible and have the characteristics of being easy to 
recall by voters as people tend to remember more visible items such as cleaner roads and 
regular water supply than increases in expenditures in education as these tend to take a 
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while before earning any returns. So as even small manipulations in visible items such as 
these would forward the cause of the incumbent, it is would be interesting to unearth the 
reason behind the results we find in case of such expenditures. 
Table 1.1: Electoral cycle in expenditure in irrigation 
Per Capita Irrigation 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
       
Scheduled elections -11.54 -10.58** -10.39**    
All elections    -7.795 -7.039 -6.777 
Literacy -2.250*** 0.0476 0.731 -2.247*** 0.0734 0.75 
Urban 1.016*** 1.134 1.661 1.027*** 1.099 1.6 
SC population -1.471*** -0.559 0.182 -1.467*** -0.555 0.121 
Per capita SDP 37611*** 2653 1476 37539*** 2796 1696 
Share of agriculture 1.544*** -0.0968 -0.246 1.544*** -0.118 -0.263 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 28.04 20.16 -21.05 29.39 22.06 -17.82 
Observations 657 657 657 657 657 657 
R-squared 0.273  0.257 0.272  0.254 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%.
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Table 1.2: Electoral Cycle in expenditure on Police 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
Table 1.3: Electoral Cycle in expenditure on Water Supply and Sanitation 
Real expenditure on Water Supply and Sanitation 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled elections -12.21 -11.44 -10.73**    
All elections    -10.84 -11.23 -10.34* 
literacy -2.921*** 1.484 3.988 -2.908*** 1.458 3.998 
urban 1.211** 0.281 2.917 1.221** 0.232 2.847 
SC population 2.851*** 1.304 -24.05 2.849*** 1.348 -24.15 
Population -7.17e-07** -2.65E-07 -1.27E-07 -7.06e-07** -2.74E-07 -1.63E-07 
Real SDP 0.000465* 0.000775** 0.000774 0.000459 0.000773** 0.000777 
Share of agriculture -2.055*** -3.912*** -4.592* -2.056*** -3.926*** -4.612* 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 142.1*** 52.66 217.9 143.8*** 57.82 224.3 
Observations 657 657 657 657 657 657 
R-squared 0.262  0.391 0.261  0.391 
Per Capita Police 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled elections 16.48 14.09 14.04*    
All elections    18.75 12.13 12.55 
Literacy 4.425*** -0.22 -0.12 4.421*** -0.239 -0.137 
Urban -4.133*** 5.759** 8.208 -4.148*** 5.827** 8.316 
SC population -17.65*** -11.40** -3.218 -17.66*** -11.41** -3.145 
Per capita SDP 13540 -4347 -5801 13568 -4719 -6248 
Share of agriculture 4.605*** -6.712*** -7.307** 4.614*** -6.682*** -7.284** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 87.32 431.3*** 301.2 82.96 427.0*** 295.2 
Observations 657 657 657 657 657 657 
R-squared 0.416  0.378 0.417  0.378 
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Table 1.4: Electoral Cycle in Own tax revenues 
Per Capita Own Tax Revenue 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled elections -28.56 -24.64 -24.08**    
All elections    -24.75 -15.5 -14.22 
literacy -4.793** -0.0982 1.702 -4.786** 0.181 1.75 
urban 8.586*** 16.27*** 21.67 8.613*** 16.87*** 21.54 
SC population 23.42*** 22.16*** -13.77 23.43*** 21.40*** -13.91 
Per capita SDP 833246*** 789715*** 770588*** 833122*** 788522*** 771013*** 
Share of agriculture -11.22*** -8.497*** -8.839 -11.23*** -8.562*** -8.879 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -118 -569.8*** -295.8 -112.9 -578.9*** -289 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 
R-squared 0.859  0.897 0.859  0.897 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
Table 1.5: Electoral Cycle in Property tax revenues 
Per Capita Property Taxes 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled elections -5.662 -5.664 -5.520**    
All elections    -6.162 -5.559 -5.131** 
literacy -0.464* -0.0243 1.12 -0.463 0.0135 1.126 
urban 2.260*** 2.082*** 3.296 2.265*** 2.080*** 3.251 
SC population 3.891*** 4.423*** 11.71 3.894*** 4.455*** 11.68 
Per capita SDP 55405*** 69300*** 77840*** 55393*** 69751*** 78013*** 
Share of agriculture -0.152 -0.298 -0.537 -0.156 -0.314 -0.546 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -81.69*** -114.3*** -271.3 -80.26*** -114.7*** -268.9 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 
R-squared 0.693  0.645 0.693  0.645 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 1.6: Electoral Cycle in Services and sales tax revenues 
Per Capita Service and Sales Taxes 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled elections -18.88 -16.12 -15.90*    
All elections    -15.36 -7.55 -6.58 
literacy -4.877** -1.865 -1.042 -4.872** -1.747 -1.003 
urban 7.399*** 17.55*** 22.05* 7.417*** 18.07*** 21.98* 
SC population 20.49*** 18.83*** -4.677 20.50*** 18.32*** -4.778 
Per capita SDP 776361*** 700046*** 681411*** 776270*** 698242*** 681578*** 
Share of agriculture -10.55*** -5.680*** -5.826 -10.55*** -5.705*** -5.852 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -77.46 -554.2*** -377.9 -74.4 -560.5*** -374.8 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 
R-squared 0.859  0.896 0.859  0.896 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
Table 1.7: Electoral Cycle in Excise tax revenues 
Per Capita Excise Tax 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled elections -8.752 -7.68 -7.480*    
All elections    -8.364 -7.304 -7.440* 
literacy 0.547* 0.229 -0.594 0.549* 0.19 -0.587 
urban 0.608* 0.542 -0.296 0.616* 0.5 -0.36 
SC population 4.564*** 4.315*** -16.58 4.568*** 4.236*** -16.62 
Per capita SDP 70553*** 45389*** 30130* 70522*** 44621*** 30384* 
Share of agriculture 2.079*** 0.888 0.798 2.075*** 0.851 0.785 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -175.5*** -91.50* 225.1 -173.7*** -84.17* 228.7 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 
R-squared 0.535  0.334 0.535  0.334 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 1.8: Electoral Cycle in Revenues from Economic Services 
Per Capita Revenues from Economic Services 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled elections -38.82 -26.44 -25.69*    
All elections    -14.85 -3.489 0.584 
literacy -7.048*** -3.684 -1.829 -7.034*** -3.562 -1.738 
urban -8.715*** 2.794 19.32 -8.677*** 3.629 19.3 
SC population -18.59*** -20.17*** -33.74 -18.59*** -20.15*** -33.93 
Per capita SDP 543445*** 430927*** 365965* 543090*** 425736*** 365739* 
Share of agriculture -0.195 5.585*** 5.421 -0.184 5.654*** 5.378 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 379.3*** -65.07 -278.8 380.3*** -86.24 -279.1 
Observations 657 657 657 657 657 657 
R-squared 0.62  0.431 0.619  0.43 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Voter behavior in response to expenditure, taxes and other revenues in Sub-national 
elections 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝛾𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Incumbent vote share here refers to the vote share obtained by the party of the 
incumbent chief minister at the state in sub-national elections. Fiscal policy variables 
include the various taxes, non-tax revenues and expenditures of state governments. 
Our results indicate that voters in the Indian states seem to be fiscal conservatives 
as when they do react to fiscal policy; they punish the incumbents for increases in 
expenditures or taxes. This implies that the voters generally perceive increases in utility 
from lower taxes while being indifferent or experiencing lose in welfare due to increases 
in certain expenditures. 
Voters in general do not seem to respond to government revenue expenditures. 
This includes expenditures on social services such as health, education, welfare, pensions 
and the like, and economic services expenditure on agriculture, industries, urban and 
rural development. Interestingly voters seem to react strongly to infrastructural 
expenditures on the revenue account. Voters punish incumbents for increases in plan 
expenditure on irrigation, roads and bridges and power. Increases in expenditures on 
police are however rewarded by the electorate. Expenditures undertaken on the capital 
account by the incumbents evoke a stronger response from voters. Here too, voters 
punish the incumbent for increases in expenditures on health, agriculture, irrigation and 
power. While coefficients on other expenditures may not reach the required levels of 
significance; the fact that most of them are negative indicates that the Indian voter 
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generally considers perceives a disutility from government expenditures. Though fiscal 
conservatism is found in exist in countries such as the U.S., voters in India generally do 
not exhibit such an ideological bent and populist political parties do not foster such 
notions. Hence such a result cannot be attributed to the philosophy of desiring smaller 
governments; rather we need to reckon whether the voters consider government 
expenditures as wasteful. Let us elaborate on this by using voter responses to expenditure 
on heath as an example. Though government hospitals are the main providers of health 
care in rural areas; the quality of services provided, number of doctors and availability of 
medicines has deteriorated over time
46
. Given that a large percent of the population in 
India still lives in rural areas; their robust turn out in elections coupled with a lack of 
perceived benefits from health services could lead to voters reacting negatively to such 
wasteful expenditures. 
There is some concern that the level of expenditures and taxes may be influenced 
by votes obtained by the incumbent in the previous election as an incumbent facing a 
competitive election may attempt policy accordingly. Though this may be the case, we 
also need to content that votes may need not necessarily be endogenous with policy as 
while contemporaneous factors such as popularity of an opponent may render the election 
unsafe for the incumbent, this may be a relatively new phenomenon and not related to 
votes that incumbent obtained previously. We however, ran tests to examine whether 
policy is influenced by past votes found that except in case of a few items of expenditures 
this generally was not the case. The inclusion as an independent variable; the votes in 
previous years also aids to control this possibility.  
                                                          
46
 Citizen‟s Report on Governance and Development (2007) 
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Taxes levied by the incumbents evoke a much stronger response from the 
electorate than expenditures undertaken. This result tends to support the notion that an 
individual tends to perceive differences between in-kind and cash transfers; as Indian 
voters‟ responses seem stronger when actual cash in hand is lowered due to increases in 
taxes than when they are faced with in-kind transfers in the form of government 
expenditures. Results indicate that increases in property, sales and other taxes and 
revenues from providing social services are penalized by the voters. Interestingly 
increases in motor vehicle taxes are rewarded by voters, this may stem from the fact that 
this is a selective tax that falls on a small percent of the population who own motor 
vehicles and are in general wealthier than the average voter. Also, most of the receipts 
from this tax are earmarked for construction and maintenance of roads and bridges; thus 
this tax may be viewed as a benefit tax leading to such responses by voters if they also 
perceive as benefits, the value added by good roads and other infrastructure. Also, while 
increases in revenues from social services are penalized, increases in revenues from 
economic services are rewarded.
47
  
Many authors argue that voters are not only affected by their own taxes, but also 
care about their taxes relative to other states‟. Therefore voter behavior would not just be 
influenced by taxes in their particular state, but also taxes prevailing in say, neighboring 
states. The rationale is that while voters may penalize incumbent for increases in taxes; 
they may not do so if there have been similar tax increases in the neighboring states.
48
 
This is examined by incorporating a variable which measures taxes in neighboring states. 
                                                          
47 These findings are similar to those of studies using data from developed countries, for example - 
Peltzman (1992), Kone and Winters (1993), Sobel (1998) and Landon and Ryan (1997).  
48
 Voters may also not care about own tax increases if they are satisfied with the services financed by the 
taxes.  
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In this exercise we construct a ratio of average per capita taxes in neighboring states and 
per capita taxes in particular state. Another variable using ratio of taxes to state domestic 
product (SDP) is similarly constructed. 
49
This variable is expected to be negatively 
related to votes received by the incumbent.
50
 Neighbor‟s states are defined as those states 
which share border the state in question, so while some coastal states may have only two 
neighbors; landlocked states may have as many as seven. In addition to the usual 
explanatory variable, another variable, revenue expenditures is also included to control 
for the level of services provided.  
Our results indicate that increases in property and excise taxes are penalized by 
the electorate. Though the property tax yardstick variable has positive sign (opposite of 
what we have hypothesized); the yardstick variable for excise has the correct sign. This 
implies that increases in own excise taxes larger than those experienced by the 
neighboring states are penalized. It must be noted that though the coefficients on sales tax 
and its yardstick variable are not significant; they do have the signs consistent with what 
we have hypothesized. While increases in motor vehicle taxes are rewarded; increases in 
own motor vehicle taxes larger than those experienced by the neighboring states are 
penalized. Increases in revenue from social service expenditures are also penalized. 
Yardstick effects do seem to exist in case of some taxes in India.
51
 
The coefficient of votes in the previous election is generally negative and 
significant; this documents the commonly acknowledged presence of an „anti-
                                                          
49 Ratio = (PC taxes of Statei /average PC taxes)*100 
50
 Increases in ratio would be due to greater increases in own taxes relative to neighbor‟s taxes; hence the 
negative relation. So if all states increase taxes by the same proportion, voters may not penalize the 
incumbent. Only increases greater than that of neighbor‟s taxes would be penalized. 
51 Beasley and Case find that while an incumbent governor‟s reelection prospect reduces with increase in 
taxes; however the effect is mitigated if neighboring states have experienced increases too.  
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incumbency‟ effect in elections. This implies that there is some „cost to governance‟ in 
form of lower votes in the succeeding elections. Though the schedule caste population 
variable is not always significant, when it is, it positively affects the incumbent‟s share of 
votes. While this may be due to patronage of incumbents, we cannot conclusively say so 
without further investigation. 
 We find that voters tend reward reductions in taxes while not reacting to 
expenditures or punishing their increases. We attribute such a finding to the notion that 
people tend to value in-kind transfers differently from in-cash transfers and there also an 
impression that government expenditure is wasteful. 
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Table 2.1: Voter response to Revenue Expenditure on Social Services 
Percent Votes Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Education 0.0195 0.0195 -0.000523 -0.0193 -0.0193 -0.00193 0.0857 0.0857 0.107 
Health 0.14 0.14 0.0958 -0.0804 -0.0804 0.148 0.0648 0.0648 0.0637 
Water supply & Sanitation -0.236 -0.236 -0.259 0.021 0.021 -0.404 -0.206 -0.206 -0.0624 
Labor & Employment 0.648 0.648 -0.00119 0.427 0.427 -0.176 0.344 0.344 0.184 
Welfare -0.105 -0.105 -0.0879 -0.0878 -0.0878 -0.152 -0.333 -0.333 -0.646 
Calamity Relief -0.0286 -0.0286 0.0545 -0.11 -0.11 0.0147 -0.0584 -0.0584 -0.36 
Pension -0.0352 -0.0352 -0.0451 0.0186 0.0186 -0.0507 -0.0666 -0.0666 -0.0891 
Votes in previous election -0.0457 -0.0457 -0.223*** -0.0656 -0.0656 -0.236*** -0.0421 -0.0421 -0.188** 
Literacy -1.395 -1.395 0.424 -1.369 -1.369 0.409 0.12 0.12 -1.425 
Urban 3.046 3.046 6.065 2.764 2.764 7.148 4.031 4.031 9.931 
Schedule caste population 7.563** 7.563** -10.11 7.779** 7.779*** -6.893 7.700** 7.700** 29.72 
Real SDP -2.67E-06 -2.67E-06 -1.40E-05 1.05E-05 1.05E-05 -1.07E-05 -6.20E-06 -6.20E-06 -3.44E-06 
Population -1.80E-06 -1.80E-06 1.47e-05** -5.88E-07 -5.88E-07 1.56e-05**    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -20.24 -20.24 -397 -17.71 -17.71 -505.5 -155.2 -155.2 -460.8 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.099  0.16 0.103  0.17 0.095  0.117 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.2: Voter response to Revenue Expenditure on Economic Services 
Percent Votes Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Urban Development 0.0173 0.0173 0.294 -0.0715 -0.0715 0.234 -0.0952 -0.0952 -0.0116 
Cooperation 0.168 0.168 0.655 -0.179 -0.179 -0.131 -0.815 -0.815 -2.815 
Agriculture & allied activities -0.103 -0.103 0.177 -0.0287 -0.0287 -0.0213 -0.0468 -0.0468 -0.0257 
Sewage & Water 0.366 0.366 -2.782** -0.185 -0.185 -2.083 1.21 1.21 0.153 
Rural Development -0.012 -0.012 -0.1 -0.0975 -0.0975 -0.0696 -0.166 -0.166 0.0123 
Industries -0.563 -0.563 -0.901 -0.361 -0.361 -0.629 -0.979 -0.979 -1.06 
Small scale industries -0.628 -0.628 0.178 -0.505 -0.505 -0.284 0.278 0.278 0.256 
Votes in previous election -0.0714 -0.0714 -0.222*** -0.0561 -0.0561 -0.229*** -0.0475 -0.0475 -0.191** 
Literacy -0.839 -0.839 -1.811 -1 -1 -3.563 1.271 1.271 -0.689 
Urban 2.216 2.216 5.698 2.886 2.886 7.625 3.222 3.222 3.211 
Schedule caste population 6.886** 6.886** -16.47 6.839** 6.839** -13.74 8.172** 8.172** 1.879 
Real SDP 1.50E-05 1.50E-05 -4.24E-05 1.26E-05 1.26E-05 -2.78E-05 -4.65E-06 -4.65E-06 -1.14E-06 
Population -1.75E-06 -1.75E-06 2.37e-05*** -3.37E-07 -3.37E-07 1.77e-05***    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -25.46 -25.46 -412.3 -16.6 -16.6 -172.6 -165.6 -165.6 27.84 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.104  0.199 0.119  0.183 0.097  0.111 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.3: Voter response to Revenue (Plan) Expenditure on Infrastructure 
Percent Votes Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Housing -1.152** -1.152** -0.988 -0.661 -0.661 -0.739 -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0816 
Irrigation -0.782** -0.782** -0.751* -0.616* -0.616* -0.572 0.147 0.147 0.215 
Power -0.894*** -0.894*** -0.869*** -0.864*** -0.864*** -0.871*** 0.0523 0.0523 0.0172 
Roads & Bridges -1.824*** -1.824*** -1.288** -1.210*** -1.210*** -0.731 -0.00679 -0.00679 -0.387 
Police 22.57*** 22.57*** 22.79*** 21.59*** 21.59*** 23.14*** 12.88*** 12.88*** 13.58*** 
Public works -0.434 -0.434 2.614 -0.834 -0.834 2.136 -0.187 -0.187 -1.224 
Votes in previous election -4.893*** -4.893*** -5.119*** -4.410*** -4.410*** -4.885*** -1.155*** -1.155*** -1.307*** 
Literacy -0.931 -0.931 1.624 -0.433 -0.433 1.634 0.562 0.562 0.053 
Urban 1.148 1.148 4.238 1.985 1.985 3.094 3.156 3.156 0.00909 
Schedule caste population 5.108*** 5.108*** -5.549 4.884*** 4.884*** 10.04 8.528*** 8.528*** 7.29 
Real SDP 1.92e-05*** 1.92e-05*** -4.61E-06 1.03e-05* 1.03e-05* -0.0000132 -3.64E-06 -3.64E-06 -0.0000024 
Population -2.54e-06*** -2.54e-06*** 6.81E-06 -1.52e-06** -1.52e-06** 6.21e-06*    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 200.8** 200.8** -57.06 148.2* 148.2* -186.4 -148.6 -148.6 -37.66 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.599  0.605 0.672  0.714 0.244  0.258 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.4: Voter response to Capital Expenditure on Social and Economic Services 
Percent Votes Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Education 0.109 0.109 0.519 -0.219 -0.219 -0.257 0.169 0.169 0.0221 
Health -0.351** -0.351** -0.566*** -0.351** -0.351** -0.444** 0.238 0.238 0.37 
Agriculture & allied activities -0.982*** -0.982*** -1.045*** -0.900*** -0.900*** -1.014*** -1.928*** -1.928*** -1.954*** 
Industries -1.669** -1.669** -1.069 -0.777 -0.777 0.0238 0.137 0.137 -1.366 
Small scale industries -0.618 -0.618 0.985 -1.941 -1.941 -1.942 -1.227 -1.227 -0.553 
Votes in previous election -0.0567 -0.0567 -0.195*** -0.0577 -0.0577 -0.192*** -0.0301 -0.0301 -0.160** 
Literacy 0.753 0.753 3.194 1.163 1.163 1.57 0.783 0.783 -4.746 
Urban 0.344 0.344 4.163 1.427 1.427 5.975 2.984 2.984 4.303 
Schedule caste population 3.76 3.76 -17.07 4.375* 4.375* -29.73 4.736* 4.736* 3.824 
Real SDP 1.80e-05** 1.80e-05** -4.17E-06 1.28e-05* 1.28e-05* -0.0000129 -3.35E-06 -3.35E-06 -2.72E-06 
Population -3.82E-07 -3.82E-07 1.61e-05*** 4.63E-07 4.63E-07 1.50e-05***    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -44.98 -44.98 -412.4 -12.7 -12.7 -96.53 -62.34 -62.34 181.3 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.278  0.365 0.308  0.412 0.261  0.32 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.5: Voter response to Capital Expenditure on Infrastructure 
Percent Votes Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Water & Sanitation -0.111 -0.111 0.172 -0.174 -0.174 0.0642 -0.0159 -0.0159 0.129 
Housing -0.636 -0.636 -2.192** -0.957 -0.957 -2.138** 0.214 0.214 -0.42 
Irrigation 0.000187 0.000187 0.00693 -0.0131 -0.0131 -0.00352 -0.0536 -0.0536 -0.216 
Power -0.0366 -0.0366 -0.197* -0.0498 -0.0498 -0.166* -0.00693 -0.00693 -0.0474 
Roads & Bridges 0.0321 0.0321 0.0201 0.0323 0.0323 0.0134 0.0573 0.0573 -0.0315 
Votes in previous election -0.0514 -0.0514 -0.244*** -0.0569 -0.0569 -0.239*** -0.0359 -0.0359 -0.173** 
Literacy -1.037 -1.037 -0.582 -1.269 -1.269 -0.706 0.633 0.633 -0.725 
Urban 2.643 2.643 7.158 2.79 2.79 7.273 2.989 2.989 2.653 
Schedule caste population 7.388** 7.388** 13.05 7.422** 7.422** 11.64 7.151** 7.151** 11.33 
Real SDP 3.81E-06 3.81E-06 -2.94e-05* 0.0000067 0.0000067 -2.71e-05* -3.86E-06 -3.86E-06 -4.67E-07 
Population -1.55E-06 -1.55E-06 1.92e-05*** -1.68E-06 -1.68E-06 1.71e-05***    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -32.18 -32.18 -736.2 -18.16 -18.16 -641.4 -143.1 -143.1 -94.18 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.093  0.212 0.1  0.204 0.082  0.105 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.6: Voter response to Tax and Non-tax Revenues 
Percent Votes Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Property tax 0.00399 0.00399 -0.127 -0.0802 -0.0802 -0.216 -0.298 -0.298 -0.881* 
State sales tax -0.0626** -0.0626** -0.044 -0.0728*** -0.0728*** -0.0607* -0.116 -0.116 -0.21^ 
Motor Vehicles tax 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.230** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.298*** 1.343*** 1.343*** 1.706*** 
Excise 0.00917 0.00917 -0.178 -0.0166 -0.0166 -0.0894 -0.276 -0.276 -0.354 
Duty on Electricity 0.154 0.154 -0.0197 0.0838 0.0838 -0.0739 0.366 0.366 -0.501 
Other taxes -0.0944 -0.0944 -0.133 -0.129* -0.129* -0.155** -0.67 -0.67 -0.513 
Revenue from social services -0.00764 -0.00764 0.133 -0.123 -0.123 0.0582 -1.547* -1.547* -1.820** 
Revenue from economic services -0.0211 -0.0211 0.123 -0.0311 -0.0311 0.122 0.222** 0.222** 0.413*** 
Votes in previous election -0.0875 -0.0875 -0.286*** -0.0996 -0.0996 -0.289*** -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.356*** 
Literacy 0.174 0.174 -4.54 0.379 0.379 -5.736 0.963 0.963 -8.147 
Urban 1.567 1.567 4.264 1.983 1.983 4.725 4.248 4.248 5.74 
Schedule caste population 5.682** 5.682** 20.92 5.643** 5.643** 4.34E+01 6.942** 6.942** 88.63* 
Real SDP 3.33E-06 3.33E-06 -0.00001 1.65E-05 1.65E-05 -1.07E-06 -3.50E-06 -3.50E-06 7.67E-06 
Population -1.09E-06 -1.09E-06 1.72e-05*** -8.24E-07 -8.24E-07 1.28e-05**    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -58.57 -58.57 -587 -104.1 -104.1 -718.5 -182.8 -182.8 -821.1 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.155  0.301 0.195  0.335 0.314  0.501 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
Note: ^ - Significant at 11% 
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Table 2.7: Yardstick measures in voter behavior analysis 
  Per Capita Values Ratios 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Property tax -0.18 -0.18 -1.310** -162.6 -162.6 -280.8** 
Property tax (Ratio) 0.502 0.502 1.193* -4.506 -4.506 -5.026 
Sales Tax -0.0185 -0.0185 -0.00096 -10.23 -10.23 -33.42 
Sales Tax (Ratio) 0.0462 0.0462 -0.0627 15.75 15.75 -17.29 
Excise -0.174 -0.174 -1.162*** -36.48 -36.48 -89.51 
Excise (Ratio) -1.027** -1.027** -0.980* -105.2 -105.2 -164.9** 
Revenue Expenditure 0.00623 0.00623 0.00238 -0.223 -0.223 -0.261 
Real SDP -4.37E-06 -4.37E-06 2.51E-06 1.02E-06 1.02E-06 -2.20e-05* 
Literacy 1.064 1.064 -1.681 0.387 0.387 -0.773 
Urban 4.585 4.585 11.79 5.011* 5.011* 9.793 
Population 
   
14.01*** 14.01*** 18.55 
Schedule class population 12.31*** 12.31*** 41.65 -5.1E-07 -5.1E-07 1.12e-05** 
Votes in last election -0.0554 -0.0554 -0.281*** -0.0805 -0.0805 -0.270*** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -189.4 -189.4 -503.7 -69.85 -69.85 -323.5 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.152 
 
0.363 0.172 
 
0.353 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.8: Yardstick measures in voter behavior analysis 
  Per Capita Values Ratios 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Motor vehicle tax 1.807*** 1.807*** 2.307*** 235.4*** 235.4*** 361.5*** 
Motor vehicle tax (Ratio) -1.025** -1.025** -0.871* -7.087 -7.087 6.972 
Other taxes -0.416 -0.416 -0.648 -43.29 -43.29 -75.22 
Other taxes (Ratio) -2.186 -2.186 -3.12 -277.2 -277.2 -505.3* 
Revenues from social services -1.413 -1.413 -1.627* -337.8* -337.8** -232.7 
Revenues from social services (Ratio) -0.252 -0.252 -1.001 -115 -115 -653.8** 
Revenues from economic services 0.126 0.126 0.177 13.86 13.86 22.86 
Revenues from economic services (Ratio) 0.0259 0.0259 -0.224 14.29 14.29 -37.07 
Revenue Expenditure -0.00674 -0.00674 -0.0106 -0.0769 -0.0769 -1.531 
Real SDP -1.6E-06 -1.6E-06 1.84E-06 -2.6E-06 -2.6E-06 -2.38e-05** 
Literacy 1.13 1.13 -7.351 0.791 0.791 -5.938 
Urban 2.273 2.273 -4.752 3.84 3.84 6.536 
Population 
   
5.228 5.228 54.38 
Schedule class population 3.576 3.576 84.23* -7.2E-07 -7.2E-07 1.27e-05*** 
Votes in last election -0.154** -0.154** -0.344*** -0.0928 -0.0928 -0.311*** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -83 -83 -484.8 -117.6 -117.6 -647 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.316 
 
0.488 0.229 
 
0.48 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Cycles in Grants provided by the National government prior to national elections 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
The fiscal policy variables in this case are centrally distributed intergovernmental 
transfers and loans, and the election dummy denotes national elections. This equation is 
estimated for all states, aligned and unaligned states independently. 
There is strong evidence that electoral cycles exist in inter-governmental grants 
even though many of the grants are based on formulas. Our results indicate that total 
loans and grants from the center are systematically larger prior to national elections. 
Grants for state plan schemes and non-plan grants are also larger prior to a national 
election. 
52
 As in the case with sub-national elections, we can conclude that cycles are 
generally found prior to scheduled elections 
Many economists argue that the grant system in India taken in its entirety is not 
transparent and is subject to increasing discretion of central government in grant 
provision. While formula based transfers have shown large fluctuations from one plan 
period to another, many have also pointed out that the construction of formula themselves 
are politicized with the presence of central ministers and chief ministers of states in the 
various commissions. Even the so-called non-plan or statutory grants provided by the 
finance commission are not transparent with its „gap filling‟ methodology. Also, though 
the Finance Commission is a constitutional body established to oversee distribution of 
statutory grants; its importance has greatly reduced in the years since majority of the 
                                                          
52
 An interesting digression – Results indicate that total grants in within the Indian union are not equalizing; 
this is mainly due to the non-equalizing nature of non-plan grants provided by the finance commission. 
Since these grants tend to be „gap-filling‟ grants it begs the question whether richer states are fiscally 
profligate?  
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grants now come under the preview of the Planning commission. Since the Planning 
commission has various ministers as its members, it can be argued that such 
manipulations can easily creep in.
53
 
An interesting variation of tactical distributions hypothesis is then examined. 
While Dixit and Londregan (1998) argue that an incumbent would try to manipulate 
distribution of resources to favor „swing‟ voters; Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that 
such distributions would generally favor an incumbents „core‟ supporters. While existing 
research use time series data on all years to test these theories; here it is examined in 
conjunction with political cycle theories. A caveat is in order, though many papers do use 
alignment with a higher tier of government to measure the nature of „swing‟ of a state, 
such a measure is generally imprecise as a state may be a swing state in terms of it being 
up for grabs but it could also be aligned with the center. So if we find that states aligned 
with the center are being targeted, it not only captures the notion that the incumbent at 
center is attempting to help a co-partisan at the state level, but it could also pick up the 
effect of the center attempting to target a swing state. Therefore though we may use 
alignment here, we use insights from the „clarity of responsibility‟ literature to interpret 
these results, though  content that this may also be picking up „swing‟ effects and we 
need to include measures of „swing‟ independently to examine its effects. To test the 
hypothesis that the national government may treat aligned (here taken to mean „core‟ 
support states) and unaligned (swing states) differently prior to national level elections, a 
variable align is constructed. Align takes the value of 1 if the chief minister of a state 
                                                          
53 These arguments are drawn from various papers, book chapters and other discussions on the Indian 
transfer system. References to these papers are included in the bibliography. See Rao and Singh (2001) for 
an excellent overview of issues regarding institutions and transfers. 
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belongs to any party in the national coalition at the time of the election. The same 
regressions are then estimated by each category, aligned and unaligned states.  
Interestingly, the cycles in grants seem to exist mainly in case of unaligned 
states.
54
 This may indicate that the central incumbent‟s objective is to maximize votes 
across the country; and is attempting to do so by influencing the more visible 
expenditures at the state level in states which do not form his or her support base by 
influencing their transfers. Loans provided by the central government however; are 
higher in aligned states prior to national elections. This would be the case if it is easier to 
provide loans which would be repaid in future than wrangle grants for these aligned 
states.  
Ideally if the central incumbent‟s motivation is to internalize all the „credit‟ 
accruing due to expenditures based on these grants, we would expect to find persistent 
cycles in grants for central plans and centrally sponsored schemes as these fund programs 
are undertaken by the states at the behest of the center or the central ministries operate 
these programs; respectively. Also, these grants would be higher prior to election in case 
of unaligned states. However; while cycles do seem to exist in case of central plan 
schemes, it‟s not so in case of centrally sponsored schemes. As expected; unaligned states 
obtain higher central plan grants prior to a national election.
55
 
                                                          
54
 This is consistent with Khemani‟s (2003) finding that political manipulation is present in the distribution 
of grants in India. However while we find unaligned states are favored with higher plan at times of 
elections, she finds that such grants are higher in case of aligned states. However, given that we test for 
slightly different hypothesis it may be the case that while at times of elections, unaligned states are favored, 
across the entire time period, aligned states may be favored. We also must keep in mind that the data set we 
use comprises of more years and a larger number of Indian states. Our results in case of non-plan grants 
however are similar. 
55 This is consistent with Rao and Singh (2000) finding of lower central plan transfers and centrally 
sponsored transfers to aligned states. 
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 Though we find evidence in favor of the notion that the central incumbent 
provides higher transfers to unaligned states, given the caveat mentioned above we 
cannot emphatically conclude that the central incumbent does not favor „swing‟ states. 
We would prefer to couch an argument for such a result on the notion that an incumbent 
would attempt to internalize the perceived gains from his or her actions and the degree of 
„clarity of responsibility‟. This implies that the central incumbent would attempt to 
increases those types of transfers for which they can claim sole responsibility to 
unaligned states. If it is the case that the central incumbent is focusing on „swing‟ states; 
it would also be interesting to examine the duration of such behavior as this may lead to 
erosion of support in „core‟ states and therefore threaten the favorable electoral chances 
of the incumbent. 
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Table 3.1: Cycles in total grants provided by alignment of states 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 52.92 -6.218 1293*** 531.6** 56.34 356.2 1742*** 39.56 1249*** 
Literacy 4.599** 19.10*** 16.46*** 3.206 3.206 25.78** 5.644* 5.644* 10.26 
Urban -21.99*** -36.88*** -47.31*** -32.13*** -32.13*** -82.15*** -13.53*** -13.53*** -25.03** 
SC population -4.334* -22.63*** -92.77*** -4.85 -4.85 -221.8*** -3.949 -3.949 71.82 
Population 8.87e-06*** 1.32e-05*** 2.93e-05*** 4.44e-06*** 4.44e-06*** 3.02e-05*** 1.34e-05*** 1.34e-05*** 1.66e-05** 
Real SDP 0.00387*** 0.00548*** 0.00346*** 0.00681*** 0.00681*** 0.00371** 0.00115 0.00115 0.00648*** 
Share of agriculture 4.134 15.84*** 18.35*** -0.789 -0.789 17.65** 11.46*** 11.46*** 16.87*** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -88.99 -706.7** -36.98 415.8 415.8 1915** -577.7** -577.7** -1748** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.793 
 
0.829 0.781 
 
0.829 0.837 
 
0.837 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 3.2: Cycles in total grants for state plan schemes provided by alignment of states 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 8.53 -19.7 765.4*** 276.5** 14.69 132.9 878.6*** -11.04 677.9*** 
Literacy 3.455** 9.688*** 7.876** 3.233 3.233 15.07** 4.222** 4.222** 4.651 
Urban -13.32*** -19.52*** -22.44*** -19.65*** -19.65*** -49.79*** -8.725*** -8.725*** -8.339 
SC population -4.712*** -13.77*** -54.97** -5.756** -5.756** -136.4*** -4.745** -4.745** 41.71 
Population 5.44e-06*** 8.16e-06*** 1.75e-05*** 3.51e-06*** 3.51e-06*** 2.50e-05*** 7.81e-06*** 7.81e-06*** 3.96E-06 
Real SDP 0.00048 0.000859 -0.000408 0.00196*** 0.00196*** -0.000947 -0.00104* -0.00104* 0.00133 
Share of agriculture 1.443 5.720** 6.453** 0.352 0.352 12.02*** 3.997 3.997* 4.285 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.14 -229.9 135.8 215.6 215.6 1036* -206 -206 -664.4 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.675 
 
0.712 0.683 
 
0.756 0.712 
 
0.702 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 3.3: Cycles in total grants for central plan schemes provided by alignment of states 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 13.12 15.87 70.75** 2.996 8.846 12.2 64.58* 16.46 170.6*** 
Literacy -0.42 -0.52 -0.55 0.0599 0.0599 0.49 -1.107** -1.107** -3.206** 
Urban 0.21 0.439 -0.932 -0.368* -0.368* 0.29 0.825 0.825 -2.34 
SC population -0.511 -0.37 0.756 -0.277 -0.277 0.165 -0.0448 -0.0448 1.379 
Population 5.68e-07*** 4.21e-07* -1.30e-06** 7.27e-07*** 7.27e-07*** -4.92E-08 2.91E-07 2.91E-07 -6.76E-07 
Real SDP 0.000160* 0.000147 0.000402*** 0.000244*** 0.000244*** 0.000325*** 0.000167 0.000167 0.000231 
Share of agriculture 0.467 1.193** 1.756*** 0.359 0.359 1.160** 0.564 0.564 1.574 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0493 -27.16 11.14 -13.54 -13.54 -64.51 15.02 15.02 140 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.28 
 
0.137 0.679 
 
0.356 0.199 
 
0.168 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 3.4: Cycles in total non-plan grants provided by alignment of states 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election -4.685 -6.514 482.3*** 96.88 -15.27 148.7 467.7*** 17.64 537.5*** 
Literacy 1.202 3.823* 2.748 0.427 0.427 7.858 1.113 1.113 1.372 
Urban -6.144*** -8.390*** -21.04*** -8.956*** -8.956*** -28.82*** -3.572** -3.572** -15.62** 
SC population 2.168 -1.019 -23.37 2.709 2.709 -44.51 2.403 2.403 14.58 
Population -5.11E-09 -5.35E-08 8.42E-07 -1.02E-06 -1.02E-06 -2.01E-06 0.0000005 0.0000005 2.32E-06 
Real SDP 0.00168*** 0.00227*** 0.00247*** 0.00237*** 0.00237*** 0.00283*** 0.00133** 0.00133** 0.00314*** 
Share of agriculture -0.349 4.906** 9.233*** -2.815 -2.815 3.321 2.514 2.514 11.67*** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 46.04 -180.5 212.3 241.6* 241.6* 728.6 -118.7 -118.7 -448.7 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.586 
 
0.627 0.623 
 
0.648 0.578 
 
0.623 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 3.5: Cycles in total loans provided by alignment of states
56
 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 98.57 83.62 647.5** 693.3*** 153 756.6** 607.2*** 19.62 602.6 
Literacy 0.966 3.072 -6.708 0.243 0.243 -23.92** 4.262 4.262 0.701 
Urban -1.267 -5.181 -16.54* 0.663 0.663 -17 -3.177 -3.177 -26.05* 
SC population 4.41 2.674 123.0*** -0.0566 -0.0566 128.0** 3.617 3.617 154.5** 
Population 9.67e-06*** 1.06e-05*** 3.57e-05*** 8.67e-06*** 8.67e-06*** 5.67e-05*** 1.24e-05*** 1.24e-05*** 5.57E-06 
Real SDP 0.00468*** 0.00495*** 0.00133 0.00466*** 0.00466*** -0.0025 0.00310*** 0.00310*** 0.00662*** 
Share of agriculture 7.301** 6.603 5.608 4.754 4.754 -4.817 13.23*** 13.23*** 15.25** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -642.0*** -627.3** -1987*** -510.9* -510.9* -1588 -900.6*** -900.6*** -1909** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.716 
 
0.562 0.769 
 
0.726 0.739 
 
0.47 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Similar cycles exist in case of real values too, but we do not present them here due to space constraints. 
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Voter behavior in response to grants and loans provided by the center in National 
elections 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝛾𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Incumbent vote share here refers to the vote share obtained by the national 
coalition in national elections. Fiscal policy variables analyzed here include the various 
intergovernmental transfers and loans provided by the central government. 
We must bear in mind that we are examining the effects of larger „invisible‟ items 
on voter response. Though the inter-governmental grants are one of the main sources of 
revenue to state governments, and hence influence expenditure and taxes collected by 
them, these are not generally visible to the electorate. Given this we may not expect to 
see strong economic voting effects in case of inter-governmental transfers. However, 
voters do seem to respond to these in small measures. Voters respond positively to 
increases in non-plan grants. This may be due to the fact that components of these non-
plan grants (generally Finance Commission grants) are used for gap-filling. There grants 
therefore could be used to in place of tax revenues and the positive effect of these grants 
may in fact be due to voters rewarding the incumbents for thus financed lower taxes.  
In case of centrally sponsored schemes, where there is a higher clarity of 
responsibility i.e., a direct link can be established between the grant provider and the 
programs undertaken; there is some evidence that voters reward the central incumbent for 
increases in such grants. 
As hypothesized, we do not find strong economic voting effects in case of 
transfers. Among those items we do find muted responses, we surmise that this is 
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generally due to the use which the grants are put into and the greater degree of clarity of 
responsibility associated with those. 
Table 4.1: Voter response to Non-Plan Grants and Loans 
  Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE 
Grants – State 0.00574*** 0.00574*** 0.00534** 
Grants – Other -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.00858 
Loans – Other -0.00471 -0.00471 -0.00907 
Votes in previous election 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.589*** 
Literacy 0.0832 0.0832 0.834* 
Urban 0.0456 0.0456 0.616 
Schedule class population -0.0576 -0.0576 -1.354 
Real SDP 5.07E-08 5.07E-08 4.68E-07 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 17.44*** 17.44*** -11.71 
Observations 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.665  0.667 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 4.2: Voter response to Plan Grants and Loans 
  Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE 
Grants - State Plan schemes -0.00018 -0.00018 -0.0019 
Grants - Central Plan schemes -0.00612 -0.00612 -0.0125 
Grants - Centrally sponsored schemes 0.0107* 0.0107* 0.00506 
Loans - State Plan schemes -0.00536 -0.00536 -0.00623 
Loans - Central Plan schemes 0.0125 0.0125 0.0149 
Loans - Centrally sponsored schemes 0.107 0.107 0.0591 
Votes in previous election 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.601*** 
Literacy 0.091 0.091 0.823* 
Urban 0.107 0.107 0.123 
Schedule class population -0.145 -0.145 -1.966 
Real SDP -5.55E-08 -5.55E-08 3.63E-07 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 18.54*** 18.54*** 10.31 
Observations 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.663  0.668 
    
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Cycles in Grants provided by the National government prior to sub-national 
elections 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
The fiscal policy variables in this case are centrally distributed intergovernmental 
transfers and loans, and the election dummy denotes sub-national elections. In this 
section we attempt to explore the existence of electoral cycles in grants and loans 
provided by the center to the states at the time of sub-national elections. We may see such 
behavior if the central incumbent attempts to aid co-partisans contesting at the sun-
national levels by influencing voter behavior through grants and loans provided. 
Interestingly, no cycles emerge in case of grants or loans.  
Sub-national elections in the Indian states occur at different times, with some 
states having elections at the same time as the national elections and others having them 
in between. Given that we find strong evidence of political cycles in grants and loans at 
the time of national election; the lack of such evidence at the time of sub-national 
elections, some which take place at the same time as the national election, is surprising. 
This may be due to the fact that the central incumbent does not consciously attempt to 
manipulate grants and loans prior to sub-national elections; but where there is a bigger 
prize in terms of being in power at the national level; manipulations do occur. It may also 
be the case that the ill effects caused by the distortions and inefficiencies caused by such 
manipulations during sub-national elections; especially when they do not occur in 
congruence with national election are not worth the gains accrued by the central 
incumbents in terms of higher votes.  
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Voter behavior in response to grants and loans provided by the center in Sub-
national elections 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝛾𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Incumbent vote share here refers to the vote share obtained by the national 
coalition in sub-national elections. Fiscal policy variables analyzed here include the 
various intergovernmental transfers and loans provided by the central government. 
Here, the effect on votes obtained by the central incumbents at the sub-national 
elections due to grants and loans provided by the same is analyzed. Since these transfers 
are not visible, voter behavior towards them may be non-existent. Interestingly, in case of 
central plan scheme grants where the central incumbent can clearly take the credit i.e., 
there is higher clarity of responsibility; voters respond positively to increases. While 
voters seem to be punishing the incumbents for increases in non-plan loans for 
miscellaneous purposes; there is some evidence that they reward grants provided for such 
purposes. As mentioned previously, since non-plan loans may lead to lower tax revenues 
collected by state governments, the positive coefficient on non-plan loans may be 
capturing that effect. 
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Table 6.1: Voter response to Plan Grants and Loans 
  Nominal Variables Real Variables 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Grants - State Plan -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.00149 -0.00255 -0.00255 -0.00189 
Grants - Central Plan 0.0271 0.0283 0.0577* 0.00328 0.00328 0.028 
Grants - Centrally Sponsored 
schemes 0.00238 0.0026 -0.00295 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.00231 
Loans - State Plan 0.00292 0.00293 0.00233 0.0016 0.0016 0.00265 
Loans - Central Plan 0.00399 0.0426 0.141 -0.0371 -0.0371 0.0109 
Loans - Centrally Sponsored 
schemes -0.000231 -0.0107 -0.0356 0.0162 0.0162 -0.032 
Votes in Previous election 0.580*** 0.578*** 0.600*** 0.585*** 0.585*** 0.586*** 
Literacy -0.183 -0.153 0.309 -0.225* -0.225* 0.149 
Urban 0.0615 0.0485 5.74E-01 0.0467 0.0467 5.61E-01 
Schedule class Population 0.221* 2.22E-01 1.77E-01 1.99E-01 1.99E-01 1.13E+00 
Population -1.90e-07*** -1.82e-07*** 2.93E-07 -1.49e-07** -1.49e-07** 2.95E-07 
Real SDP 4.71E-07 4.88E-07 2.52E-07 5.23E-07 5.23E-07 3.17E-07 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 26.18*** 24.92*** -21.12 28.17*** 28.17*** -25.84 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.566   0.57 0.561   0.56 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 6.2: Voter response to Non - Plan Grants and Loans 
  Nominal Variables Real Variables 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Grants - Non-plan state 0.000182 -0.000646 -0.00205 0.000688 -0.0000923 -0.002 
Grants - Non-plan other 0.0121** 0.0110** 0.00766 0.0139** 0.0126** 0.00768 
Loans - Non-plan other -0.0329* -0.0344* -0.0332* -0.0239** -0.0242*** -0.0231** 
Votes in Previous election 0.576*** 0.565*** 0.555*** 0.588*** 0.579*** 0.563*** 
Literacy -0.254** -0.232* 0.00811 -0.273** -0.258** 0.000205 
Urban 0.103 0.0933 0.266 0.13 0.121 0.267 
Schedule class Population 0.213 0.228 0.507 0.256* 0.270* 0.309 
Population -1.43e-07*** -1.35e-07** 1.17E-07 -1.54e-07*** -1.50e-07*** 2.99E-08 
Real SDP 3.45E-07 3.43E-07 2.88E-08 3.55E-07 3.6E-07 1.69E-07 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 29.51*** 28.78*** 4.701 30.37*** 29.96*** 10.63 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.583  0.566 0.592  0.573 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Cycles in expenditures undertaken and revenues collected by the sub-national 
governments prior to national elections 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
The fiscal policy variables in this case are state level tax and non-tax revenues 
collected and expenditures undertaken. And the election dummy denotes national 
elections. We may expect to find such manipulations of fiscal policy if the state 
incumbent is attempting to influence voters in its favor at the time of national elections.  
As in case of transfers; alignment matters in case of political cycles in taxes, other 
revenues and expenditures too. However; in case of expenditures, political cycles are 
persistent only in case of aligned states. Revenue expenditures, expenditures on education 
and labor are significantly higher prior to elections in case of aligned states. Interestingly 
while expenditures on social services, especially health are higher pre-election in case of 
aligned states; they are lower in case of unaligned states. No cycles are found for total 
capital outlay, own tax and non-tax revenues for aligned states; however these are 
significantly lower pre-election in case of unaligned states. While both aligned and 
unaligned states experience electoral cycles in pensions; higher pensions are distributed 
in unaligned states.  
There is strong evidence to the fact that state incumbents attempt to aid their co-
partisans at the national level by manipulating expenditures. This result fortifies the 
rationale given for cycles found in transfers to unaligned states. Since national 
incumbents seem to be able to manipulate visible expenditures through their so-partisans 
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at the state level, they may use to transfer system to influence indirectly, the behavior 
unaligned states prior to elections.
57
 
It is also interesting to note that while aligned states seem to manipulate 
expenditures, unaligned states seem to manipulate tax and non-tax revenues. This 
behavior is optimal if the state incumbent is attempting to improve his (her) own chances 
in the national election, as the credit for lower taxes accrues exclusively to him or her 
while the credit would have been „shared‟ with the central incumbent in case of 
expenditures undertaken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 This is consistent with Khemani‟s (2003) finding that aligned states are generally more fiscally profligate 
than unaligned states.    
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Table 7.1: Cycles in Revenue expenditures undertaken by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 35.61 -25.98 688.6 3550*** 368.3 2252* 6171*** -352.5 -2763 
Literacy 39.44*** 50.89*** 87.75*** 4.822 4.822 -30.38 74.87*** 74.87*** 131.6*** 
Urban -85.93*** -108.1*** -135.2*** -94.77*** -94.77*** -193.9*** -85.68*** -85.68*** -95.21 
SC population -46.33*** -64.60*** -64.06 -38.25* -38.25* -567.1** -83.62*** -83.62*** 629.8* 
Population -1.11e-05* -2.04e-05*** 0.000193*** -5.12e-05*** -5.12e-05*** 0.000136*** 3.84e-05*** 3.84e-05*** 0.000154*** 
Real SDP 0.145*** 0.159*** 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.178*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.191*** 
Share of agriculture 65.09*** 72.10*** 35.49 39.51 39.51 24.59 95.02*** 95.02*** 27.97 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4418*** -4435*** -9836*** -1509 -1509 3742 -6623*** -6623*** -18893*** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.912 
 
0.93 0.934 
 
0.957 0.913 
 
0.909 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.2: Cycles in Expenditures on social services undertaken by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 42.56 -35.54 183.2 1311*** 126.5 1479*** 1753*** -49.01 -1199** 
Literacy 9.917** 26.08*** 30.50*** 2.178 2.178 -18.9 16.43** 16.43** 47.90*** 
Urban -33.15*** -56.06*** -58.83*** -42.21*** -42.21*** -83.71*** -24.27*** -24.27*** -29.24 
SC population -17.90*** -39.86*** -28.68 -23.10*** -23.10*** -300.5*** -16.65** -16.65** 207.9* 
Population -6.41e-06*** -1.28e-05*** 3.71e-05*** -1.84e-05*** -1.84e-05*** 2.38e-05** 6.69e-06** 6.69e-06** 3.37e-05** 
Real SDP 0.0522*** 0.0644*** 0.0623*** 0.0585*** 0.0585*** 0.0669*** 0.0456*** 0.0456*** 0.0666*** 
Share of agriculture 11.52* 23.41*** 21.38*** 4.628 4.628 26.68** 22.98** 22.98** 12.48 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -789.7** -1170** -2658*** 136.9 136.9 3137** -1635*** -1635*** -6160*** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.921 
 
0.934 0.938 
 
0.963 0.922 
 
0.913 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.3: Cycles in expenditures on education undertaken by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election -15.19 -34.46 605.5** 580.3*** 31.34 995.1*** 581.6** -89.76 -462.7 
Literacy 12.18*** 16.55*** 1.684 9.760*** 9.760*** -18.21** 14.92*** 14.92*** 18.16* 
Urban -23.90*** -34.75*** -43.01*** -26.08*** -26.08*** -55.49*** -20.89*** -20.89*** -32.53** 
SC population -15.52*** -27.03*** -12.21 -17.56*** -17.56*** -165.1*** -18.01*** -18.01*** 100.5 
Population -1.05E-06 -4.38e-06** 3.32e-05*** -6.31e-06*** -6.31e-06*** 3.41e-05*** 5.20e-06** 5.20e-06*** 2.53e-05*** 
Real SDP 0.0286*** 0.0347*** 0.0324*** 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0329*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0368*** 
Share of agriculture 11.60*** 16.79*** 15.55*** 10.21** 10.21** 23.74*** 15.60*** 15.60*** 8.652 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -790.7*** -803.7*** -1134* -496.8* -496.8* 1384* -1066*** -1066*** -2789*** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.909 
 
0.916 0.929 
 
0.958 0.912 
 
0.884 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.4: Cycles in expenditures on health undertaken by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 23.68 -10.65 -44.32 280.3*** 43.51 223.2** 369.4*** -8.511 -253.5* 
Literacy 2.109** 8.361*** 10.24*** 0.887 0.887 4.055 3.298** 3.298** 10.82*** 
Urban -5.541*** -12.36*** -13.05*** -6.932*** -6.932*** -13.60*** -3.941*** -3.941*** -10.58** 
SC population -0.534 -6.698*** -14.63 -1.356 -1.356 -39.02** -0.353 -0.353 31.83 
Population 3.23E-07 4.88E-07 1.19e-05*** -2.36e-06*** -2.36e-06*** 5.64e-06*** 3.40e-06*** 3.40e-06*** 1.29e-05*** 
Real SDP 0.00872*** 0.0108*** 0.00963*** 0.0100*** 0.0100*** 0.0107*** 0.00718*** 0.00718*** 0.0104*** 
Share of agriculture 2.624** 4.812*** 4.484*** 0.44 0.44 7.859*** 5.725*** 5.725*** 1.427 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -234.9*** -383.4*** -624.4*** -33 -33 -65.04 -427.8*** -427.8*** -1142*** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.902 
 
0.906 0.942 
 
0.948 0.893 
 
0.869 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.5: Cycles in expenditure on labor and employment undertaken by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election -4.485 0.279 32.20*** -4.97 -5.029 53.25*** -14.73* -4.791 5.073 
Literacy 0.393*** -0.597*** -1.158*** 0.435*** 0.435*** -2.529*** 0.432*** 0.432*** -0.441 
Urban -0.302*** 0.124 0.357 -0.280** -0.280** -0.131 -0.360*** -0.360*** 0.799* 
SC population -0.416*** -0.0464 3.542*** -0.349** -0.349** -0.277 -0.666*** -0.666*** 3.187 
Population -9.21e-08** -4.19e-07*** -5.10e-07*** -7.01E-08 -7.01E-08 -2.73E-07 -5.43E-08 -5.43E-08 -8.93e-07*** 
Real SDP 0.000715*** 0.000860*** 0.000886*** 0.000677*** 0.000677*** 0.000918*** 0.000725*** 0.000725*** 0.000909*** 
Share of agriculture 0.156 -0.212 -0.326** 0.206 0.206 -0.443 0.106 0.106 -0.239 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -15.45** 30.11*** 11.15 -18.73* -18.73* 120.9*** -13.73 -13.73 -15.18 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.834 
 
0.801 0.842 
 
0.857 0.846 
 
0.759 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.6: Cycles in pensions provided by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election -33.87 -11.22 942.7*** 274.3* -6.094 736.9*** 716.1*** -55.06 437.0* 
Literacy 5.204** -0.0706 -15.27*** 2.473 2.473 -30.07*** 7.565** 7.565** -10.17 
Urban -8.112*** -14.21*** -13.34** -8.216*** -8.216*** -22.99*** -7.741** -7.741** -8.017 
SC population 3.007 -4.663 -4.235 0.673 0.673 -55.43 3.049 3.049 160.6*** 
Population -9.14E-07 -5.70e-06*** 9.55e-06*** -3.33e-06*** -3.33e-06*** 1.53E-06 1.42E-06 1.42E-06 2.95E-06 
Real SDP 0.0101*** 0.0161*** 0.0153*** 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0141*** 0.00980*** 0.00980*** 0.0231*** 
Share of agriculture 1.561 0.928 -2.09 2.087 2.087 -3.522 2.67 2.67 -3.349 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -351.1** 122.2 418.1 -186.9 -186.9 2144*** -511.9* -511.9* -1754*** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.772 
 
0.833 0.799 
 
0.85 0.775 
 
0.865 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.7: Cycles in total capital outlay undertaken by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 38.44 211.7 -1584*** -20.76 743.4*** -975.9** 1409*** 1409*** -1581** 
Literacy 0.897 22.10*** 58.56*** -4.258 -4.258 37.10*** 4.327 4.327 49.29*** 
Urban -12.25*** -29.43*** -9.285 -22.09*** -22.09*** -49.53*** -6.837 -6.837 40.90* 
SC population -20.27*** -30.39*** 16.2 -13.99*** -13.99*** -143.5** -28.12*** -28.12*** 159 
Population -4.29e-06** -3.61E-06 3.00e-05*** -1.49e-05*** -1.49e-05*** -2.46e-05*** 7.85e-06*** 7.85e-06*** 7.66e-05*** 
Real SDP 0.0214*** 0.0261*** 0.0227*** 0.0291*** 0.0291*** 0.0380*** 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 0.00829** 
Share of agriculture 12.43** 11.32* 3.823 4.379 4.379 3.427 16.36** 16.36** -0.13 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -273.2 -673.3 -3685*** 474.6 474.6 1146 -629.6 -629.6 -6735*** 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.728 
 
0.738 0.845 
 
0.867 0.677 
 
0.637 
       Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.8 Cycles in Own tax revenues collected by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 13.46 -119.1 -1207** 928.2 86.62 -289.2 1894*** -97.21 -2743*** 
Literacy 0.833 9.34 32.40** -7.271 -7.271 -25.83 6.44 6.44 61.07*** 
Urban -13.34** -17.9 50.40*** -31.13*** -31.13*** -15.54 -2.181 -2.181 133.4*** 
SC population -18.35** -30.14 -25.43 -10.58 -10.58 -242.8** -27.74** -27.74** 60.09 
Population -4.70e-05*** -6.88e-05*** -5.62e-05*** -5.91e-05*** -5.91e-05*** -8.69e-05*** -3.20e-05*** -3.20e-05*** -3.34e-05* 
Real SDP 0.0969*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.136*** 0.0869*** 0.0869*** 0.113*** 
Share of agriculture 11.45 -4.46 -18.80* 3.12 3.12 -34.71** 15.63 15.63 -18.87 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -688.2 -65.13 -2353* 222.2 222.2 5197*** -1133 -1133 -6584*** 
Observations 608 608 608 294 294 294 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.924 
 
0.946 0.939 
 
0.968 0.92 
 
0.925 
        Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 7.9: Cycles in Non-tax revenues collected by states by alignment 
 
Nominal Values 
 
All States Aligned States Unaligned States 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Scheduled election 109 -34.47 -683.1** 600.0** 141.8 -341.4 1136*** 33.87 -687.5** 
Literacy -12.11*** 0.424 25.67*** -11.10** -11.10** 14.93 -9.504** -9.504** 32.81*** 
Urban 11.52*** 5.245 26.23*** 13.41*** 13.41*** 37.63** 7.515* 7.515* 20.56* 
SC population 6.813** 19.42** 77.10* 9.936** 9.936** 133.0* -0.401 -0.401 -163.2** 
Population -1.20e-05*** -1.18e-05*** -1.76e-05*** -1.11e-05*** -1.11e-05*** -0.0000126 -1.02e-05*** -1.02e-05*** -2.01e-05*** 
Real SDP 0.0185*** 0.0189*** 0.0196*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 0.0189*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0165*** 
Share of agriculture 12.66*** -13.89*** -22.62*** 11.09* 11.09* -22.47** 15.14*** 15.14*** -18.80*** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -301.8 178.7 -1498** -410.3 -410.3 -2224 -298.3 -298.3 1176 
Observations 609 609 609 295 295 295 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.73 
 
0.711 0.782 
 
0.738 0.71 
 
0.674 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Voter behavior in response to expenditure, taxes and other revenues in national 
elections 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝛾𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Incumbent vote share here refers to the vote share obtained by the national 
coalition or the chief minister‟s party in national elections. Fiscal policy variables 
analyzed here include the various taxes, non-tax revenues and expenditures of the state 
government. 
Since both the central incumbent and state incumbents have a role to play in 
undertaking expenditures; estimations using percent votes received by both the central 
and state incumbents in the elections are carried out.  
Results from estimations using the percent votes obtained by the state incumbents 
are similar to those obtained in the case of sub-national elections. Voters tend to penalize 
most increases in expenditures. While voters seem to be indifferent to revenue 
expenditures on social services; increases in economic and infrastructural expenditures on 
items such as agriculture, industries, rural development and roads are penalized. Increases 
in expenditures on public works and small scale industries however, are rewarded. While 
increases in capital expenditures on health and sanitation are rewarded, expenditure in 
agriculture and small scale industries are penalized.  
Interestingly, while voters penalized state incumbents for increases in taxes in 
sub-national elections, in case of the national elections, voter do not seem to be basing 
their votes on taxes or non-tax revenues. Voters therefore seem cognizant of the division 
of functional responsibility between the levels of government and basing their voting 
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decisions in national elections on items wherein both the center and the state have a role 
to play.  
Evidence of economic voting is more muted in case of estimations using the 
percent votes obtained by the central incumbent. This is not very surprising as the central 
incumbent is directly responsible for a small percent of expenditures undertaken and they 
do not share the same tax base with the sub-national government. Revenue expenditures 
on infrastructure such as housing, irrigation, roads and public works are rewarded by 
voters. This is interesting as the increases in these were either ignored or penalized by 
voters in case of sub-national election or in the exercises outlined in the previous 
paragraph. Since the national government has always been seen as the agent behind 
infrastructural development, voters are reacting to expenditure on these items. It may also 
indicate those voters are more satisfied with performance of the national government in 
this area, than with the performance of the sub-national government. Voters also do not 
base their votes on any taxes, providing further credence to the supposition that voters are 
aware of the different functional responsibility among governments. This result would 
also imply that voters perceive incumbents at different levels of governments are distinct 
entities even though they may be co-partisans. In other words, national elections are a 
referendum on the performance of the national incumbent and not on the performance of 
co-partisans at the sub-national level.  
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Table 8.1: Voter response to Revenue Expenditures on Economic services (State incumbents) 
 Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Urban Development 0.0195 0.0192 -0.00796 0.0239 0.0233 -0.00123 0.178*** 0.175*** 0.0978 
Cooperation 0.0613 0.0609 0.0819* 0.0252 0.0241 0.0344 0.141 0.133 0.121 
Agriculture & allied activities -0.00234 -0.00212 0.000019 0.0026 0.00371 0.00689 -0.0104 -0.00989 -0.0387** 
Sewage & Water 0.0561 0.0546 0.0262 0.0593 0.0553 0.041 0.0886 0.0868 0.0913 
Rural Development -3.14E-03 -0.00318 -0.00522 -7.91E-04 -0.00121 -0.00331 -2.06E-02 -0.0247 -0.0441** 
Industries -0.045 -0.0466 -0.0722 -0.0182 -0.0203 -0.0298 -0.138* -0.142** -0.176** 
Small scale industries -0.0701** -0.0698** -0.0347 -0.0601** -0.0623** -0.0646 0.101** 0.105** 0.111** 
Votes in previous election 0.357*** 0.346*** 0.197*** 0.350*** 0.314*** 0.206*** 0.382*** 0.350*** 0.192*** 
Align -0.331 0.00656 3.451 -0.0205 0.957 3.565 1.04 1.582 4.698* 
Literacy 0.187 0.187 0.0664 0.173 0.174 0.0608 0.126 0.137 -0.046 
Urban -0.360** -0.367** -2.580*** -0.306* -0.329* -2.193*** -0.468*** -0.480*** -1.324** 
Schedule caste population -1.17E-01 -1.23E-01 -4.14E+00 -6.89E-02 -8.43E-02 -2.85E+00 2.19E-01 1.96E-01 -2.68E+00 
Real SDP 1.15E-07 1.27E-07 2.02E-06 -5.16E-07 -5.16E-07 1.14E-06 1.78E-07 1.52E-07 -3.60E-08 
Population -5.86E-08 -6.01E-08 -4.96E-07 -6.36E-08 -6.60E-08 -4.67E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 34.38*** 34.82*** 148.8*** 33.31*** 34.20*** 122.4** 29.46*** 30.93*** 113.3** 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.301  0.255 0.308  0.247 0.375  0.307 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.2: Voter response to Revenue Expenditures on Infrastructure (State incumbents) 
 Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Housing 0.0215 0.0148 -0.0458 0.0248 0.0201 -0.0547 0.0674*** 0.0627*** -0.00884 
Irrigation 0.0046 0.00413 0.00599 0.00552 0.00521 0.00796 -0.0162 -0.0153 0.0228 
Power 0.000666 0.000621 0.000696 0.000805 0.000796 0.000828 0.0103** 0.0101** 0.00213 
Roads & Bridges -0.00219 -5.36E-06 0.00343 -0.00749 -0.00599 -0.000794 -0.0266** -0.0274** -0.0574*** 
Police -4.60E-03 -0.00435 0.00184 -5.68E-03 -0.00574 0.00301 0.0177** 0.0175** -0.00249 
Public works 0.0301 0.0259 -0.00425 0.0221 0.0213 -0.02 0.0317* 0.0362** 0.0852*** 
Votes in previous election 0.350*** 0.313*** 0.186** 0.337*** 0.307*** 0.180** 0.333*** 0.307*** 0.182*** 
Align -1.206 -0.00356 3.676 -1.132 -0.128 3.928 0.76 1.214 3.714 
Literacy 0.185 0.183 -0.0278 0.19 0.189 -0.0172 0.192 0.202 -0.163 
Urban -0.391** -0.411** -2.049*** -0.421** -0.440** -2.130*** -0.408** -0.428** -0.697 
Schedule caste population -0.038 -0.0705 -3.6 -0.0262 -0.0538 -3.889 0.326* 0.315 0.041 
Real SDP -2.62E-07 -1.41E-07 1.13E-06 -1.57E-07 -5.55E-08 1.02E-06 4.25E-07 4.29E-07 2.66E-07 
Population -6.37E-08 -7.54E-08 -5.86E-07 -6.09E-08 -7.15E-08 -5.01E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 35.06*** 36.70*** 139.7*** 35.56*** 36.97*** 142.9*** 24.41*** 25.25*** 60.95 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.274  0.207 0.279  0.209 0.403  0.347 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.3: Voter response to Capital Expenditures on Economic and social services (State incumbents) 
 Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Education -0.0897 -0.0791 -0.0161 -0.0934 -0.0844 -0.0462 -0.0121 -0.0121 0.0239 
Health 0.0139 0.0143 0.0161 0.0144 0.0152 0.0213 0.0658*** 0.0658*** 0.0693*** 
Agriculture & allied activities 0.0219 0.0179 0.00623 0.0212 0.0191 0.00817 -0.0164 -0.0164 -0.0559*** 
Industries 0.00893 0.00981 0.00752 -0.00256 0.000785 0.0182 0.0875 0.0875 0.0911 
Small scale industries -0.305 -0.262 -0.266 -0.173 -0.152 -0.222 -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.281*** 
Votes in previous election 0.350*** 0.299*** 0.187*** 0.353*** 0.307*** 0.189*** 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.263*** 
Align -1.358 0.276 3.415 -1.438 0.0511 3.404 -0.347 -0.347 2.523 
Literacy 0.216 0.211 -0.232 0.2 0.197 -0.271 0.066 0.066 -0.492 
Urban -0.379** -0.405** -2.079*** -0.385** -0.409** -2.001*** -0.158 -0.158 -1.916*** 
Schedule caste population -0.0413 -0.0818 -3.008 -0.0434 -0.0801 -3.481 0.258 0.258 -2.169 
Real SDP -9.96E-08 -6.13E-08 2.56E-07 -1.14E-07 -7.64E-08 2.11E-08 4.34E-07 4.34E-07 6.7E-07 
Population -4.30E-08 -4.97E-08 -1.59E-07 -3.95E-08 -4.90E-08 2.43E-09    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 32.33*** 34.67*** 132.2*** 31.94*** 33.95*** 132.4*** 21.64*** 21.64*** 117.9*** 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.295  0.209 0.296  0.212 0.457  0.334 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.4: Voter response to Capital Expenditures on Infrastructure (State incumbents) 
 Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Water & Sanitation 0.0137 0.0118 0.000015 0.015 0.0126 -0.00567 0.0733*** 0.0733*** 0.0502** 
Housing 0.116 0.112 0.0829 0.0773 0.0758 0.0415 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.0142 
Irrigation 0.000275 -0.00153 -0.0036 0.00116 -0.00087 -0.00369 -0.00327 -0.00327 -0.0254 
Power 0.00155 0.000149 -0.00302 0.00148 -0.0000664 -0.00382 -0.00812 -0.00812 0.00369 
Roads & Bridges -0.00574 0.000202 0.0182 -0.00349 0.00311 0.0265* -1.24E-02 -0.0124 0.0243 
Votes in previous election 0.363*** 0.274*** 0.187*** 0.358*** 0.270*** 0.187*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 0.220*** 
Align -0.77 1.824 4.143 -0.898 1.762 4.293* 0.736 0.736 3.931 
Literacy 0.204 0.193 0.0496 0.217 0.198 0.0392 0.0751 0.0751 -0.0049 
Urban -0.409** -0.456** -2.270*** -0.416** -0.454** -2.311*** -0.211 -0.211 -1.648** 
Schedule caste population -0.171 -0.222 -2.798 -0.154 -0.203 -3.284 0.108 0.108 -2.105 
Real SDP 3.5E-07 4.06E-07 3.28E-07 2.17E-07 2.66E-07 -8.11E-09 5.63e-07* 5.63e-07** 8.85E-07 
Population -8.49E-08 -9.77E-08 -2.54E-07 -8.19E-08 -9.46E-08 -1.68E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 34.42*** 38.68*** 123.4*** 33.54*** 37.84*** 127.5*** 29.50*** 29.50*** 90.79** 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.282  0.236 0.276  0.236 0.434  0.27 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.5: Voter response to Tax and Non-tax revenues (State incumbents) 
 Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Property tax -0.0017 -0.00682 -0.0132 -0.00156 -0.00611 -0.012 -0.0716 -0.0663 -0.0227 
State sales tax -0.00312 -0.00233 -0.00107 -0.00302 -0.00275 -0.000858 -0.0047 -0.00374 0.00362 
Motor Vehicles tax 0.00441 0.0053 0.0107* 0.00371 0.0044 0.00977 0.0136 0.0155 0.0289 
Excise 0.00797 0.00369 -0.00606 0.00499 0.00449 0.00235 0.00494 0.00942 0.0205 
Duty on Electricity 0.0137 0.0173* 0.0274** 0.0122 0.015 0.0249* 5.24E-02 0.0626* 0.113* 
Other taxes -0.00716 -0.00819 -0.00931* -0.00622 -0.007 -0.00725 -0.064 -0.0684 -0.0966* 
Revenue from social services 0.0164 0.0179 0.0388 0.0126 0.0136 0.0246 0.0147 0.017 0.025 
Revenue from economic services -0.00428 -0.00479 -0.00453 -0.00238 -0.00285 -0.00199 0.0109 0.00944 0.00288 
Votes in previous election 0.340*** 0.252*** 0.182** 0.341*** 0.261*** 0.176** 0.326*** 0.260*** 0.173** 
Align -0.716 2.124 4.398* -0.441 2.166 4.591* -0.592 1.445 4.155 
Literacy 0.226 0.218 -0.223 0.241 0.247 -0.0903 0.356** 0.350** 0.0603 
Urban -0.476*** -0.550*** -2.401*** -0.478*** -0.538** -2.239*** -0.392** -0.482** -2.496*** 
Schedule caste population -1.81E-01 -2.39E-01 -3.77E+00 -1.85E-01 -2.36E-01 -3.27E+00 -5.92E-03 -1.21E-01 -2.63E+00 
Real SDP 6.87E-07 9.98E-07 1.22E-06 7.62E-07 1.02E-06 9.39E-07 5.12E-07 4.75E-07 2.77E-07 
Population -9.45E-08 -1.12E-07 -4.97E-07 -8.99E-08 -9.63E-08 -4.23E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 34.72*** 39.30*** 155.4*** 32.09*** 35.46*** 136.5*** 23.11** 27.45*** 115.6** 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.289  0.266 0.292  0.256 0.295  0.251 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.6: Voter response to Revenue Expenditures on Infrastructure (Central incumbents) 
 Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Housing -0.00514 -0.00514 0.0238 -0.0075 -0.0075 0.0085 0.000608 0.000608 0.0502* 
Irrigation 0.00584 0.00584 0.00358 0.00488 0.00488 0.00507 0.0133 0.0133 0.0472* 
Power -0.0000153 -0.0000153 -0.00137 0.000365 0.000365 -0.00101 0.00287 0.00287 0.00569 
Roads & Bridges -0.0132 -0.0132 -0.0037 -0.0178* -0.0178* -0.0119 0.013 0.013 0.0263* 
Police 0.00226 0.00226 0.00521 -0.009 -0.009 -0.00711 -0.00588 -0.00588 -0.0618*** 
Public works -0.0337 -0.0337 -0.0446 -0.0225 -0.0225 -0.0339 0.0338** 0.0338** 0.0418* 
Votes in previous election 0.605*** 0.605*** 0.577*** 0.606*** 0.606*** 0.581*** 0.622*** 0.622*** 0.549*** 
Align -0.123 -0.123 0.486 0.133 0.133 0.456 -0.447 -0.447 -0.714 
Literacy 0.0946 0.0946 0.839* 0.0795 0.0795 0.824* 0.143 0.143 0.912** 
Urban -0.00953 -0.00953 0.685 -0.00974 -0.00974 0.571 -0.0488 -0.0488 1.013 
Schedule caste population -0.159 -0.159 -1.74 -0.167 -0.167 -1.743 -0.00839 -0.00839 0.0408 
Real SDP 4.04E-07 4.04E-07 -6.61E-07 8.39E-07 8.39E-07 -5.11E-08 1.34E-07 1.34E-07 -1.08E-07 
Population -5.46E-08 -5.46E-08 5.00E-07 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 5.35E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 23.29*** 23.29*** -18.91 24.67*** 24.67*** -15.11 16.37** 16.37** -33.27 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.653  0.662 0.66  0.664 0.669  0.713 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.7: Voter response to Capital Expenditures on Economic and social services (Central incumbents) 
 Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Education 0.0151 0.0151 -0.0339 -0.0282 -0.0282 -0.0936 0.0083 0.0083 -0.00281 
Health 0.00676 0.00676 0.00395 0.00416 0.00416 -0.000591 -0.00685 -0.00685 -0.0391** 
Agriculture & allied activities 0.00863 0.00863 0.0123 0.00113 0.00113 0.00813 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.00813 
Industries 0.0191 0.0191 0.0285 0.000244 0.000244 0.0282 -0.0305 -0.0305 -0.057 
Small scale industries -0.145 -0.145 -0.0748 -0.0795 -0.0795 -0.00812 0.0846 0.0846 0.169 
Votes in previous election 0.612*** 0.612*** 0.588*** 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.585*** 0.613*** 0.613*** 0.589*** 
Align -0.469 -0.469 0.112 -0.365 -0.365 0.37 -0.26 -0.26 1.248 
Literacy 0.0804 0.0804 0.811* 0.0806 0.0806 0.808* 0.136 0.136 1.108** 
Urban 0.0178 0.0178 0.66 0.0118 0.0118 0.784 -0.0151 -0.0151 0.382 
Schedule caste population -0.152 -0.152 -1.686 -0.158 -0.158 -2.023 -0.222 -0.222 -1.856 
Real SDP -1.26E-08 -1.26E-08 -5.11E-07 1.02E-07 1.02E-07 -4.59E-07 -1.03E-07 -1.03E-07 2.2E-07 
Population -3.83E-08 -3.83E-08 4.34E-07 -2.56E-08 -2.56E-08 5.77E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 22.94*** 22.94*** -17.13 22.81*** 22.81*** -20.67 22.65*** 22.65*** -7.426 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.648  0.659 0.646  0.662 0.649  0.679 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.8: Voter response to Capital Expenditures on Infrastructure (State incumbents) 
Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Water & Sanitation 0.0172 0.0172 0.0155 0.0128 0.0128 0.00994 -0.0231* -0.0231** -0.0576*** 
Housing -0.124** -0.124** -0.101 -0.128** -0.128** -0.107 -0.0357 -0.0357 -0.0811* 
Irrigation 0.00135 0.00135 0.0016 0.000038 0.000038 0.00102 0.000731 0.000731 -0.00064 
Power 0.000231 0.000231 -0.00188 0.0000186 0.0000186 -0.00254 0.00336 0.00336 -0.0000348 
Roads & Bridges 0.00015 0.00015 -0.00169 0.00103 0.00103 0.00179 0.00981 0.00981 0.0158 
Votes in previous election 0.606*** 0.606*** 0.586*** 0.613*** 0.613*** 0.590*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.620*** 
Align -0.293 -0.293 0.222 -0.00235 -0.00235 0.518 -0.409 -0.409 0.937 
Literacy 0.0925 0.0925 0.742 0.0792 0.0792 0.796* 0.162 0.162 0.990** 
Urban 0.00298 0.00298 0.592 0.0107 0.0107 0.517 -0.0183 -0.0183 -0.101 
Schedule caste population -0.119 -0.119 -2.004 -0.119 -0.119 -2.078 -0.168 -0.168 -2.403 
Real SDP 6.47E-08 6.47E-08 -4.43E-07 2.38E-07 2.38E-07 -4.17E-07 -1.98E-07 -1.98E-07 -2.96E-07 
Population -3.46E-08 -3.46E-08 0.00000045 -4.38E-08 -4.38E-08 3.91E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 22.92*** 22.92*** -8.446 24.02*** 24.02*** -6.166 18.97*** 18.97*** 11.4 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.657  0.664 0.658  0.664 0.658  0.683 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8.9: Voter response to Tax and Non-tax revenues (Central incumbents) 
  Nominal Values Real Values Per Capita Values 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Property tax 0.00651 0.00651 0.00266 0.00363 0.00363 0.00441 -0.00145 -0.00145 -0.00187 
State sales tax -0.00154 -0.00154 0.00112 -0.00043 -0.00043 0.00176 -0.00438 -0.00438 0.0116 
Motor Vehicles tax -0.000823 -0.000823 -0.00419 0.000223 0.000223 -0.00259 0.0116 0.0116 0.0148 
Excise 0.0102 0.0102 0.0123 0.00115 0.00115 0.0035 -0.00517 -0.00517 -0.0109 
Duty on Electricity 0.00372 0.00372 0.00921 0.00267 0.00267 0.0145 0.0193 0.0193 0.108* 
Other taxes -0.00134 -0.00134 0.000658 -0.00161 -0.00161 0.000791 -0.0297 -0.0297 -0.0178 
Revenue from social services 0.037 0.037 0.0169 0.00562 0.00562 -0.000692 0.0393 0.0393 -0.0129 
Revenue from economic services 0.00103 0.00103 0.00388 -0.000632 -0.000632 -0.000321 0.00159 0.00159 0.00379 
Votes in previous election 0.605*** 0.605*** 0.581*** 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.590*** 0.619*** 0.619*** 0.585*** 
Align -0.104 -0.104 0.894 -0.0893 -0.0893 0.712 -0.294 -0.294 0.595 
Literacy 0.115 0.115 0.902* 0.0701 0.0701 1.003** 0.127 0.127 1.076** 
Urban -0.0151 -0.0151 0.533 -0.00233 -0.00233 0.515 -0.0423 -0.0423 -0.318 
Schedule caste population -1.75E-01 -1.75E-01 -1.49E+00 -1.77E-01 -1.77E-01 -2.14E+00 -2.07E-01 -2.07E-01 -8.38E-01 
Real SDP -8.95E-07 -8.95E-07 -2.23E-06 -1.64E-07 -1.64E-07 -1.34E-06 1.24E-07 1.24E-07 2.55E-07 
Population -7.44E-09 -7.44E-09 6.45e-07* -3.64E-08 -3.64E-08 4.93E-07    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 22.67*** 22.67*** -23.29 23.29*** 23.29*** -18.18 20.34*** 20.34*** -7.94 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
R-squared 0.655  0.671 0.645  0.666 0.65  0.675 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Voter responses to economic growth and inflation in national and sub-national 
elections  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝛾𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑍𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
This section analyses voter responses to economic outcomes in terms of GDP 
growth, SDP growth and inflation. This also aids in quantifying a popular notion in India 
that economic growth and inflation have had a sizeable impact on election outcomes. We 
also examine the effects of political clarity of responsibility by examining the effect of 
these economic outcomes on not only the PM‟s party, but also on the major parties of the 
coalition and all parties (including those providing „outside‟ support). We expect stronger 
responses when we examine the PM‟s party alone than in other cases as a greater number 
of coalition members makes it difficult for voters to attribute responsibility. 
Though conclusions from empirical studies are equivocal; in the case of India, 
preliminary results indicate that economic performance measured by economic growth 
and inflation influence voter responses. At the national level, voters tend to reward 
incumbents for consistent increases in income over their term in office while election 
year increases are penalized.
58
 This may imply that the Indian voters have long memories 
and utilize a large set on information on growth to base their decision. Incumbents are 
also penalized for increases in inflation prior to elections.
59
  These results are consistent 
across the types of electoral outcomes used. Interestingly; the PM‟s party seems to bear 
                                                          
58
 This finding is consistent with many other US and cross county studies. Brender and Drazen (2006) 
conclude that economic growth is rewarded by voters in developing countries while Wilkin et al. (1997) 
concludes that economic growth positively affects incumbent‟s vote share. Chappell (1990) finds that in the 
US presidential and House elections, voters reward economic growth while they disapprove of inflation. 
59 This is consistent with Chapel and Veiga (2000) findings that higher inflation adversely affects 
incumbents.  
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the brunt of voter‟s decisions. Economic voting effects seem to diminish as we move 
from examining the PM‟s party to including all members of the ruling coalition. When 
we use percent votes obtained by all coalition members as our dependent variable; we 
find that average growth over the incumbent‟s term is not a significant factor in their 
electoral fortunes. This implies that economic voting effects may be weaker when there is 
a lower clarity of responsibility in form of a large coalition and electoral fortunes of 
junior coalition members may not be affected as much as larger partners. We also find 
that income growth in the period prior to the elections affect incumbent vote share 
adversely; we are unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon. It 
may be the case that the electorate view previous period growth as a proxy for changes in 
economic policies of the government.
60
 However examining the effects of both these 
growth variables, we conclude that Indian voters do tend to reward good economic 
performances. 
While examining the effect of economic conditions on incumbent vote share 
reflects the decisions of the electorate; examining their effects on seats won by 
incumbents would enable us to conclude whether such effects on votes translated into 
changes in the constituent assemblies. We find similar results using seats and percent 
seats won as independent variables.  
                                                          
60 This argument is advanced in the light of the results obtained in previous sections. Voters seem to 
penalize increases in certain expenditures. If these expenditures lead to temporary growth in incomes, the 
voters may perceive this as a pre-election ploy which may not continue in later years and therefore react 
negatively to such income growth.  
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Table 9.1: Effect of economic conditions on percent votes obtained in National elections by incumbents 
  Percent Votes obtained by PM's Party 
Percent votes obtained by Main 
Coalition members 
Percent votes obtained by All Coalition 
members 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Real GDP Growth -6.213*** -6.213*** -12.22*** -5.303*** -5.303*** -12.29*** -3.858*** -3.930*** -9.678*** 
Growth over term 10.87*** 10.87*** 24.01*** 7.507*** 7.507*** 21.82*** -16.89*** -16.76*** -4.509 
Inflation -2.963*** -2.963*** -4.181*** -2.682*** -2.682*** -3.958*** -0.339 -0.364 -1.351* 
Real SDP Growth -0.142 -0.142 -0.0697 -0.0954 -0.0954 -0.0791 0.0528 0.0546 0.11 
Performance in past election 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.450*** 0.634*** 0.634*** 0.586*** 0.564*** 0.555*** 0.513*** 
Literacy 0.0812 0.0812 0.766* 0.106 0.106 0.989** 0.00799 0.0123 0.708** 
Urban -0.000519 -0.000519 0.779* 0.00348 0.00348 0.847** 0.0733 0.0856 1.019*** 
Schedule Cast Population -0.198* -0.198* -2.668 -0.191 -0.191* -1.147 -0.239* -0.23 -1.706 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 17.67 17.67 -29.17 25.06 25.06 -53.94 129.8*** 129.4*** 65.72 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.727 
 
0.742 0.636 
 
0.645 0.468 
 
0.482 
 Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 9.2: Effect of economic conditions on seats won in National elections by incumbents 
  Seats won by PM's Party 
Seats won  by Main Coalition 
members Seats won by All Coalition members 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Real GDP Growth -2.683*** -2.683*** -7.616*** -2.563*** -2.563*** -7.693*** -1.978** -1.978** -6.149*** 
Growth over term 3.202*** 3.202*** 14.17*** 2.756* 2.756* 13.53*** 1.985 1.985 10.32** 
Inflation -1.218*** -1.218*** -2.123*** -1.163*** -1.163*** -2.156*** -0.617 -0.617 -1.362*** 
Real SDP Growth 0.0511 0.0511 0.104 0.065 0.065 0.111 0.0707 0.0707 0.145 
Performance in past election 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.310*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.286** 0.563*** 0.563*** 0.336** 
Literacy -0.0489 -0.0489 0.664*** -0.0593 -0.0593 0.655*** -0.0681 -0.0681 0.493* 
Urban 0.072 0.072 0.164 0.126* 0.126* 0.397 0.138* 0.138* 0.449* 
Schedule Cast Population 0.0643 0.0643 -2.418 0.116** 0.116** -1.719 0.0884 0.0884 -1.633 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.76* 13.76* -16.94 13.92 13.92 -25.7 10.16 10.16 -17.85 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.53 
 
0.387 0.505 
 
0.324 0.523 
 
0.244 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 9.3: Effect of economic conditions on percent seats won in National elections by incumbents 
  Percent Seats won by PM's Party 
Percent Seats won  by Main 
Coalition members 
Percent Seats won by All Coalition 
members 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Real GDP Growth -14.16*** -14.16*** -42.09*** -15.99*** -15.99*** -38.52*** -15.23*** -15.23*** -36.47*** 
Growth over term 11.5 11.5 71.23*** 8.199 8.199 55.23*** 2.747 2.747 45.34*** 
Inflation -7.673*** -7.673*** -13.18*** -6.933*** -6.933*** -11.04*** -6.467*** -6.467*** -10.46*** 
Real SDP Growth -0.207 -0.207 -0.0633 -0.0807 -0.0807 -0.0121 0.0185 0.0185 0.126 
Performance in past election 0.214** 0.214** 0.0473 0.302*** 0.302*** 0.229* 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.139 
Literacy -0.0619 -0.0619 3.763*** 0.298 0.298 3.478*** 0.123 0.123 3.038*** 
Urban 0.194 0.194 1.08 -0.102 -0.102 0.606 0.0635 0.0635 0.706 
Schedule Cast Population -0.0667 -0.0667 0.462 -0.081 -0.081 -0.416 -0.2 -0.2 -0.372 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 122.3*** 122.3*** -211.3* 124.9*** 124.9*** -139.7 153.5*** 153.5*** -80.37 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.33 
 
0.384 0.344 
 
0.379 0.321 
 
0.357 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Interestingly, voters do not seem to base their votes in sub-national elections on 
growth in real state domestic product. Rodden and Ebid (2006) argue that at the sub-
national level voters care more about relative income growth i.e., how their state has 
fared compared to the entire nation. To test this proposition, a variable measuring the 
difference between the state‟s growth and national growth has been included. Relative 
growth too seems to have no part to play in voter responses in sub-national elections. 
They also argue that economic geography of a state matters, for example if a state‟s 
domestic product is heavily dependent on primary products; SDP will be affected mainly 
by factors other than state‟s economic policies. In India this is especially true is case of 
agriculture as its output is heavily dependent on nature and not necessarily on a state‟s 
policy. To account for this, another variable is constructed as the product of relative 
growth and primary product index (share of primary sector in SDP). Results indicate 
however that this hypothesis too is not accepted.
61
   
Given the results in the previous sections it seems that voters in India hold the 
national government responsible for the performance of the economy and inflation while 
they evaluate state governments on the basis of expenditures undertaken and taxes 
collected. This would attribute a high level of sophistication to the Indian electorate as 
this closely corresponds to the functional division of responsibilities in the Indian 
constitution. 
 
                                                          
61
Many other papers have found similar results; i.e., strong evidence of voter responses to income and 
inflation in national elections and none in sub-national elections.  
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Table 9.4: Effect of economic conditions on electoral outcomes of incumbents in Sub-national elections 
  Percent votes obtained by Incumbent Seats obtained by Incumbent Percent seats won by Incumbent 
VARIABLES POLS RE FE POLS RE FE POLS RE FE 
Real SDP Growth 14.5 14.5 16.2 -2.306 -2.306 -2.504 1.669 1.669 2.495* 
Growth over term 0.974 0.974 -1.699 -1.818 -1.818 -0.889 -0.878 -0.878 -0.678 
Relative Growth -8.101 -8.101 -3.369 2.527 2.527 2.963 -1.259 -1.259 -2.186 
Relative Growth (interacted with 
state's economic geography) -18.69 -18.69 -38.71 -1.243 -1.243 -2.447 0.208 0.208 0.635 
Performance in previous election -0.0258 -0.0258 -0.177*** 0.339*** 0.339** 0.00668 0.196* 0.196 -0.00794 
Literacy 1.192 1.192 -1.668 -0.911 -0.911 -0.409 -0.29 -0.29 -0.188 
Urban 0.721 0.721 0.35 0.517 0.517 1.328 0.406 0.406 1.262 
Scheduled caste population 4.845** 4.845 11.14 0.369 0.369 -4.299 -0.302 -0.302 -9.788 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -154.3 -154.3 -91.99 91.66*** 91.66** 136.6 32.18** 32.18** 128.8 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.076 
 
0.117 
  
0.165 
  
0.124 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
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Summary 
The results obtained, while consistent with the findings in existing literature also 
extend the same by providing insights on phenomena which are rarely studied in depth in 
developing countries and new democracies.  
We find that political cycles exist incase of almost all fiscal policy instruments 
available to Indian government at various levels. Though such manipulations are 
economically inefficient; these manipulations are strategic politically. The incumbents 
tend to manipulate those items of fiscal policy whose responsibility lies solely in their 
domain, thereby internalizing all the gain (or loss) they can obtain from these 
manipulations. Therefore we find that taxes and non-tax revenues of state governments 
are lower prior to sub-national elections while at the time of national elections; aligned 
states increase some expenditures (a responsibility which they share with their co-
partisan at the center) and unaligned states reduce taxes and non-tax revenues (items for 
which they alone are responsible). Similarly, there is no evidence of any cycles in 
intergovernmental transfers or loans at the time of sub-national elections indicating 
perhaps that inefficiencies from such manipulations out weigh the political gains that can 
be obtained by the central incumbent whose distributes these transfers. The central 
incumbent increases grants to unaligned states prior to elections probably hoping to 
influence expenditures; an item both tiers of the government can claim responsibility for. 
The central incumbent also increases transfers to unaligned states for those projects 
which are jointly undertaken by both thereby solidifying the link between the good and 
the provider in the voters‟ eyes.  
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Indian voters seem to be fiscal conservatives, as they penalize increases in most 
items of expenditures and generally reward reductions in taxes. Such a finding is 
attributed to the perceived differences in in-kind versus in cash transfers and the notion 
that voters may find government expenditures wasteful or voters being unsatisfied with 
the quality of government services and goods. Evidence of yardstick effects in taxes is 
also presented. As we hypothesized, when there is a higher degree of clarity of 
responsibility, economic voting effects are stronger. We find that while responses to taxes 
while are the sole responsibility of the state is stronger than what we find in case of 
expenditures, a responsibility the states share with the center. While economic voting 
effects are almost non-existent in case of grants provided by the central incumbent as 
these are not directly „visible‟ to the voters; they do seem to reward central government 
incumbents in sub-national and national elections for increases in grants for central plan 
and centrally sponsored schemes, which can be easily attributed to them. Economic 
voting effects with respect to growth and inflation are stronger when only the PM‟s party 
is considered. Peripheral coalition partners are considered to be less responsible for 
economic outcomes. Voters seem to be cognizant of the division of functional 
responsibility between the two levels of government and they evaluate their performance 
independently. We come to this conclusion since our results indicate that voters do not 
base their decisions of voting for or against the national incumbent on changes in sub-
national taxes and respond to only those sub-national expenditures for which a more 
direct link can be established with the central incumbent, while voting in national 
elections. Also, we find results consistent with the notion that the central government is 
responsible for the overall health of the economy as voters seem to penalize the central 
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incumbent for increases in inflation and reward them for steady growth while being 
indifferent to such outcome variables while voting for the state level incumbent. We also 
find that when political clarity of responsibility is less clear (as in case of coalitions), 
economic voting effects are more muted. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This dissertation has established that economic voting and political cycles are 
entrenched in the Indian political landscape. This study has provided insight into 
economic voting behavior of Indian voters, a phenomenon many agree needs to be 
examined, and by doing so; it extends a well established developed country literature to 
developing countries and newer democracies. Indian voters seem to be fiscal 
conservatives; they dislike both increases in expenditures as well as taxes. Indian 
politicians on the other hand do seem to be working „efficiently‟ in a political sense by 
manipulating fiscal policies in a manner that would help them internalize the 
ramifications of doing so. We also find that economic voting effects are stronger when 
there is a greater clarity of responsibility. A higher degree of clarity enhances the ability 
of the voter to effectively evaluate the incumbent. When many agents are in charge of 
any economic policy, the voter is unable to assign responsibility and hence may not 
effectively punish any detrimental actions by agents. 
These results beg the question of whether such manipulations of polices and 
economic voting effects have led successive Indian governments to follow untenable 
economic policies. We have seen that intergovernmental grants have been distributed to 
states on the basis of co-partisanship, i.e., the central and the state incumbent are of the 
same party. In absence of any economic reasoning to validate such manipulations, we 
may expect a different trajectory of development for these states; different than if they 
did not have to deal with election-grant cycle. The states may also face significant 
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economic losses if higher grants at time of elections lead to the establishment of new 
programs which are abandoned due to a lack of funds in the future.  That is, grants given 
for political reasons (not well thought-out development) may not be sustainable and 
thereby waste scarce resources.  A particularly troubling phenomenon is the increasing 
use of centrally sponsored schemes and central government programs, such programs run 
by the central government generally preempt the state‟s decision making authority. If we 
assume that the lower level of governments are more aware of the specific needs of their 
constituents, such concentration of responsibilities in the hand of the top tier of 
government may lead to dissatisfaction among the voters. We have seen that 
governments have a tendency to increase expenditures prior to elections, if most of these 
increases translate to mere transfer payments such as debt forgiveness, increasing support 
prices of crops and  food subsidies; in the long run they do not contribute towards the 
development of the economy. Also, increasing expenditures and reducing taxes may set 
the states on an unsustainable deficit path and led them to be overly dependent on the 
central government.  
Indian voters are fiscal conservatives who reward lower taxes and expenditures. 
However such actions taken by the incumbents may be inequitable given that they may 
affect some sections of voters more that others. Given the structure of the Indian 
economy where there are parallel private and state run enterprises that provide goods and 
services to people, reducing taxes and expenditures would affect the already vulnerable 
section of the society which relies heavily on government services.   
By showing that economic voting effects are present in India; we have established 
that they are aware of the government‟s responsibilities and their performance is 
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consistently evaluated. Vigilant voters are perhaps the best defense against political 
interferences which cause economic in efficiencies in the economy. Since we also found 
that these effects are stronger when there is grater clarity of responsibility; it behooves 
reformers to push for better delineations in responsibility and power of various levels of 
the government.  
Indian states have embarked on a journey of decentralization to lower levels of 
government. It would be interesting to see, given the results we find regarding economic 
voting and arguments regarding clarity of responsibility, the size of such local 
governments and the effects of increasing agents who are now responsible for outcomes 
and policies. Since Indian states are at different stages on this journey state specific 
analysis may prove really fruitful. 
While the presence of economic voting has been catalogued for many developed 
countries, there was a lack of similar studies in case of developing nations. Here we have 
thus established that economic voting is not just a phenomenon in western democracies, 
but voters are sophisticated in developing countries too.  
Many have argued that voters in India base their votes on caste and regional 
associations, though this may also be the case; we find that economic factors play an 
important role. This finding is heartening as this would imply that voters; immaterial of 
their affiliations do evaluate a government‟s performance objectively. 
While the most general recommendation in the face of evidence of political 
influence in the grants system is to clamor for independent grant distribution agencies; 
such agencies are by their very nature hard to construct. This dissertation on the other 
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hand argues that we need to take such interferences as a given; examine the nature of 
such influences and then formulate specific guidelines and practices to combat 
inefficiencies. This is of at most importance as we find such evidence in almost all 
countries but the nature of these differs significantly across them. So a general one-size-
fits-all recommendation is somewhat futile.  
This dissertation can also be considered as evidence for those newer models in tax 
setting, redistribution and provision of public goods which now include rational political 
agents. Given the realities of today‟s worlds we believe that these models should form the 
backbone of any reform project and not the traditional models which typically ignore 
politics.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics 
    Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue Expenditures 
Plan Revenue Expenditure 1243.613 1890.394 0 15766.03 
Non-Plan   6125.355 8973.328 0 55399.71 
Total   7270.792 10568.68 0 67550.73 
Plan Developmental Expenditure 1191.315 1730.807 0 14664.58 
Non-Plan   3097.062 4369.222 0 30579.75 
Total   4243.504 5936.334 0 40950.06 
Plan Social Services Expenditures 649.9067 1110.654 0 10642.75 
Non-Plan   1931.202 2744.941 0 19954.93 
Total   2551.669 3704.652 0 27408.8 
Plan Education 165.9524 295.585 0 3141.23 
Non-Plan   1231.832 1784.641 0 13159.93 
Total   1378.904 1972.992 0 13885.49 
Plan Health 182.7033 258.9179 0 1827.91 
Non-Plan   332.322 441.7537 0 2823.65 
Total   507.7779 659.9157 0 4602.13 
Plan Water supply & Sanitation 70.62527 128.124 -2.25 1022.81 
Non-Plan   65.2816 133.8046 -1.98 1060.16 
Total   133.172 204.5032 -0.09 1700.84 
Plan Housing 21.96198 77.03107 0 1093.75 
Non-Plan   15.5412 32.76178 0 275.04 
Total   37.31706 94.34834 0 1111.09 
Plan Labor and Employment 10.05323 37.02618 -0.43 617.34 
Non-Plan   24.63157 41.90631 -481.82 290.52 
Total   34.38761 53.89085 -1.36 520.42 
Plan Welfare 161.7206 343.4201 0 3483.8 
Non-Plan   156.3563 264.1897 0 2556.92 
Total   316.871 576.2744 0 6040.71 
Plan Calamity Relief 4.600365 29.96806 -0.1 395.69 
Non-Plan   93.92778 206.1507 -22.06 2503.89 
Total   96.08648 207.9872 -22.06 2503.89 
Plan Cooperation 8.950502 28.3372 0 544.62 
Non-Plan   32.27123 97.85822 0 1396.83 
Total   40.93883 119.6186 0 1941.46 
Plan Agriculture and allied activities 144.5678 169.3423 0 1778.49 
Non-Plan   284.4239 413.8243 0 3064.16 
Total   425.6165 554.4636 0 4667.46 
Plan Agriculture 64.95154 88.0107 0 743.16 
Non-Plan   91.61327 148.5495 0 1372.7 
Total   155.3255 216.9545 0 1594.85 
Plan Sewage and Water conservation 17.23037 34.27552 0 297.44 
Non-Plan   7.942055 10.74447 0 90.81 
Total   24.98306 42.19802 0 368.7 
Plan Rural Development 200.0935 273.6452 0 1970.2 
Non-Plan   110.9856 235.4859 0 1898.03 
Total   310.1827 461.7443 0 3033.3 
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Plan Industries and Minerals 42.07645 61.95079 0 486.5 
Non-Plan   31.12546 57.29073 -0.98 1012.04 
Total   72.6321 102.9423 0 1049.33 
Plan Industries  15.51787 38.99468 -0.09 428.31 
Non-Plan   12.68024 44.00609 0 978.78 
Total   28.06093 63.79729 0 988.72 
Plan Small Scale Industries 25.09753 36.42645 0 282.11 
Non-Plan   17.30301 27.02858 -1.22 235.74 
Total   42.14177 58.8634 0 517.86 
Plan Irrigation 42.29671 98.83315 -2.41 1758.35 
Non-Plan   229.8559 411.4756 -3.45 3726.06 
Total   268.5693 481.3448 -0.75 5484.41 
Plan Power 37.03184 162.5422 -0.01 1917.4 
Non-Plan   267.0251 773.8078 -0.04 13401.72 
Total   301.4572 810.6227 0 13552.94 
Plan Transport and Communication 21.98075 60.10722 -22.84 581.58 
Non-Plan   171.595 234.3776 -0.69 2096.05 
Total   191.2017 263.5478 0 2296.23 
Plan Roads and Bridges 19.79338 55.90935 -22.84 581.58 
Non-Plan   131.2552 196.8828 -0.69 2093.82 
Total   149.4674 222.9387 0 2233.88 
Plan Police 6.154368 45.41141 0 838.28 
Non-Plan   356.0593 481.0516 0 3201.35 
Total   355.7165 485.2282 0 3237.79 
Plan Public works 2.036621 12.99404 -94.04 237.7 
Non-Plan   56.99781 83.70087 -24.48 623.34 
Total   57.76973 83.62225 -24.36 627.15 
Plan Pension 5.966073 86.51181 -1.05 1685.28 
Non-Plan   586.9295 982.045 0 6718.22 
Total   581.3413 981.5869 0 6718.22 
Plan Economic Services 542.1655 686.2863 0 5133.03 
Non-Plan   1167.552 1755.966 0 17354.46 
Total   1695.84 2337.607 0 18878.24 
Capital Expenditures 
  Total capital outlay 1027.686 1933.02 -238.79 18995.44 
  Developmental Capital outlay 992.1879 1875.562 -271.28 18317.64 
  Social services 175.916 350.3659 0 3200 
  Education 19.18699 43.31604 0 652.48 
  Health 97.40802 213.2613 0 2353.87 
  Family Welfare 22.09866 80.96034 0 1481.67 
  Water supply & Sanitation 72.49665 181.565 -0.6 2254.99 
  Housing 15.24438 28.69446 -14.83 321.67 
  Economic Services 816.2718 1633.161 -300.07 15925.43 
  Cooperation 13.69933 76.81564 -19.61 1378.12 
  Agriculture and allied activities 45.14192 150.0019 -542.3 1598.76 
  Industries and Minerals 22.66035 49.71104 -30.31 861.71 
  Small Scale Industries 3.275282 6.195655 -11.01 62.16 
  Irrigation 369.2449 932.2582 0 11227.05 
  Power 119.159 461.4064 -907.36 6665.53 
  Transport and Communication 187.7295 406.9619 0 4854.38 
  Roads and Bridges 172.855 395.0149 0 4792.97 
Tax and Non-tax Revenues 
  Total tax revenues 4746.757 7694.528 0 57882.46 
  Own tax revenues 3268.258 5672.261 0 46611.91 
  Property tax 384.6714 828.7015 0 8695 
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  Commercial services and goods tax 2835.216 4784.457 0 36462.91 
  Sales tax 1965.637 3461.633 0 26612 
  State sales tax 1548.831 2806.709 0 21720.99 
  Central sales tax 246.5734 433.7729 0 2547.66 
  Motor vehicle tax 330.3496 629.6383 0 4668.59 
  Excise 274.7915 519.7867 0 4634.44 
  Electric duty 120.1961 289.8657 0 2318 
  Other taxes 33.99759 136.3643 -1.02 2966.81 
  Own non-tax revenues 881.109 1229.842 0 7518.23 
  Social services revenue 71.51679 172.0462 0 2757.82 
  Economic Services revenue 359.6054 514.091 0 4158.08 
Grants and Loans 
  Grants from Center 1054.107 1352.103 0 11907.76 
  State plan grants 464.982 609.4514 0 4337.02 
  Calamity Relief grants 1.159366 12.59761 0 242.88 
  Central plan grants 47.71772 101.893 0 1544.36 
  Centrally sponsored schemes 249.5349 376.6181 0 4509.32 
  Non-plan grants 285.9181 474.4595 0 3636.81 
  Non-plan grants (State) 146.5229 320.6493 0 3256.39 
  Non-plan grants (Calamity relief) 31.541 98.96529 0 1850.83 
  Non-plan grants (Other) 107.8159 292.2416 0 3054.05 
  Loans from center 628.395 806.1879 -80.28 5687.07 
  State plan loans 395.6714 590.7514 -236.01 4086.9 
  Calamity Relief loans 1.500685 13.6881 -62.69 208.03 
  Central plan loans 3.27793 25.6882 -2.8 625.72 
  Centrally sponsored schemes 7.384825 24.11971 0 440.67 
  Non-plan loans 184.2052 395.6139 -462.37 3933.76 
  Non-plan loans (Other) 19.35991 66.64165 -462.37 701.72 
Controls 
  Literacy 59.64152 15.66824 20.8 94.539 
  Urbanization 24.56591 10.90479 6.6 56.98 
  Schedule class population 12.16988 8.428323 0 29.249 
  Population 3.56E+07 3.70E+07 311800 1.88E+08 
  State domestic product (SDP) 44800.23 71833.13 52.07 576553.9 
  SDP - Agriculture 10383.6 14224.24 15.16 97149.91 
  Primary sector 12153.32 16516.22 20.63 106048.6 
  Share of agriculture in SDP 28.28709 9.590443 5.824582 52.9735 
  Share of Primary sector in SDP 33.6683 10.01005 12.30847 55.29387 
  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1296541 1191719 132520 4303654 
  Inflation 7.842815 3.153292 3.767 13.87 
Election data 
National elections Votes received by incumbent in current election 29.82012 19.6039 0 67.58 
  Votes received by incumbent in previous election 32.29958 20.68097 0 82.83 
Sub-national election Votes received by incumbent in current election 33.75993 13.01951 0 71.09 
  Votes received by incumbent in previous election 37.40079 9.975627 0.21 70.41 
  Alignment 0.486607 0.500193 0 1 
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